COMMENT Iran brings new direction to
NAM By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Although much of the world's media's
attention on this week's summit of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) in Tehran has focused on how it
benefits Iran and its counter-sanctions strategy,
so far little attention has been paid to the
related question of how the developing world's
global political movement benefits from Iran's
input, particularly now that Tehran has assumed
NAM's stewardship for the next three years?
The answer is relatively straightforward,
that is, Iran is helping NAM recapture its
original political imagination, reflected in the
1955 founding Bandung summit's 10 principles
emphasizing independence and solidaristic
anti-hegemonic orientation, in light of Iran's
"neither east, nor west" ideological expression
that has
been a hallmark of the
post-revolutionary order in Iran.
One may
compare this to, say, Egypt and Cuba, the past two
NAM presidents, one (under Hosni Mubarak) clearly
aligned with the West and the other carrying a
long legacy of being a part of the eastern bloc
during the Cold War.
The contrast with
Iran's complete harmony of its foreign policy
orientation with the NAM norms and principles
means that the movement has taken a healthy turn
toward self-renewal by elevating Iran as its next
leader, which in turn gives Tehran a good deal of
latitude in shaping NAM's next moves, for example
at the United Nations, where NAM's eyes are
focused on a meaningful UN reform, such as the
expansion of the Security Council and enhancing
the role of General Assembly.
Nearly 20
years ago, this author in his book, After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign
Policy (Westview, 1994), articulated a theory
of Iran's foreign policy that was much indebted to
the late French philosopher, Michel Foucault, and
his specific concept of "cameralism" denoting a
unique logic of evolution on the part of the
Islamic Republic that dictated a greater and
greater role as an "international actor".
Revisiting the final chapter of that book,
sub-titled "Iran as an international power", may
be instructive for a better insight into this
week's historic summit in Tehran and Iran's new
NAM presidency:
Yet, inside Iran there persists the
belief that Iran by virtue of its old
civilization or the dynamism of its religious
ideology, has been destined to play a crucial
role in reshaping global politics ... the Cold
War's end has helped Iran project power beyond
its immediate region and acquire a semblance of
influence in international affairs...
Iran has been building up its network of
international solidarity, and its ideological
appeal has picked up momentum instead of waning
... For Iran there is little room to compromise
this identity because of the fusing of foreign
and domestic issues. Almost all of the country's
identity pivots around the definition of its
special place in Muslim international politics.
The founding of the Islamic Republic was
attacked to the realm, in Husserl's term, of a
"world constituting subjectivity" that bespoke
of Iran's emergence as an international power of
a different kind, ie, as a "moral superpower"...
the regime's Third Worldist concerns with
"underdevelopment," North-South relations,
anti-imperialism, and so on, have remained
virtually unchanged today, although the
perception of the method of dealing with those
problems has changed dramatically ...
Overall, the newness in Iran's Third
World strategy consists of a fresh rethinking of
the entire problematic of domination and
resistance on the world level. Iran's new
penchant for a Third-World struggle from inside
the IOs (international organizations) resonates
with Krasner's insight that "Third World states
have been able to change, to some degree, all
regimes to which they had access, or in which
their sovereignty could be used effectively ...
In this connection, charting a new path for NAM
requires a great deal of sensitivity by the
Iranian foreign policy leaders to the logic of
Third World diversity and to the limits of their
Third World strategy. [1]
In
retrospect, I would not be inclined to make any
changes in that book's narrative that, at least
with respect to the particular issue of NAM and
the requirements of Third Worldist politics, has
withstood the test of time. Of course, the nature
of problems confronting NAM has undergone some
significant changes, while remaining rather
constant with respect to the traditional problems
of big power domination and underdevelopment.
Perhaps even India has realized this
important point, which may explain New Delhi's
high level of participation, along with the
largest delegation to the summit, a timely
turnaround from the bombastic post-NAM discourses
in India recently that questioned the
organization's relevance to an India that has
risen to the prominence of an "advanced"
industrial country.
But, the recent
extensive blackouts in India, affecting half the
population, have been a sore reminder that the
country still has a long way to go and, as a
corollary, should return to its initial NAM elan,
as championed by Jawaharlal Nehru some half a
century ago. Hence, in a certain sense, we are
witnessing India's "big return" to NAM, which,
along with Iran's presidency, is a god omen for
the movement's immediate future.
NAM today
could benefit from a new university that, much
like the UN University, could promote a culture of
peace and diversity, with special emphasis on
south-to-south student exchange and technical
cooperation with other universities in various NAM
countries. Such a university could prepare a young
generation of NAM leaders.
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