INTERVIEW Iran eyes role as post-Arab Spring
'anchor' By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Dr Abbas Maleki, former deputy foreign
minister of Iran and currently senior Wilhelm
Fellow on Energy Policy at Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, was an important voice in Iran's
foreign policy decision making process for many
years. In an interview with Asia Times Online,
Maleki sheds light on how Iran conceptualizes
foreign policy, while challenging negative Western
perceptions of Iran's behavior. He emphasizes
Iran's role in regional crisis-management,
particularly in Syria, and explains why the
upcoming summit of leaders of the Non-Aligned
Movement, to be held this month in Tehran, is so
important for Iran.
Kaveh Afrasiabi:
How would you describe Iran's regional
diplomacy?
Abbas Maleki:
Well, the best word to describe this is
regionalism. Regionalism forms the core of Iran's
foreign policy
approach, one that seeks
to integrate the different, and complex,
dimensions of Iran's trans-border relations. This
is based on Iran's multi-region geography - and
identity - that encompasses the Persian Gulf,
Caspian Sea, the Central Asia-Caucasus regions and
Iran's numerous neighbors and near-neighbors.
In this context, Iran's policy is to have
good-neighborly relations and a calm environment
at its borders while pushing the arch of regional
cooperation through a variety of bilateral and
multilateral channels, such as the Economic
Cooperation Organization. Often this means a
delicate balancing act between and among the
welter of economic, geopolitical, strategic, and
national security considerations in a very dynamic
and even fluid setting, given the nature of
compound problems of insecurity, foreign
intervention, and inadequate institution-building
in Iran's vicinity, which co-exist with tremendous
opportunities for cooperation and mutual
advancement.
KA: How does
Iran view the current crisis in the Middle East
and North Africa?
AM: We are
presently facing multiple crises in the Middle
East, North Africa, and West Asia. These include
insecurity in Iraq, on-going conflict in
Afghanistan, tensions in the Persian Gulf, the
difficulties and uncertainties of political
transition in Egypt, chaos in Syria, a crisis of
authoritarianism in Bahrain, the Caucasus's
unresolved disputes, and the outstanding legal
regime problem in Caspian Sea, to mention the
salient ones.
Of course, we must add the
sanctions on Iran and the nuclear standoff to the
list. There is a connection among the issues that
calls for a "linkage diplomacy" on the part of
Islamic Republic of Iran, that is, one that is
cognizant of the need for a comprehensive approach
that moves the pieces in tandem with each other
and with proper coordination, of course based on a
correct diagnosis of the issues, such as the
results and prospects of the "Arab Spring"
particularly as they affect Iran's national
security calculus. Contrary to the conservative
view in the West, Iran's role is not a
destabilizer but rather as an anchor of stability
in the region.
KA: How do you see
Iran's role in Syria developing?
AM:
There is a definite risk of Syria's
disintegration and endemic chaos, in light of the
government's handover of a few provinces to the
Kurds, which can spillover into neighboring
countries. The Syrian situation calls for a
regional solution with all the regional players
cooperating to find a peaceful solution for the
political crisis that has degenerated into a
bloody internal conflict fueled by outside forces.
This could be a lose-lose scenario for
regional actors and no one should harbor the
illusion of a quick fix. Iran is greatly concerned
about the role of extra-regional powers
manipulating the crisis in Syria. Tehran
understands the consequences of losing its
leverage in the Levant, yet this does not
necessarily mean that Iran cannot deal with the
next government in Damascus. Iran has pushed for
dialogue and reconciliation between the government
and the opposition and has endorsed the idea of an
orderly political transition while simultaneously
opposing the foreign script for regime change in
Syria.
Iranians are eager to go to Syria
for pilgrimage and spend money, Syria needs oil
and gas, therefore as a result of interdependence
the relations will endure in the future. As for
Hezbollah, it is a major political party in
Lebanon which has its own various relations with
Iran and not all depend on Syria. Still, as a
major stakeholder in this particular crisis, Iran
is prepared to explore ways to help Syria's
transition back to internal peace and tranquility.
KA: Tensions in Persian Gulf
appear to be on the rise, what is the next step to
de-escalate these tensions?
AM: There are few proposals
for security arrangements in Persian Gulf. One of
them, proposed by Iran, tends to recognize the
status quo of inter-state borders, and calls for
signing a non-aggression pact among the littoral
states, as well as for cooperation on energy
security within the region. This means that there
is no need for a foreign military presence in
Persian Gulf. Iran and Oman can guarantee the flow
of oil from the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran
also is looking to de-escalate tensions in the
Persian Gulf by arranging a sea-rescue system. It
needs connectivity among all vessels which are
moving inside of the Gulf.
KA:
How do you assess the energy security
situation in the region?
AM:
My hunch is that we have passed the oil
peak and conventional oil production cannot go
beyond 100 million barrels per day - the actual
production now is around 83 mbd. Still, despite
talk of a slow global economic recovery, demand
has been rising, especially in rapidly developing
countries like China, India and Brazil. The new
developments in the Middle East also imply new
economic programs in countries like Tunisia,
Libya, and Egypt, where they need more job-growth
economy and eventually more energy. Therefore
demand would be higher than supply in near future.
In a nutshell we need more oil.
Part of
new demand would be fulfilled by unconventional
oils in US, Canada, and Venezuela. But still the
cost of oil is a volatile issue that is partly
determined by the security environment and the
scope and fate of tensions in the oil regions.
Middle East oil in some countries like Iraq has
cost US$1 a barrel [to exploit], compared with oil
from shale in Canada costing up to $65 a barrel.
Despite new finds such as shale oil and gas, and
new technologies like fracking and horizontal
wells, the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea will still
remain pivotal sources of energy for decades to
come.
KA: Finally, Iran is
about to assume the presidency of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). What are Iran's objectives?
AM: Iran's goal is to use
its NAM presidency to help the movement pursue
multiple objectives and revitalize itself. NAM
continues to have a major role in international
affairs in today's post-Cold War world order and
one of them is to enhance and deepen the role of
multilateral diplomacy and to increase the input
of developing nations in international
institutions.
There are several ways to
improve NAM's global role, for example in global
conflict-management, disarmament, that require
better coordination among the member states. This
is an area where the regional meets the global,
depending to a large extent on smart "soft power"
diplomacy whereby we move toward a more equitable
distribution of global power and shared,
horizontal global management.
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