Unspoken Israeli-Saudi alliance
targets Iran By Chris Zambelis
The machinations surrounding Iran's
nuclear program continue to dominate international
headlines. A closer look at the atmospherics in
play indicates the presence of a web of competing
narratives that seek to delineate the threats Iran
allegedly poses to its neighbors and global
security.
The boilerplate rhetoric out of
Washington and US media regarding Iran is well
known. But sorting through the cacophony of public
threats of war, psychological operations, and
propaganda broadcast by Israel and Saudi Arabia -
Iran's primary regional adversaries - is equally
crucial toward understanding the geopolitics
surrounding the Iranian nuclear question and, in a
broader sense, Iran's place in the region.
Alongside the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia
have taken the lead in
articulating a litany of
purported threats emanating from the Islamic
Republic. On May 21, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated the long-standing
position held by Israel that views Iran as an
existential threat: "Iran wants to destroy Israel
and it is developing nuclear weapons to fulfill
that goal."
Relying on a sectarian
discourse, Saudi Arabia has also defined its fears
of Iran in existential terms. A special series
published by the Saudi daily Al-Jazirah just days
before the Kingdom dispatched its security forces
to Bahrain to suppress democratic opposition
protests led largely by Bahrain's oppressed
Shi'ite majority reflects Riyadh's deep-seated
antipathy for the Iran. The inflammatory title of
the series, "Safavid Iran's plans for the
destruction of the Gulf States", is of particular
importance. The reference to Iran's Safavid legacy
draws attention to the Persian Empire's adoption
of Shi'ite Islam as its official religion. By
highlighting Iran's Shi'ite character, Saudi
Arabia is able to define the perceived threat from
the republic in territorial as well as ideological
and theological terms.
Paradoxically,
Israel and Saudi Arabia are officially enemies.
Yet they appear to be acting in lockstep - almost
in a perfect symbiosis - when it comes to
undermining and attacking Iran and painting it as
a threat to regional and world peace. A sampling
of the collective responses of both countries to
matters related to Iran and other areas of mutual
concern, such as the course of the uprisings in
the Arab world, suggests that the Israeli-Saudi
interface represents more than a temporary pact of
convenience. Indeed, the convergence of their
interests over Iran constitutes an unspoken
strategic alliance that runs deeper than either
side cares to admit.
Silence speaks
volumes Israel regularly lambastes Iran for
supporting its nemeses Hezbollah in Lebanon and
Hamas in Palestine. At the same time, it mutes any
serious criticism of Saudi Arabia despite Riyadh's
support for the militant Salafist and Wahhabist
ideologies that serve as the intellectual and
ideological infrastructure of al-Qaeda's brand of
extremism.
Keen to preserve its military
superiority in the Middle East, Israel has
historically expressed strong opposition to
attempts by the US and other major arms producers
to sell advanced weapons platforms and defense
systems to its neighbors - friends and foes alike.
Yet Israel has tempered its usual disapproval of
the sales of tens of billions of dollars' worth of
arms by the US to Saudi Arabia and its Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) allies over the past few
years. In contrast to its reactions to similar
deals concluded in the past, Israel has remained
noticeably silent over the most recent of these
sales, counted as among the largest arms-transfer
agreements ever concluded by the US with foreign
nations.
The reasons behind Israel's quiet
acquiescence to the arms sales are telling. On the
surface, the timing of the latest sales was
designed to bolster Saudi Arabia's deterrence
posture in the face of growing Iranian influence
in the Persian Gulf. They also signal Washington's
commitment to Riyadh's defense amid intensifying
tensions with Iran.
An emboldened Saudi
Arabia keeps Iran on the defensive and preoccupied
with outmaneuvering its neighbors in the Gulf
region. Consequently, this scenario indirectly
strengthens Israel's position relative to Iran.
These circumstances are amenable to Israel because
it does not perceive Saudi Arabia and its GCC
allies as threats. On the contrary, their shared
interest in containing Iran make Israel and Saudi
Arabia natural allies.
Ever sensitive to
the precariousness of Saudi Arabia's position when
it comes to any hint of collaboration - both
official and covert - with Israel, Israeli
politicians are careful to play down the extent of
their joint strategic interests with Riyadh. The
geopolitics underlying the Israeli-Saudi
relationship is not, however, lost by observers in
Israel. Media and research institutes there often
allude to the convergence of Israeli and Saudi
interests when it comes to a range of topics
involving Iran. An opinion piece published by the
Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth in April 2011
titled "Our Saudi Arabian allies" illustrates this
point.
While a similar set of dynamics is
evident in Saudi Arabia's behavior toward Israel
as it relates to Iran, Riyadh takes a different
approach. It is quick to condemn Iran's nuclear
program in public. Riyadh and some of its GCC
partners have also gone as far as to threaten to
initiate their own domestic nuclear-weapons
programs in the event that Tehran were to achieve
a nuclear capability.
Saudi Arabia has
also implored the US to take action against Iran.
According to a US diplomatic cable drafted in
April 2008 and exposed by WikiLeaks, Saudi
Arabia's King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz is reported
have called on the United States to "cut off the
head of the snake" in dealing with Iran while
affirming the kingdom's commitment to work with
Washington to undermine Tehran.
At the
same time, Saudi Arabia is curiously reticent when
it comes to any mention of Israel's nuclear
arsenal. In addition to fielding one of the
world's most technologically advanced and powerful
conventional military forces, Israel boasts a
nuclear-weapons inventory that may contain up to
400 warheads. Yet in contrast to its treatment of
the Iranian nuclear program, Israel's nuclear
arsenal does not constitute a Saudi concern. While
the prospect of a nuclear-capable Iran may spur it
to pursue its own nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia
has never expressed any interest in matching
Israel's nuclear arsenal with one of its own.
Saudi Arabia's deference to its quiet
Israeli partner extends beyond the Iran portfolio
and is especially evident in its approach to
Palestine. As a regime that derives its legitimacy
from its status as the self-proclaimed guardian of
Islam's two holiest places, Saudi Arabia must
tread carefully in how it navigates its tacit
relationship with Israel.
Officially, the
kingdom supports the Palestinian struggle for
self-determination amid Israel's continued
occupation of Palestinian land. But despite its
formidable geopolitical and economic influence, it
has been decades since Saudi Arabia has thrown its
weight behind the Palestinian cause. This is the
case despite widespread sympathy among Arabs and
Muslims more broadly on Palestinian suffering.
Saudi Arabia's relative inaction toward
Palestine is important considering the kingdom's
willingness to engage forcefully on other issues
that resonate with Arabs and Muslims. For example,
it was in the forefront of organizing a global
consumer boycott of Danish products after the
publication of inflammatory cartoons mocking the
Prophet Muhammad in the Danish daily
Jyllands-Posten in September 2005. Muslims around
the globe applied a consumer boycott against
Danish products, devastating that country's
exports in a number of critical sectors. Saudi
Arabia also recalled its ambassador to Denmark,
hurting Copenhagen's diplomatic standing in the
Middle East among the global Muslim community.
Saudi Arabia's official clerical
establishment and media helped shape a powerful
narrative that resonated among a wide constituency
while Saudi diplomacy paved the way for Muslims to
direct their ire toward Denmark. Its behavior
during the height of the cartoon controversy is
illustrative of the kingdom's potential to shape
global events in its favor relatively quickly.
The vigor and unity of purpose displayed
by Saudi institutions in the diplomatic, economic,
ideological and media realms in the name of
Islamic solidarity during the cartoon controversy
and on matters related to Iran are noticeably
absent when it comes to pressuring Israel to
withdraw from Palestinian land or refrain from
continued construction of settlements in the
occupied territories.
The US
linchpin The nature of the bond between
Israel and Saudi Arabia should come as no
surprise. The two countries constitute the pillars
of an alliance network in the Middle East crafted
and honed by the US for decades. In this regard,
it would seem rational to conclude that Israeli
and Saudi moves against Iran are sanctioned,
encouraged, and actively facilitated by the United
States.
After all, the US and Iran have
been adversaries since the Islamic Revolution
ousted the Shah in 1979. Any efforts by the
Israelis and Saudis to undercut Iran, by
definition, should further US interests.
Such a perspective would suggest that
Israel and Saudi Arabia act as surrogates for
advancing US interests related to Iran and other
regional matters. To a great extent, this scenario
applies. In a broad sense, the interests of Israel
and Saudi Arabia appear to align with US interests
in most respects over Iran. All three countries
maintain an adversarial relationship with Iran and
view it as a threat, in varying degrees, to their
respective interests.
A consideration of
the history of US foreign policy toward the Middle
East lends credence to this argument. During the
Cold War, Israel and Saudi Arabia stood alongside
the United States in checking the spread of Soviet
influence in the Middle East and beyond and
undermining Arab nationalism.
Emergent
divergences and smokescreens It is worth
highlighting that major gaps also exist between
the US on the one hand and Israel and Saudi Arabia
on the other when it comes to their unique
perceptions of and approaches to Iran. This
divergence of interests is most apparent when it
comes to how each actor assesses the potential
impact a nuclear Iran will have on its respective
strategic posture.
Despite the hardline
rhetoric out of Washington, American planners may
have already come around to reluctantly accepting
the reality of a nuclear Iran somewhere down the
line that will need to be engaged diplomatically.
Even a limited rapprochement between the US and
Iran would have a profound impact on the
geopolitical map of the Middle East.
The
hope of improved US-Iranian relations would
immediately help ease many of the most acute
regional tensions that keep the Middle East on the
brink of war and global energy prices at record
and unsustainable highs. This possibility would
also pave the way for the development of lucrative
economic ties between Washington and Tehran in
critical sectors such as oil and natural gas. In
the long run, the relative importance of Israel
and Saudi Arabia to the US would decline as a
result of any kind of rapprochement between
Washington and Tehran.
In this context,
Israel and Saudi Arabia not only have an interest
in undercutting Iran; they are also heavily
invested in the persistence of US-Iranian enmity.
Israeli and Saudi planners are well aware that the
US is powerful enough to recalibrate its strategic
conception of the Middle East to account for major
changes that include the normalization of
relations with Iran all the while simultaneously
maintaining constructive ties with Israel and
Saudi Arabia.
Alternatively, Israel's
relentless threats and diatribes against Iran may
have been conceived to achieve a different set of
goals. For all its bluster, there is little
evidence to indicate that Israel could
successfully execute an attack against Iran's
nuclear program and achieve any sort of military
success. The scale of the regional conflagration
and global economic catastrophe that would
certainly follow an Israeli strike is also likely
deterring Israel from following through with its
threats.
Nevertheless, drawing the world's
attention to Iran enables Israel to divert the
eyes of international public opinion away from its
ongoing occupation of Palestinian land; doing so
provides it with the cover it needs to consolidate
its hold permanently over the lives of millions of
Palestinians and their natural resources - water,
oil and natural gas - in the West Bank, Gaza and
East Jerusalem. Defined as illegal under
international law, Israeli settlements in the
occupied territories continue to be constructed at
record pace, creating new facts on the ground.
Meanwhile, Palestinians are left to inhabit
disconnected and impoverished enclaves reminiscent
of the South African-style Bantustans born out of
the apartheid era.
Conclusion The unspoken alliance
between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains in full
force as popular Arab revolts against tyranny
transform the region. Heavily invested in the old
status quo, Israel and Saudi Arabia (and its GCC
partners) are marshaling efforts to lead a
counterrevolution to co-opt fledgling democracies
in countries such as Egypt that are seeing
previously suppressed demands for freedom,
accountability, dignity and independence shape a
new politics.
Yet the interests of Israel
and Saudi Arabia diverge greatly over events in
Syria. On the surface, they should equally relish
the possibility of Iran's most important ally
crumbling. But only Saudi Arabia, a principal
supporter of the political and violent militant
factions making up the Syrian opposition, appears
determined to destroy the Baathist regime.
Israel stands to lose a great deal in the
event that Syria's Baathist regime falls. The
regime has largely ignored Israel's occupation of
its Golan Heights and the thousands of Israeli
settlers who inhabit Syrian territory. This has
allowed Israel to devote its military resources to
other theaters. A post-Baathist order in Syria
that sees the rise of an Islamist-oriented regime
or the country plunged into years of internecine
strife might witness an attempt to recapture the
territory based on the model of armed resistance
employed by Hezbollah against Israeli forces in
southern Lebanon.
In spite of their
differences over Syria, however, the course of
regional events involving Iran and other matters
provide fertile ground for continued strategic
cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Chris Zambelis is an analyst and
researcher specializing in Middle East affairs
with Helios Global Inc, a risk-management group
based in the Washington, DC, area. The opinions
expressed here are the author's alone and do not
necessarily reflect the position of Helios
Global.
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