A
middle-way solution for
Syria By Kayhan Barzegar
On his recent visit to Moscow, Syrian
Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil said his
country's government was ready to negotiate the
resignation of the incumbent president, Bashar
al-Assad, during the process of talks with the
oppositions. This development is in itself a
turning point in the Syrian government's policy.
As the Syrian crisis lingers on, various
dimensions of it continue to increase, making it
clear that the crisis cannot be solved by the
current maximalist demands of each of the parties
involved. This reality has been highlighted as it
bears inevitable importance in finding a
"middle-way" solution that will take the interests
of all involved parties into account.
The
Syrian crisis has three levels of engagement.
First, domestically, in which the opponents and
supporters of the Syrian regime are pitted against
each other. The opponents, banking on
the latest developments
in the Arab Spring, give priority to such issues
as the necessity of promoting democracy, political
freedoms, human rights etc in Syria. In doing so,
they are trying to make the most of the Arab
Spring by drawing regional and international
public opinion to the necessity of changing
Assad's regime. On the other hand, supporters of
the government, relying on the security forces and
army, still sway the conflict and have succeeded
in driving the armed oppositions out of major
cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, in many cases.
Second, regionally, in which important
regional players such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey play respective roles and take maximalist
approaches in preserving their national and
security interests.
Iran, while keeping an
eye on its economic and ideological interests,
mostly considers the Syrian crisis in the context
of power relations and preservation of the
existing regional balance of power, thus
containing the threats posed by the US and Israel.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, mostly
considers the crisis in Syria in the context of
preserving security. The conservative regime in
Riyadh is trying to keep the sweeping waves of the
Arab Spring away from its own borders as well as
Bahrain. As a result, it has made the Syrian
crisis - as a way of putting pressure on Iran and
containing Tehran's regional role - a priority for
its regional policies.
Turkey, mostly in
the context of regional leadership and its soft
power, is interested in changing Assad's regime.
Of course, in its effort to make the most
opportunistic use of regional developments through
the Syrian crisis, the ruling Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP) has been facing a serious
challenge and is under tremendous domestic
pressure from those who accuse Ankara of having
chosen an inappropriate policy toward this crisis.
And third is the trans-regional level of
confrontation in which Russia and the US are lined
against each other. Russia is mostly willing to
contain the United States' influence in the region
while keeping its traditional and strategic ally,
Bashar al-Assad's regime, intact. Concurrently, as
a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, Russia is cautious about the issues
related to protecting the international peace and
security as well as human rights.
The
United States' ultimate goal is to implement a
regime change in Syria at minimum costs while
making the most of the dynamics of Syria's
domestic politics and the wave of developments in
the Arab world. Although the US theoretically
bases its current rhetoric on the state of human
rights and democracy in Syria, one should note
that the first and foremost priority is still to
meet its own interests: protecting the security of
the Israeli regime and curbing Iran's regional
role.
Therefore, all political players
nationally, regionally and internationally pursue
their own maximalist approaches, and this is why
the crisis in Syria has continued so far and could
potentially continue on for many months to come.
In other words, the complex relationship between
the country's domestic and regional issues is such
that none of the players can meet their interests,
maximally, on their own.
Under these
circumstances, the scenario of President Assad's
resignation, in the process of political
transformation, could be a starting point for more
proximity among all belligerent parties and even
perhaps a prelude in achieving a sustainable
solution for the Syrian crisis. Syria's armed
oppositions may be able to remove Assad's regime,
if supported by foreign forces, but this would
indeed be very costly.
An intermediate
solution, however, could possibly be acceptable to
all sides. Although Iran prefers to have the Assad
regime intact, it is likely to accept changes in
the process of political transition. For Iran, the
most important matter is to use the changes in the
Syrian regime to maintain the clout of the
resistance front in the region, enabling it to
take up positions later. Saudi Arabia, which is
always keen on maintaining its own security, is
likely to agree with a gradual political
transition that can lead to the removal of Assad
from power. In view of its own domestic problems,
Turkey is also sure to agree with the current
regime staying in place if Assad himself steps
down.
At the international level, Russia,
the US, China, and even the European Union are
also concerned that the civil war in Syria could
spread to other parts of the region. Such a
situation might lead to the strengthening of
violent groups such as al-Qaeda as well as the
intensification of regional rivalries. Therefore,
they are also likely to agree, though reluctantly,
with the gradual transference of political power
in the context of the current Syrian regime.
Under these circumstances, an announcement
of the resignation of Assad through a transitional
process would seem to be a middle-way solution.
The success of this solution, however, depends on
providing the necessary guarantees and commitments
from all players at the aforesaid levels. This can
only be achieved by holding a number of peace
conferences.
Kayhan Barzegar is
director of the Institute for Middle East
Strategic Studies. He is also chairman of the
Department of Political Science and International
Relations, Science and Research Branch of the
Islamic Azad University in Tehran.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
