'Teachable moments' loom in Syrian
conflict By Christof Lehmann
After more than 18 months of belligerent
action against the government de jure of the
Syrian Arab Republic, the regime is still
maintaining relative stability and security. A
peaceful resolution however, becomes increasingly
illusive while the potentially catastrophic
regional and global consequences of the failure to
broker a peaceful resolution seem to be a
harbinger of a return to global barbarism, anarchy
and unspeakable human suffering.
NATO's
victory and teachable moments in Libya. In
an article, published in Foreign Affairs
March/April 2012 edition which was published prior
to the 25th summit of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in Chicago, Ivo H Daalder, the
US Permanent Representative to NATO, and James G
Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander and Commander
of the US European
Command, gave a clear
indication of what NATO has in mind for Syria.
Daalder and Stavridis described NATO's
Operation Unified Protector in Libya as "NATO's
Victory in Libya. The Right Way to Run and
Intervention" and as "A Teachable Moment". [1]
What was so "teachable" about Libya, and
what is "The Right Way to Run an Intervention"? An
analysis of NATO's post 25th summit doctrine and
the consequences for security and stability in the
Middle East points to a two-tiered NATO strategy
that combines low cost, low intensity,
illegitimate warfare with an aggressive nuclear
posture. [2]
There are in fact numerous
teachable moments in the phenomena that is
euphemized under the name "The Arab Spring":
the successful political manipulation of
Turkey;
the successful implementation of plans
developed by the RAND Corporation, which already
in 1996 advised that Turkey should be governed by
Abdullah Gul in the office of president and Recep
Tayyip Erdogan in the office of prime minister, as
a precondition for a successful implementation of
a comprehensive solution for the Middle East;
the successful transformation of the Turkish
High Command from a bastion of secularism into a
High Command that would cooperate with Muslim
Brothers and Al-Qaeda mercenaries in preparation
of the division of both Syria and Turkey along
ethnic lines;
the successful manufacturing of a crisis as
precondition for the successful abuse of a UN
Security Council resolution, as a precondition for
the successful implementation of regime change.
A UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution is
adopted when it has the concurrent vote of all
permanent members. However, since resolution #4
(1948) on Spain it has become practice that
abstentions are interpreted as a passive or
quasi-concurrent vote. This practice implied that
the members who propose the resolution are not
overstepping the resolutions authorizations to a
significant degree.
When Russia and China
abstained on UNSC resolution #1973 (2011) on Libya
it was implicitly understood that Russia and China
expected that NATO would adhere to the letter of
the resolution and not overstep it in any
significant degree. It should be added here, that
the fact that the UNSC has adopted a resolution
does not necessarily make it legitimate.
What Daalder and Stavridis also found
"teachable" was that NATO or its allies could
disregard the Convention against the Use of
Mercenaries and use the al-Qaeda-associated Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group as infantry, while abusing
resolution 1973 to wage an aerial war against the
Libyan military.
Special Forces on the
ground would function as liaison within a joint
command while NATO could enjoy "plausible
deniability". The Libyan government de jure was
ousted, the head of state murdered in cold blood,
an independent investigation into his death could
be prevented, a proxy government could be
installed.
It is not surprising that
Daalder and Stavridis proclaim a NATO victory in
Libya. From a NATO perspective it was in deed a
victory and a teachable moment. It was also a
moment that has taught both Russia and China that
NATO will abuse an abstention at the Security
Council to implement wars of aggression.
The UN Security Council has since been
frozen in a deadlock between NATO members on one
hand and China and Russia on the other. The
deadlock has brought the necessity of structural
changes within the United Nations into focus.
The United Nations is rapidly loosing its
residual credibility and functionality as an
instrument for conflict resolution while security
and stability in the Middle East are
deteriorating. Negotiating a peaceful resolution
of the conflict in Syria, for the brewing conflict
between NATO, Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council
member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) on one hand, and
Iran, Russia, China on the other at the UN seems
increasingly implausible, if not impossible.
NATO's victory in Libya not only brought
about regime change, it also devastated the
countries infrastructure, divided the country
along tribal and ethnic lines, and resulted in a
weak and split national government that is unable
to maintain internal as well as external stability
and security.
What is most worrying about
Daalder's and Stavridis interpretations of Libya
as a victory and teachable moment is that it
implies that the achievement of the
destabilization of Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and
subsequently Turkey are also likely to be
perceived as victories and teachable moments.
The cost of further NATO victories in
terms of regional and global stability and
security, in terms of the economies of Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, Turkey and the global economy, the
cost in terms of a deterioration of international
law and a return to barbarism and anarchy in
conflict and conflict resolution, and the cost in
terms of human suffering are staggering.
Peaceful resolution in Syria and good
faith The primary precondition for a
peaceful resolution to the crisis in Syria is that
all parties are negotiating and acting in good
faith.
An immediate withdrawal of all NATO and GCC
member states special forces and other military
personnel from Syria is a minimum precondition for
showing good faith.
An immediate adherence to the Convention
against the Use of Mercenary Forces and other
international bodies of law by NATO and GCC member
states, Jordan, Lebanon or major political players
in Lebanon such as Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt,
Israel, Libya and any other nation that is
currently involved in financing, training, arming
or other support of insurgents and the armed
opposition.
An immediate establishment of strict controls
of refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.
Particularly the refugee camps in Turkey are being
systematically abused to recruit, train, arm and
deploy insurgents into Syria. Strict controls
would include that entrance into and exit from the
camps is strictly monitored by Turkish police or
military personnel, eventually with the
participation of military observers from one or
several non NATO or GCC member states.
The close monitoring of all Syrian borders by
neighboring countries military forces to stop the
illegal flow of weapons, troops and the deployment
of military observers from non NATO, GCC member
states.
The blatant violations of
international law in particular by Turkey and
Jordan, which not only offer their territory for
infiltration by foreign fighters, but also
actively take part in organizing the subversion,
and all logistical and other support of insurgents
must halt immediately.
The new joint
UN-Arab League envoy Ladhkah Brahmini should be
given the full support of all UN member states.
His role is, however, not likely to be perceived
as that of a neutral or fair broker, as long as
the Arab League upholds the dispensation of
Syria's membership. Brahmini will be facing an
insurmountable challenge as long as Saudi Arabia
and Turkey, which together with Iran and Egypt
form the Contact Group, are violating
international law and sponsoring the insurgency
and subversion.
Initiatives by the Arab
League to politically, diplomatically,
economically and otherwise isolate Syria which are
inherently opposed to the Charter of the Arab
League and its purported function do not create
preconditions for negotiations in good faith.
Illegitimate initiatives, such as the one
to pressure Arabsat and Nilesat to stop
broadcasting Syrian Radio and TV satellite signals
in order to facilitate absolute image and media
control by nations who are taking part in the
attempted subversion must cease.
A dialog
in good faith is not facilitated by one-sided,
strongly biased propaganda. The Organization of
the Islamic Conference must recall the
dispensation of Syria. The abuse of this
organization is dangerous and risks to aggravate a
religious dimension of the conflict and to further
aggravate the abuse of Sunni-Shia conflicts world
wide.
Organizations such as the "Friends
of Syria" group, which is a de facto subversive
alliance, must be abandoned as instruments for
finding a resolution to the conflict. The Friends
of Syria group is a de-facto cartel of nations
that meet to organize systematic violations of
international law in an attempt to bring about
regime change in Syria.
Iran last week
hosted a conference of 120 nations to work towards
a peaceful resolution of the crisis. It is a
positive initiative that should be supported, but
it is not likely to bring about a peaceful
resolution unless Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
the UAE will take part in good faith.
It
is a positive initiative that should be supported,
but it risks further aggravating the conflict
unless Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates are taking part and are
willing to play a constructive role, which is
unlikely.
In the absence of NATO and GCC
member states, Jordan's, Israel's, Libya's and
others good faith in negotiating a peaceful
resolution, the Iranian initiative may in fact be
part of the only viable alternative. If it is
supported by Russia and China it may have a chance
to succeed.
The second-best solution to an
all-inclusive solution that embraces the armed
political opposition and the nations that are
supporting it would be the establishment of a
multilateral group that protects Syria from the
consequences of a continued aggression. Such an
alternative solution could include the following
initiatives: countering the consequences of
attempts to diplomatically, politically,
economically and otherwise isolate the government
de jure of Syria by reinforcing diplomatic and
political relations; trade agreements that help
alleviate the devastating consequences of
sanctions; and diversifying the one-sided
international discourse about Syria.
Even
though political parties in Syria are legitimate,
and even though one opposition party is holding a
ministerial post in the unity government, there is
a lack of party infrastructure that makes
opposition parties equal competitors to the Arab
Socialist Ba'ath Party. Selective support of the
one or the other political party at building a
party infrastructure can be problematic and
invites unwarranted foreign interference.
A model for developing a democratic
culture and multi-party infrastructure projects
could facilitate a pluralistic political process
that could help to remedy the consequences of
decades of government under emergency laws.
When organizing those projects, it must be
taken into consideration that Syria, because of
its de-facto state of war with Israel, has had
heightened security needs that have not decreased
since the onset of the attempted subversion. A
long-term strategy of delegating political
influence and responsibilities to multiple
political parties is the best strategy to
discourage attempts to use violence and to
strengthen national coherence.
In the
event that the UN fails as an instrument to
safeguard the national sovereignty and security of
Syria while the subversive alliance continues the
illegitimate support of armed insurgents, it must
be considered to add a military dimension to
finding a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The government de jure of the Syrian Arab
Republic has the right to sign treaties with
friendly, non-hostile nations and deploy foreign
military troops on Syrian territory. Failure by
Turkey and Jordan to ensure that insurgents are
not using their territories as bases of operation
for transgressions in Syria could be countered by
the deployment of international troops along the
borders to help repel insurgents.
Further
failure of Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, as well
as NATO member states to halt the illegitimate
support could warrant diplomatic and other
sanctions.
Sadly, in the light of
sustained aggression, the most viable way to
secure peace and stability is to aid Syria by
establishing diplomatic, political, economical and
military credibility against a foreign aggression.
In closing this article, I would like to
reiterate that war crimes will be committed as
long as they can be committed with utter impunity.
The current state of affairs, where NATO and
allied nations instrumentalize the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and special tribunals for
political show trials and victor's justice, with
an ICC that in and of itself has no legitimacy in
international law on one hand, and a Kuala Lumpur
war crimes tribunal that has no other than moral
authority, it is unlikely that the international
regression into barbarism can be halted.
Those nations that wish to facilitate a
peaceful resolution of the crisis in Syria and who
want to prevent future aggressions would be well
advised to establish international jurisdiction
for the most serious crimes to limit war
criminals' ability to act with impunity.
Notes: 1. Daalder Ivo H,
Stavridis James G. (2012) "NATO's Victory in
Libya. The Right Way to Run an Intervention".
Foreign Affairs March/April 2012 pp 2-7 2.
Lehmann Christof (2012) "NATO`s 25th Summit in
Chicago in Preparation of Global Full Spectrum
Dominance, Interventionism, Possible Preparations
for A Regional War Directed against Russia and
China, and Developments in Global Security." nsnbc,
May 20, 2012.
Dr Christof
Lehmann, born 1958 in West Germany, was
Advisor for Research in Psycho-traumatology to
Yasser Arafat and survivors of the Sabra Shatila
massacre in 1982, secured a doctoral degree in
clinical psychology in 1986. He was adviser to
Joshua Nkomo on the impact of torture and
psychological trauma on conflict solution and
reconciliation in Zimbabweดs politics in
1986-1990, and advised Nelson Mandela on social
politics, public mental health and the effect of
psychological trauma on peace and reconciliation
in 1994-1997. Dr Lehmann is a practicing clinical
psychologist and runs an independent blog at:
http://nsnbc.wordpress.com
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