Persian Gulf primed to
explode By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
"US navy fires on Emirate boat out of fear
of Iran" - headline in Kayhan Newspaper, Tehran.
The Persian Gulf powder keg may soon
explode if the current cycle of mounting tensions
continues unabated. Two days ago, a minor incident
involving a US refueling warship and an Indian
fishing boat off the coast of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) resulted in one fatality and three
wounded. That the fishermen insist they were fired
on without a warning - contrary to the US navy's
assertion - gives us a prelude to more ominous
developments on the horizon. It seems
trigger-happy American sailors see gathering
clouds of conflict and are taking preemptive
measures that, in this particular case, made a
small dent in otherwise amicable US-India
relations.
In a sign of New Delhi's
unwillingness to call for an inquiry into the
incident, however, it
has not voiced even a whisper of criticism of the
US. Initially, US media reported that the incident
was a US warning to "Iran and al-Qaeda" to stay
away from US warships, in light of Iran's renewed
threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. This
reflects a US siege mentality that also
underscores the Persian Gulf region's growing
volatility and potential for imminent maritime
tensions.
This spike in tensions is also
partly due to the US navy's bulked up presence in
the region. The Pentagon on July 16 deployed an
extra aircraft carrier there months ahead of
schedule. It is also organizing unprecedented
mine-sweeping exercise in the area - this month it
deployed four additional minesweepers and
additional fighter jets to the region.
The
resulting overcrowding of Persian Gulf waters with
the US fleet is an invitation for similar
incidents to this week' fatal encounter.
Accidental confrontations could easily escalate
into something bigger in coming weeks and months,
particularly if the US and Iran bump into each
other.
There is no guarantee that a
US-Iran war would not be triggered by such
incidents, since there is no military-to-military
hotline or similar communications to handle such
emergencies. In spite of some US overtures toward
such a preventive mechanism, Iran refuses to
consider it, as well as any other "incident at
sea" protocols, since it regards the US presence
in the Persian Gulf as fundamentally illegitimate.
The thickening fog of suspicion and mutual
distrust is growing more dangerous, with the US
pondering the possibility of an Iranian
provocation and Tehran studying the US's
inclination to resort to shows of force to assert
its hegemony. Beyond such tactical questions, the
larger strategic question is what is Washington's
ultimate aim?
From Tehran's vantage point,
it scored big points in recent drills that
convinced the West of its vastly improved missile
capability, contrary to various US expert studies
that have painted a different picture, citing the
Iranian missiles' lack of precision and relatively
low payload. Confronted by a more lethal adversary
than previously thought, the US is now treading a
fine line by relying on its military muscle to
deter any Iranian "asymmetrical" provocation that
could see oil prices soar. The US containment
strategy may not work, however, if Tehran decides
to up the ante against the US over the sanctions
that are hurting the Iranian economy.
This
is unlikely to happen, however, as major US
exemptions for the Iran oil sanctions will, at
least for the next five months, give the green
light for business to continue mostly as usual
with regards to Iran's oil shipments. Should the
US choose to remove those exemptions when they are
up for review, Iran may opt for more direct action
in the Persian Gulf.
In this rapidly
evolving milieu, the Persian Gulf is hostage to
the geostrategic calculations of, on the one hand,
a Western superpower and its local client states
and, on the other, a traditional regional power
with growing military prowess. What makes the
scenario more dangerous is that the whole picture
is moving in the direction of a zero-sum game of
strategy, that is, a win-lose scenario,
increasingly bereft of prior shades of grey
indicating "shared" or "parallel" interests. This
sharpening of conflicting interests is ready-made
fuel for open conflict in the Persian Gulf.
In the assortment of available remedies,
one can easily point to the on-going multilateral
nuclear talks between Iran and the "5 +1" nations
(the United Nations Security Council permanent
five members plus Germany) that have now been
degraded to the level of experts. If the Western
nations headed by the United States decide to
continue with the uncompromising approach already
seen at Iran Six meetings in Baghdad and Moscow,
however, the nuclear standoff will linger and
possibly worsen.
To de-escalate tensions
with Iran, the West will need to take a vastly
different negotiation strategy, one that is
willing to trade sanctions for concessions.
However, in a US election year, this is unlikely
to happen.
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