Israel stirs on the eve of Middle
East war By Victor Kotsev
Perhaps the most ominous words uttered in
recent months by Ehud Barak, the influential
Israeli defense minister, came in the form of a
paradoxical reassurance. "I believe and hope that
there will be no war this summer, but that is all
that can be said at this time," he said in a
televised interview on Friday.
Conventional wisdom has it that the louder
the Israeli threats of war, the less likely that a
war is imminent - and, in certain situations such
as the present one, vice versa. Earlier this year,
threats were flying - Barak was talking about the
Iranian nuclear program entering an "immunity
zone" by the end of the summer - but more recently
this has changed dramatically. As Reuters observed
two months ago, Israeli officials have gone into an
ominous "lock down." [1]
Now comes Barak's statement.
The
million-dollar question is, which war. From a
narrow Israeli perspective, war may in fact be
avoidable and all the threats - Barak is certainly
aware of the ripple effect of his words - could be
primarily defensive in nature. With the entire
region in flux and its home front underprepared
(only 53% of Israelis, for example, are equipped
with gas masks), Israel might ideally prefer to
save its shots.
From a broader regional
perspective, the civil war in Syria is already a
fact, and it looks as if the violence, both there
and elsewhere, can only explode further. At some
point in the near future, somebody will likely
feel compelled to intervene, if not against the
Iranian nuclear program, then against the Syrian
chemical and biological weapons, if not through a
full-scale attack then by a "surgical strike". If
not Israel, this would most likely be the United
States, though other regional players also stand
ready to weigh in. In many ways, it's a war of
nerves as much as it is a diplomatic bazaar, and
it is hard to tell who will blink first and what
deals will be struck.
Barak's words come
at a particularly sensitive time, when the Israeli
army is on high alert near the northern border and
the Israeli leadership is reportedly preparing for
a spillover of violence from the Syrian conflict.
One scenario that is particularly worrisome and
has attracted a lot of attention is that, as the
Syrian regime collapses, some of its missiles
tipped with chemical weapons could fall into the
hands of either Sunni Muslim extremists or
Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This danger, of
course, could be used for propaganda purposes, in
order to justify a pre-emptive strike on Syria
backed by the US and other Western powers; this is
a tempting hypothesis, but it carries significant
hidden risks and costs. Most importantly, any
Israeli intervention, save perhaps for a very
brief and pointed strike, could rally popular
support behind Syrian president Bashar al-Assad
and thus backfire spectacularly. Other Arab states
might face public pressure to shift their stance
as well, and the coalition against Assad may come
under strain. (During the First Persian Gulf War,
former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sought to
exploit this dynamic by firing Scud missiles at
Israel.)
Also, Syria's response to an
Israeli incursion could escalate much more quickly
and to much more gruesome levels than that against
other aggressors. As the Syrian foreign ministry
spokesman put it on Monday, "These [chemical and
biological] weapons are stored and secured by
Syrian military forces and under its direct
supervision and will never be used unless Syria
faces external aggression." [2] It should be noted
that the Syrian regime is almost as unlikely to
use weapons of mass destruction against another
Muslim country as it is against its own
population, which leaves Israel the main target of
its current threats.
It is true that,
among the regional countries, Israel is best
equipped to deliver a blow to Syria - after all,
it successfully deceived the Syrian air defenses
in 2007, when it bombed an alleged Syrian nuclear
reactor. By contrast, the other regional heavy
weight, Turkey, lost a plane on a reconnaissance
mission near the Syrian border this year.
It is also widely believed that among all
Israeli politicians, Barak, in particular, is
itching for action, and it is possible that some
American officials would rather see him engaged in
Syria than in Iran, particularly prior to the US
presidential elections in November. It is easy to
imagine, however, an outcome in which the negative
consequences of such action far outweigh the
positive ones.
Surprises are possible, and
Saudi Arabia is one corner from which we can
expect them. Recently, the kingdom made a
remarkable choice of a new spy chief, in the face
of the "peasant-prince" Bandar bin Sultan. He is a
familiar personality in international diplomatic
circles, having served for over two decades as the
Saudi ambassador in Washington, but for a number
of years he had been sidelined. John Hannah,
writing for Foreign Policy Magazine, discussed his
return to diplomacy last year, [3] and now, it
seems, he has re-assumed his spot at the center of
the action.
The prince's exploits are
legendary - in the 1980s, for example, he
reportedly arranged the delivery of Chinese
medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia under the
nose of the US administration, sparking a
diplomatic crisis. His resourcefulness is likely
being put to use in Syria.
As a Saudi
analyst told Reuters on Friday, "Bandar is quite
aggressive, not at all like a typical cautious
Saudi diplomat. If the aim is to bring [Syrian
President] Bashar [al-Assad] down quick and fast,
he will have a free hand to do what he thinks
necessary. He likes to receive an order and
implement it as he sees fit." [4]
Yet,
while coordinating a surprise move with the
Israeli "enemy" may well be within Bandar bin
Sultan's (and Saudi Arabia's) repertoire, it is
hard to imagine that the Saudis would be
comfortable with an Israeli intervention in a
predominantly Sunni Muslim country. In fact,
Prince Bandar is known as a hawk on Israel, and
his earlier diplomatic downfall is rumored to have
been caused in part by his aggressive support for
the Palestinians during the Second Intifada
(Palestinian uprising).
A damning 2002
quote, which is widely attributed to him and slams
the US policy of supporting the Jewish State,
goes:
It is a mistake to think that our
people will not do what is necessary to survive,
and if that means we move to the right of [late
al-Qaeda leader Osama] bin Laden, so be it; to
the left of [former Libyan leader Muammar]
Gaddafi, so be it; or fly to Baghdad and embrace
Saddam like a brother, so be it. It's damned
lonely in our part of the world, and we can no
longer defend our relationship to our
people.
Syria, similarly to the
Palestinian territories, might be unpalatable for
the Saudis as a target for an Israeli
intervention, but Shi'ite Iran is a different
matter altogether. In fact, for several years now
credible rumors have circulated about the alleged
Saudi-Israeli cooperation against the Iranian
nuclear program, even claiming that Saudi Arabia
has offered its air space as an attack route to
the Israelis.
As a side note, this year
the Iranians chose to start the Muslim holy month
of Ramadan on a different date than Saudi Arabia,
in a fresh affront to Riyadh.
For Israel,
too, Iran is a much more urgent target than Syria
(the Lebanese militant organization Hezbollah also
likely ranks higher than Syria, though not as high
as Iran). In fact, since the start of the unrest
in their northern neighbor the Israelis have
generally preferred as much stability in their
immediate neighborhood as possible, and have been
skeptical about the Syrian rebels' ability to
guarantee that. In the Iranian nuclear program, on
the other hand, they see an urgent threat
accompanied by the long-term danger of a nuclear
arms race in the Middle East.
Right now,
Israel seems content to wait as tensions in the
Persian Gulf rise by the day, both in order to
increase international pressure on Iran and in
hopes that the US might get drawn into the fray.
Most recently, over half of the Iranian parliament
reportedly backed a bill calling on the military
to block the Strait of Hormuz. This is a red line
for the US, yet the move is mostly symbolic, since
final authority over the matter rests with the
Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
At the same time, however, an aide to
Khamenei reportedly threatened that Iran would
increase uranium enrichment levels to over 50%
fissile material in response to the international
pressure, while a computer virus that is
attributed to the Islamic Republic has been making
rounds in the Middle East. The code, dubbed
"Mahdi," is believed to be Iran's response to
cyber warfare waged against it by the West, and
has reportedly infected a number of computers in
Israel and other countries. [5]
Finally,
both Israel and the US pointed a finger at Iran
for the terror attack which claimed five Israeli
lives in Bulgaria last week, as well as for a
similar plot foiled in Cyprus earlier this month.
Both are doing their best to sell their narrative
to the international community, and to prepare
world public opinion for hostilities.
The
main difference is in their time frames, and a
long string of top American visitors in Jerusalem
(Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton and National Security
Advisor Tom Donilon in the last couple of weeks)
is widely interpreted as an ongoing American
campaign to restrain Israel for another few
months. The Israelis, however, are growing
increasingly restless, as are the Saudis. Barring
substantial progress against Iran and its allies
soon, the Americans might not get their wishes.
Some analysts have speculated that an
American-led campaign in Syria might postpone an
Israeli strike on Iran, not least because the
Assad regime is a key element of Iran's influence
on the Levant. [6] However, in order for this
strategy to work (assuming it would), the
Americans would need to assume responsibility for
Syria themselves.
This is where the
bargaining gets really tricky. Both the Israelis
and the Americans would prefer to do as little of
the heavy lifting themselves, and to reap as many
of the benefits as possible. Each country has a
different calculus of its goals and capabilities,
and each may find itself compelled to act under
different circumstances. Needless to say, the
actions of each influence the other.
On
the Israeli side, domestic political
considerations also weigh in. Last week, the
largest party in the Israeli Knesset (parliament),
Kadima, left the coalition, which it had joined
barely two months ago. While this was due to a
domestic intrigue, it will most likely lead to
elections early next year, and will put pressure
on Barak and his ally, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, to deliver on their promises
to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Moreover, the
exit from the top decision-making panel of
Kadima's head, Shaul Mofaz, can be seen as
conducive to rash military action. Mofaz, a
Persian Jew born in Iran and a former chief of
staff of the Israeli army, was widely perceived as
a moderating influence when it comes to Iran.
Overall, it is hard not to agree with the
acclaimed economist Nouriel Roubini, who predicted
earlier this month that a "perfect [economic]
storm scenario" was "unfolding," in part due to
the high likelihood of large-scale violence in the
Middle East. While it is not yet completely clear
who the main actors would be - and whether Israel
would be directly involved - the likelihood that
the various diplomatic negotiations will succeed
grows slimmer with each day that passes.
Conversely, the danger of a regional war
increases.
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