One
step forward in Mecca, one
back By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Two steps forward, one step back. This is
how this week's Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) summit in Mecca could be
characterized in terms of Iran-Saudi relations.
Although the summit widened the gap
between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the issue of
Syria, which was suspended from the OIC despite
loud protests by Iran (and Algeria), it was
instrumental in bringing Tehran and Riyadh closer
together, thanks in part to the positive chemistry
between King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud and
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who were seated next
to each other and discussed various issues at
length.
Upon returning home, a spirited
Ahmadinejad emphasized at a press conference the
trip's importance in terms of improving
relations with Saudi
Arabia, custodian of the house of Islam and a
pillar of regional geopolitics; he remained
critical of the fact that whereas the summit had
been promoted as a show of unity, it was "limited
to other issues", above all Syria.
Still,
a consensus is emerging in the Iranian parliament
(Majlis) that it is important for Iran to
participate in such diplomatic arenas to
disseminate its own point of view on various
issues. Iran may have lost the battle over Syria's
expulsion but, ironically, it may have scored on
the broader issue of an apt Syria policy, by
hammering on the importance of focusing on Israel
and "ending discord among ourselves", to
paraphrase Ahmadinejad's OIC speech.
According to Nowzar Shafiee, a member of
the Majlis' foreign policy and national security
committee, in spite of the setback on Syria, the
OIC summit was still a plus for Iran since it
allowed Iran to reach out to the Muslim world. In
addition to the Saudi leader, Ahmadinejad held
bilateral talks with a number of other Muslim
leaders and his fiery speech in defense of
Palestinians was music to the ear of many ordinary
Muslims around the world.
What is more,
Ahmadinejad's participation ensured the presence
of high-level Arab leaders at the upcoming summit
of the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran at the end
of the month, including from Kuwait, Qatar and
Jordan. An important question revolves around
Syria's embattled President Bashar al-Assad, who
has been invited although his presence may prove
divisive and counter-productive to Iran's
interests.
On the other hand, the NAM
summit may pick up the issue of Syria and initiate
a high-level mediation group to complement the
United Nations's current efforts. Assad's presence
and his pledge to cooperate with the UN and to
agree to a cease-fire and political dialogue could
also be in the cards and gain some support among
the NAM global community.
Meanwhile, the
United States and Israel are working overtime to
poison the environment leading up to the NAM
meeting, which is emerging as a clear snub to
their strategy to Isolate Tehran.
While
the US media have been replete with negative and
even derogatory references to NAM - a Washington
Post editorial on March 14 mocked it as a
"bacchanal of nonsense" - Israel is desperately
trying to raise the alarm level regarding an
imminent attack on Iran, hoping that this will
dissuade some NAM leaders from attending the
Tehran summit.
This familiar noise from
Israel, heard persistently over the years, is
channeled through "leaks" from the Israeli Prime
Minister's Office, among other venues, and is
unlikely to have the slightest effect on Iran's
march to become a focus of global diplomacy two
weeks from now; already more than 43 world leaders
have committed to participate at the NAM summit
and this number is sure to grow in the coming
days.
Riyadh has now satisfied its
regional ego with the impressive OIC summit and is
therefore less worried about Iran's upper hand in
regard to the NAM summit. This underlines the
OIC's leveling effect. With the Shiite-Sunni rift
also addressed by Riyadh's initiative of a
dialogue center, the overall impression is that
Tehran and Riyadh have decided to improve their
relations and manage their traditional rivalry in
a more structured fashion so that it does not get
out of hand.
However, this is precisely
what may happen depending on the fast-developing
crisis in Syria and the inevitable result of the
OIC's Syria decision as a diplomatic setback for
Iran (see Saudis
use summit to isolate Syria, Iran, Asia Times
Online, August 15, 2012). Will the Saudis take
advantage of the Syria's expulsion from OIC and
try to escalate their pressure on Assad to resign?
Or will they join hands with Tehran in search of a
political solution short of "regime change" in
Syria?
The answer to these questions will
be clarified in the near future. The Saudis are at
a fork in the road, and their mini-overtures
toward Iran may well be interpreted in Tehran as
shrewd tactical summitry to achieve their
objectives and to highlight their political sway
over the Sunni-dominant Muslim World.
Still, some Tehran political analysts are
convinced that Riyadh's complex internal and
external context dictates a more cautious approach
vis-a-vis Syria, particularly since the Syrian
army has been gaining an upper hand in the bloody
conflict in Aleppo. After all, even nations in the
Middle East base their policies on political
realism and not wish lists.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
