The realization came only belatedly in
Ankara when the White House released the
photograph that United States President Barack
Obama was holding a baseball bat with one hand as
he made a phone call to Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday night.
The
White House statement merely said Obama discussed
with Erdogan how to "coordinate efforts to
accelerate a political transition in Syria, which
would include the departure of [Syrian President]
Bashar al-Assad" and to share the "growing
concerns" about the violence in Syria and the
"deteriorating humanitarian conditions".
Why hold a baseball bat while on
statecraft - and then publicize
it? The Turks could see
any number of reasons: Obama was likely
grandstanding as a tough world leader; possibly,
threatening Bashar; maybe, impressing Israel and
Saudi Arabia - or, Iran and Russia. But they
calmly concluded that Obama was conveying a blunt
message to Erdogan to speed up the "regime change"
in Syria: "Whack Bashar, ErdoganBey".
Indeed, the Turkish army is maneuvering
with tanks on the Syrian border. But Erdogan is
yet to take the momentous step of approaching the
Turkish parliament for approval for the army to
cross the border into the country. Erdogan is
thinking furiously. He took a meeting of the
Supreme Military Council in Ankara on Wednesday to
oversee "war preparations" and inter alia realized
that the Turkish armed forces are in great
disarray.
Sixty-eight pashas (a title used for
military and civil officers) are locked up in jail
facing charges of treason. The meeting on
Wednesday was called to decide on the annual
promotions of the Turkish top brass, but the
choice was severely limited, since something like
40 generals out of the 68 happen to be in the
"promotion zone" but cannot be considered for
promotion since they are in jail. The Turkish
commentator Murat Yetkin surveyed the scandalous
situation:
"Last year, Chief of General Staff
Isik Kosaner resigned along with three force
commanders in protest at the arrests. That puts
even more pressure on the current Chief of Staff
General Necdet Ozel, who is already under
pressure because of the arrest of a former Chief
of Staff, Ilker Basburg. Basburg has been
accused of being the "chief of a terrorist
organization". Another former Chief of Staff
Hilmi Ozkok is expected to appear before the
Istanbul criminal court today [Thursday]."
Ozkok has since pleaded that he was
indeed aware of two possible coup plots hatched
against the elected government by the Pashas
during the period 2003-2004. But he went on to
rationalize: "When the AKP [Erdogan's Justice and
Development Party] came to power, the Turkish
Armed Forces staff, including me, had concerns.
Taking into consideration the [AKP officials']
statements in the past, we were worried about
whether Turkey would roll back to old days [read
Islamism]. We began discussing these issues. In
the army everyone expresses their opinions even if
they think differently from each other, this is
normal, but they obey the chief of General Staff's
orders in the end."
Erdogan has a
formidable challenge on his hands - he is being
exhorted by Obama for taking quick military action
to expel Bashar, while the Turkish army itself is
sinking into a morass, as Ozkok's testimony gets
played out in the coming days and weeks in army
barracks across Anatolia.
Meanwhile,
Kurdish separatists watching from mountain
hideouts have opened another front near the remote
eastern town of Sendinli located in the tricky
tri-junction between Turkey, Iraq and Iran.
Turkish army has been fighting there for a week.
Concurrently, the incipient political rift
between him and incumbent President Abdullah Gul
(who used to be his deputy in the AKP), surged
last week. Gul dropped a political bombshell by
letting it be known Monday he probably would have
an open mind about seeking a second term as
president in the 2014 election.
Gul reset
the kaleidoscope of Turkish politics. A riposte
came from Erdogan camp within the day when AKP's
deputy chairman and a confidante of Erdogan,
Huseyin Celik reminded Gul that he owed his job as
president to Erdogan and it was time to
reciprocate goodwill by stepping down and opening
the road to the presidency for Erdogan.
Gul himself responded Wednesday that there
is still a lot of time to talk about what Celik
said. Indeed, two years is a long time in politics
and Gul is right, nothing is ever a done thing in
politics. Both Gul and Erdogan are charismatic
figures and the expectation among Turks was that
they might opt for a Russian style switch of roles
in 2014. But then, there is also an "ideological"
content to the Gul-Erdogan rift.
Gul has
some definite views about the shortcomings of the
kind of constitutional reform that Erdogan is
presently seeking, which is a presidential system
with greatly strengthened executive powers. To
quote prominent political commentator SemihIdiz,
"Gul is opposed to the kind of
presidential system the AKP wants … Gul believes
the present parliamentary system should be
cleansed of its shortcomings and improved in order
to further enhance Turkey's democracy… Neither the
AKP nor Erdogan have talked about the checks and
balances that would exist in the presidential
system they desire. This is what is worrying for
many, especially given Erdogan's well-known
authoritarian tendencies."
But
does the war in Syria come into all this? Sure it
does. Both Obama and Erdogan are agreed that the
Syrian crisis should end soon. Obama seems to
think that if Erdogan can be persuaded to "do
more" - to borrow from the US exhortation to
Pakistan - the civil war will end and a "new
Syria" can take shape. Just like that.
But
Erdogan has a problem here. He has an
"operational" problem, given the disarray in the
Turkish military, and increasingly, perhaps, a
political problem as well.
Turkey's
military machinery needs to be toned up first,
which takes time, and now Gul has opened a dicey
political front. Syria is becoming a dangerous
minefield for Erdogan. A perceptive and
experienced Turkish security analyst, Nihat Ozcan,
recently peered into Syria through the looking
glass:
"In my opinion, we need to ask four
questions to understand how the Syria model will
be at the end of the process. Firstly, what does
the changing character of the war mean in
analyses? Secondly, how does the proxy war
affect political development and the time
period? Thirdly, how does the deep sociological
division among the people in Syria shape the
problem? Fourthly, if there is no authority or
sufficient power and desire to end the
interference, how will Syria turn out?"
Ozcan sees the insurgency
masterminded from Turkey expanding rapidly into a
civil war. The Syrian army could incrementally
begin to lose its all-national character and
assume a sectarian character, composed of
Alawites. On the other hand, the insurgency's
"Sunni political features" could be further
reinforced.
Indeed, the rebels would never
be a fully disciplined and regular armed force,
which in turn opens the prospect of a war
continuing "without front, irregular, facade,
brutal and no rule and no moral block," and
seriously threatening the future of Syria.
Again, this is a "proxy war" involving
outsiders, which implies that it will be simply
within no one's capacity to bring an end to the
war anytime soon. "This situation increases the
capacity of both [Syrian] sides and causes the war
to continue." Meanwhile, deep-rooted sociological,
psychological and religious prejudices and the
historical traumas of the past will begin to feed
into the civil war, bolstering the strength and
verve of warring parties.
Ozcan explains
that if the current processes go on, Syria would
fall apart and a reunification would take a very
long time. As a military analyst knowledgeable
about Turkish capabilities, he assessed: "In the
foreseeable future, it is difficult to have
clandestine operations, air operations, punitive
air operations, blockages from the sea,
peace-making and peacekeeping operations that
would provide an advantageous position to one of
the sides compared to the other. Apparently, the
fire in Syria will extinguish with its own
domestic dynamics."
Simply put, Erdogan is
highly likely to find himself trapped in a Syrian
quagmire unless he exercised circumspection about
these increasingly rare trans-Atlantic phone
calls. (Obama and Erdogan apparently spoke on the
phone 13 times last year whereas, they have had
only two phone conversations so far in 2012.)
Ozcan's gloomy message is that the "future
picture" of Syria leaves little for Erdogan to be
complacent about.
Erdogan never played
baseball. But he was a good soccer player - a
semi-professional, in fact, playing for a 90-year
old local club in Istanbul. Erdogan would know
that on the soccer field if he lost control of the
ball, anything could happen; it could be an own
goal, or, it could be that Gul simply nutmegs him
to nudge the ball into the back of the net.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His
assignments included the Soviet Union, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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