Page 1 of
2 Is
Egypt's Morsi eyeing an AKP
revolution? By Richard Javad
Heydarian
As the country's first
democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi
has audaciously pulled of an astonishing political
feat that has re-energized the spirit of the
Egyptian revolution.
After six decades of
military rule, and more than a year of Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)-led
counter-revolution, Egypt may finally taste the
true essence of "civilian supremacy" on its path
towards establishing a genuine democratic system.
There are many ways to interpret Morsi's
unprecedented move. He may have enjoyed the
support of key elements within the
SCAF before sacking the
country's most powerful men, namely Field Marshal
Tantawi and Chief of Army Staff Sami Anan.
On the other hand, he could have just
opportunistically taken advantage of the "Sinai
debacle" - an attack by suspected militants last
Sunday in Sinai that left 16 Egyptian soldiers
dead - to discredit the military's top leadership
for self-aggrandizement, while relying on broad
popular support - and the Muslim Brotherhood's
(MB's) formidable organizational machinery - to
dissuade any potential blowback by the junta.
Of course, it is also possible that the
SCAF - overwhelmed by the political limelight and
the weight of the country's growing economic woes
- is simply setting-up Morsi for failure by
(symbolically) transferring accountability to the
civilian regime in order to deflect future blame.
Yet, Morsi's "civilian coup" against the
SCAF resembles a very similar story just across
the Mediterranean: Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan's gradual displacement of the
Turkish "deep state" and his re-concentration of
power in the hands of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP). Just like in Turkey,
Morsi is also watching out for how the Supreme
Constitutional Court will react on behalf of the
junta.
Perhaps, in just a matter of two
months, Morsi is trying to pull off what took a
decade for Turkish Islamists to accomplish.
Against a military regime Since
the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian state has been
ruled by the military: the top leadership has been
composed of elite military officials (from Gamal
Abdel Nasser to Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak,
then later Tantawi himself as the head of the
SCAF) establishing full-control over all organs of
the state, while the military as an institution
has been the "silent guardian" of the raison
d'etat.
In the 1980s, the regime, facing
growing fiscal woes, decided to grant more
economic autonomy to the military to raise
necessary funds. To gain allies and ensure loyalty
within the upper echelons of the armed forces,
president Mubarak also granted favorable
investment-and-privatization deals to the armed
forces.
Under the stewardship of General
Abdel Halim Ghazala, Mubarak's defense minister
(1981-1982), the military was transformed into an
economic empire. Today, the military accounts for
almost a third of the country's US$200 billion
economy. So, the military is not only the guardian
of the state, but also a central economic player.
It has a direct stake in the perpetuation of a
political order, established by Nasser, along with
Muhammad Naguib, in 1952.
This is why
during the revolution in early 2011, the military
- facing growing international pressure and
domestic instability - launched its own coup by
ousting Mubarak to protect its interests and
maintain the status quo.
The uneasy
relationship In certain periods, the
Egyptian regime used the Islamists to weaken the
secular-democratic opposition, but when threatened
by the rise of Islamists, it responded with brutal
crackdowns. In short, the Islamists have been part
of the political system, but their room for
maneuvering has always been kept under check.
Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood's
relationship with the military establishment has
oscillated between strategic co-optation and
(uneasy) cohabitation on the one hand, and
occasional confrontation and mutual hostility on
the other.
The lowest point in their
relationship was marked by the 1981 assassination
of Sadat by hardliner Islamist elements, who
condemned the president's rapprochement with the
West and peace treaty with Israel. This incident
engendered a deep sense of distrust (if not
hostility) within the military elite vis-a-vis the
Islamists, ranging from the hardline Salafist
movements to less militant and more politically
pragmatic organizations such as the MB.
Following a heavy crackdown in the 1980s,
the MB leadership took an increasingly moderate
position, avoiding confrontation with the state,
while deepening its social embededness by
expanding its far-reaching networks of charities,
welfare-provision, and socio-political
organization. Later, in early 2000s, it translated
its growing social capital and organizational
capacity into electoral prowess - but, crucially,
never threatening the foundations of the existing
regime.
Morsi's direct confrontation with
SCAF's most powerful men is as unprecedented as it
is breathtaking. He has replaced Tantawi and Anan
with relatively young (and presumably more
sympathetic and docile) figures such as former
military intelligence chief, Colonel General
Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi, and former commander of
Suez-based Third Field Army, General Sidqi Sobhi
Sayed, respectively. To increase his leverage
vis-a-vis the pro-SCAF constitutional court, Morsi
has appointed reformist judge Mahmoud Meki as his
vice president. Clearly, Morsi's plan was some
time in the making and well thought out. He
launched his coup, perhaps, to pre-empt a possible
crackdown by SCAF's "old guards".
A
grand political gamble Owing to the wide
range of permutations in speculating on the true
nature of Morsi's political offensive, there are
many schools of thought on the significance and
implications of the Muslim Brotherhood's renewed
tug of war with the SCAF.
However, at
least on the surface, one thing is clear:
President Morsi's dismissal of Tantawi and Anan is
tantamount to a civilian coup, which has taken
many observers as well as the Egyptian nation
itself by surprise - potentially portending a new
era in Egyptian politics.
Of course, Morsi
is a former member of the Freedom and Justice
Party (FPJ), which represents the electoral wing
of the powerful Islamist umbrella organization,
the Muslim Brotherhood. He claimed the presidency
by narrowly defeating a regime insider (former
prime minister and Air Force chief commander under
Mubarak), Ahmad Shafik.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
