Some
light shines on Sunni-Shi'ite
rivalries By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Two steps forward, one step back. This is
how this week's Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) summit could be characterized in
terms of Iran-Saudi relations.
Although
the summit widened the gap between Iran and Saudi
Arabia on the issue of Syria, which was suspended
from the OIC despite loud protests by Iran (as
well as Algeria), it was instrumental in bringing
Tehran and Riyadh closer together, thanks in part
to the positive chemistry between King Abdullah
bin Abdulaziz al Saud and President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad, who were seated next to each other
and discussed various issues at length.
Upon returning home, a spirited
Ahmadinejad in a press conference emphasized the
trip's importance in terms of improving relations
with Saudi Arabia, Custodian of the House of Islam and
a pillar of regional
geopolitics; though he remained critical of the
fact that whereas the summit had been promoted as
a show of unity, it was "limited to other issues,"
above all Syria.
Still, a consensus is
emerging in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) that
it is important for Iran to participate in such
diplomatic arenas to disseminate its own point of
view on various issues. Iran may have lost the
battle over Syria's expulsion but, ironically, it
may have scored on the broader issue of an apt
Syia policy, by hammering on the importance of
focusing on Israel and "ending discord among
ourselves," to paraphrase Ahmadinejad's OIC
speech.
According to Nowzar Shafiee, a
member of Majlis's foreign policy and national
security committee, in spite of the setback on
Syria, the OIC summit was still a plus for Iran
since it allowed Iran to reach out to the Muslim
world. In addition to the Saudi leader,
Ahmadinejad held bilateral talks with a number of
other Muslim leaders and his fiery speech in
defense of Palestinians was music to the ear of
many ordinary Muslims around the world.
What is more, Ahmadinejad's participation
ensured the presence of high-level Arab leaders at
the upcoming summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in
Tehran at the end of the month, including from
Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. An important question
revolves around Syria's embattled President Bashar
al-Assad, who has been invited and yet his
presence may prove divisive and counter-productive
to Iran's interests.
On the other hand,
the NAM summit may pick up the issue of Syria and
initiate a high-level mediation group to
complement the United Nations's current efforts.
Assad's presence and his pledge to cooperate with
the UN and to agree to a cease-fire and political
dialogue could also be in the cards and gain some
support among the NAM global community.
Meanwhile, the US and Israel are working
overtime to poison the environment leading up to
the NAM meeting, which is emerging as a clear snub
to their strategy to Isolate Tehran.
While
the US media has been replete with negative and
even derogatory references to NAM - a Washington
Post editorial on March 14th mocked it as a
"bacchanal of nonsense" - Israel on the other hand
is desperately trying to raise the alarm level
regarding an imminent attack on Iran, hoping that
this will dissuade some NAM leaders from attending
the Tehran summit.
This familiar noise
from Israel, heard persistently over the years, is
channeled through "leaks" from the Israeli Prime
Minister's Office, among other venues, and is
unlikely to have the slightest effect on Iran's
march to become a focus of global diplomacy
precious two weeks from now; already more than 43
world leaders have committed to participate at the
NAM summit and this number is sure to grow in the
coming days.
Riyadh has now satisfied its
regional ego with the impressive OIC summit and is
therefore less worried about Iran's upper hand via
the NAM summit - this underlines the OIC's
leveling effect. With the Shiite-Sunni rift also
addressed by Riyadh's initiative of a dialogue
center, the overall impression is that Tehran and
Riyadh have decided to improve their relations and
manage their traditional rivalry in a more
structured fashion so that it does not get out of
hand.
However, this is precisely what may
happen depending on the fast-developing crisis in
Syria and the inevitable result of the OIC's Syria
decision as a diplomatic setback for Iran (see Saudis
use summit to isolate Syria, Iran, Asia Times
Online, Aug 15, 2012). Will the Saudis take
advantage of the Syria's expulsion from OIC and
try to escalate their pressure on Assad to resign?
Or will they join hands with Tehran in search of a
political solution short of "regime change" in
Syria?
The answer to these questions will
be clarified in the near future. The Saudis are at
a fork in the road and their mini-overtures toward
Iran may well be interpreted in Tehran as shrewd
tactical summitry to achieve their objectives and
to highlight their political sway over the
Sunni-dominant Muslim World. Still, some Tehran
political analysts are convinced that Riyadth's
complex internal and external context dictates a
more cautious approach vis-a-vis Syria,
particularly since the Syrian army has been
gaining an upper hands in the bloody conflict in
Aleppo. After all, even nations in the Middle East
base their policies on political realism and not
wishlists.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
