Page 2 of
2 SPEAKING
FREELY 'Arab Summer' turns
messy By Richard Javad
Heydarian
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
So obviously, what we
should perhaps expect from the 'Arab Summer' is a
new order that upgrades as well as combines Arab
nationalism (with emphasis on independence and
defense of the Palestinian cause), liberal
democratic institutions (emphasizing the 'rule of
law' and reflecting the secular-pluralistic
character of the 'Tahrir' revolutionaries), and a
quasi-socialist state, which
prioritizes social
welfare, employment-generation,
poverty-alleviation, and the revival of the
heavily-deteriorated industrial and agricultural
sectors.
The question is: are the
revolutions moving in such direction?
The disorderly transition Once
we gaze beyond the euphoria over the Arab spring,
and take a sober look at the trajectory of ongoing
uprisings and post-revolutionary government, we
find a mixed but generally worrying picture:
democratic elections have taken place in countries
such as Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Libya, but
the general economic and political situation is
far from rosy or encouraging. Practically all Arab
states in the throes of the revolution are facing
tremendous economic challenges. Most of them are
struggling with declining economic output, rising
fiscal deficit, steep deterioration in the balance
of payments, and rising difficulties with
debt-payment and maintenance of strategic subsidy
schemes.
The ascent of Islamists, with
strong organizational background in
welfare-provision (especially in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Morocco) has not brought about a significant
change - or promise of - in the structure of Arab
economies. We are yet to witness a single Islamist
government - or any post-revolutionary state for
that matter - proposing concrete policies on
employment-generation, poverty-alleviation, and
disengagement from unfavorable
trade-and-investment schemes, which have
contributed to the industrial-and-agricultural
hollowing in the much of the Arab world.
We are also yet to see a decisive movement
towards further regional integration to maximize
trade-linkages, economies of scale, and the
comparative advantage of individual Arab
economies. In absence of major external financing
- exacerbated by the world's focus on the eurozone
crisis - most post-revolutionary Arab states will
continue to struggle. Libya, the only oil-rich
revolutionary state, is yet to unfreeze billions
of dollars in frozen assets and resolve the
growing Tripoli-Benghazi tensions over the
division of oil wealth.
The political
picture is far from encouraging. Libya is yet to
rein in thousands of renegade (former) rebel
forces and establish a unified, professional
national army. There is also the fear of the
disintegration of the Libyan state in face of
growing calls for regional independence and
devolution, especially by the Benghazi-dominated
East. Egypt and Tunisia have been rocked by
continuous industrial strikes and political
protests, while the ruling Islamists are facing
fierce challenge from the (divided) secular
opposition and/or struggling to wrist power from
the military and remnants of the previous regime.
Among the populace, expectations are
running high, but patience is wearing thin. So,
one can expect continuing protests and political
uncertainty for some time to come - thus,
complicating the economic crisis and empowering
counter-revolutionary forces.
In terms of
foreign policy, even Islamist governments seem to
be sticking to the status quo. Wary of Western
concerns, circumscribed by the influence of the
military as well as the secular forces, and
'bribed' by reactionary monarchies in the Persian
Gulf, the Islamist governments have gone to a
great extent to ensure that there would be no
major shift in relations with either Iran or
Israel. The former is to be kept in check, while
the latter is to be left untouched.
In
Egypt, the military has ensured that the civilian
government will have no control over internal
security and foreign policy. This was achieved
through the introduction of new constitutional
amendments just days before the Islamist won the
Presidential elections.
However, things
have turned even more interesting and yet
dangerously uncertain in recent days. Against the
backdrop of recent deadly attacks by jihadi
elements against border soldiers in Sinai, the
Islamist President Mohammad Morsi has upped the
ante by directly taking on the ruling junta, or
the so-called 'Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces': he ended Field Marshal Tantawi's
two-decade-long role as a defense minister, while
forcing the Chief Army of Staff Sami Anan into
retirement and reversing the junta's
constitutional amendments - restoring presidential
powers. Surely, the uniformed men are not just
going to sit idle as the new Islamists chip away
at their half-century-long powers and
entitlements.
By taking on the country's
two most powerful military figures, the Islamist
civilian leadership has opened a new front in
Egypt's ongoing political civil war: the seculars
and Islamists have been fighting over civilian
leadership, ideology, and constitutional
principles, while the Islamists have taken on the
military for the control of the state.
Moreover, unlike the 'lightening'
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the uprisings in
Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria have been fraught
with violence and sectarian/tribal divide. Salleh
and his acolytes continue to threaten the fragile
post-revolutionary government in Yemen, while the
casualties in Libya and Syria have been in tens of
thousands. Bahrain is still rocked by
predominantly Shia-led protests, with the monarchy
refusing to institute much-needed reforms to
remedy the continuous injustices faced by the
Shi'ite majority.
Of course, Syria is
already experiencing a slow-motion disintegration,
with fears of large-scale civil war (even after
Assad's prospective downfall) leading to mass
atrocities compounding a conflict that is
increasingly becoming a 'proxy war' between Arab
monarchies, Turkey, and the West on one hand, and
China, Iran, and Russia, on the other. The Syrian
uprisings is already spilling over into
neighboring countries such as Iraq and Lebanon,
which have been struggling with festering
sectarian conflicts for sometime.
The Arab
summer is a clear indication of how revolutions
can cruelly defy our most optimistic ideals and
hopes. Not only can they fail to bring fundamental
structural changes overnight, but also fraught
with uncertainty and chaos. Unless Arab states
make a decisive move towards democratization,
structural economic reforms and a more independent
foreign policy, instability will continue to loom
on the horizon.
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a
Phillipines-based foreign affairs analyst
specializing on Iran and international
security.
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