Silk
Road nears an historic
opening By Vijay Prashad
On the sidelines of the 16th Non-Aligned
Movement Summit in Tehran, Iran, two significant
meetings took place. Pakistani President Asif Ali
Zardari met with the Iranian President Mahmud
Ahmedinejad to review the relations between their
countries.
The second meeting was a
trilateral discussion between senior foreign
ministry officials from Afghanistan, India and
Iran. Productive discussions in both sessions
furthered the attempt to create a new "Southern
Silk Road" connecting Iran to Central and South
Asia through rail-lines and roads, and of course
two major ports in the Gulf of Oman.
Afghanistan, India and Iran have worked
since 2003 to come to an agreement over the port
of Chabahar in south-eastern Iran, and to
link this port to
Afghanistan by Indian and Iranian built road and
rail systems (see The
Iran-Indian-Afghanistan Riddle," Asia Times
Online, August 28, 2012). At their trilateral
meeting, the foreign ministry officials agreed to
set up a joint working group (JWG) "to take the
discussions forward", as the Indian Ministry of
External Affairs put it. According to shipping
analysts, about 70% of the construction of
Chabahar is complete, with most of the investment
coming from Iran. The sanctions have hit Iran
hard, and the Iranian government now hopes that
India will be able to invest in the completion of
the port. The JWG will meet in three months.
One of the underlying fears is that the
Chabahar port will further alienate Pakistan from
India and Afghanistan. The natural route to link
Kabul to India is through the Bolan and Khyber
passes, both in Pakistan, but mistrust between the
Delhi and Islamabad has slowed the use of these
transit points.
On his return from the
NAM, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held up
hope for a summit between President Zardari and
himself to deepen the confidence between the two
countries. On September 8, the foreign ministers
of India (S M Krishna) and Pakistan (Hina Rabbani
Khar) signed a joint statement that goes some way
toward the creation of confidence between the two
states, including a bid to increase "cross-border
trade".
Nonetheless, former Indian and UN
Ambassador Prakash Shah tells me that he fears
that the JWG was set up to forestall an immediate
commitment to Chabahar so as not to "annoy"
Pakistan. Senior Iranian and Indian officials
disagree, saying that they believe that the JWG
was set up to placate US fears that Afghanistan
and India have failed to join the US-led embargo
of Iran. Better a slow process to ally Washington
than anything precipitous, they suggest.
The meeting between Zardari and
Ahmedinejad provides a window into a less
pessimistic scenario. They reviewed the extensive
ties between Iran and Pakistan, notably the
proposed 2,700 kilometer gas pipeline from the
South Pars field (in Iran's Assalouyeh Energy Zone
in the south) through Balochistan and Sindh into
Punjab. As well, the two leaders discussed the
1000 MW power transmission line that is to run
from Taftan to Quetta, the upgrades for the rail
line and road that link Taftan to Quetta, and
pointedly, the 100 MW power supply project for
Gwadar.
Zardari and Ahmedinejad briefly
discussed a transportation link between Gwadar and
Chabahar. That Iran is involved in the Gwadar
power grid suggests that Tehran does not see
Chabahar as competition to the Gwadar port
(control of which, formerly with Singapore's PSA
International, is reportedly to be handed over to
the Chinese government, as reported by Syed
Fazl-e-Haider in China
set to run Gwadar port as Singapore quits,
Asia Times Online, September 5, 2012).
Shortly after the NAM Summit, China's
Minister of National Defense, Liang Guanglie,
visited New Delhi. India and China will conduct
naval exercises within the year, building on links
that opened up in 2003 and have deepened through
joint anti-piracy work. In an interview with The
Hindu, General Liang tried to dispel the view that
China has an aggressive posture toward India in
Kashmir, Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh. He also
pointed out that "China has no plans for Indian
Ocean military bases."
China has, however,
been deeply involved in infrastructure projects,
notably port building in the Indian Ocean. In
June, the Sri Lankan port at Hambantota was opened
when 1,000 Indian-made cars were off-loaded there.
The US$1.5 billion port was constructed with very
large Chinese investments.
China had
invested hundreds of million of dollars for the
construction of Pakistan's Gwadar port, and it is
slated to invest heavily in the construction of
deep-sea ports in Myanmar's Indian Ocean cities of
Dawei and Kyaukpyu. Gwadar, Dawei and Kyaukpyu
will allow China to circumvent its reliance upon
the congested Straits of Malacca for the oil
tankers that carry 60% of its oil (by 2015, it is
estimated that the figure will rise to 75% if
these ports do not take up the slack).
China has no seat at the table during the
JWG neither at the summit between India and
Pakistan. Nevertheless, if China takes a positive
tone toward these developments it might be able to
use its influence in the region to create the
policy space for these projects to go ahead.
General Liang's statement that the India-China
border dispute is "an issue left over from
history" is indicative of the kind of approach the
region should take toward its suspicions. This is
at least the hope of India's Singh, who has long
suggested that trade is a worthwhile salve over
the wounds of history.
There is an
underside to these developments that does not get
mentioned much. At an investment summit for
Afghanistan this June in Delhi, India's Foreign
Minister S M Krishna asked the corporate leaders
to "let the gray suits of company executives take
the place of olive green or desert brown fatigues
of soldiers."
The sentiment is a genuine
one, and it indicates that the Indian government
would prefer that the corporate sector take charge
rather than the military sector. But the corporate
sector's own ambitions do not comport with the
needs of the majority the people in the region,
nor with the requirements of peace. Corporations
are in the game to make money. They have little
other motivation. It would limit the Southern Silk
Road if it were turned over to private enterprise,
whose history shows us that it creates more
distress than development.
The
anthropologist Hafees Jamali warns that the
benefits of Gwadar, for instance, have not accrued
to the local Baloch population, notably the
fisherfolk (see Dispatches from Pakistan,
edited by Qalandar Bux Memon, Madiha Tahir and
myself, to appear soon from Delhi's LeftWord
Books). They initially protested when their lands
were seized, then when their fishing rights were
curtailed, and finally when their access to their
Sufi shrines was diminished. Their civic protests
were met with the full force of the Pakistani
police and military, and this reaction turned them
from citizens to Baloch nationalists.
The
Southern Silk Road is an important development in
the creation of regionalism, linking South Asia to
Central Asia, West Asia to China. No longer will
these regions need to go through US and
European-dominated routes to conduct their trade.
The hub (US-Europe) and spokes (rest) approach to
world affairs is being rendered anachronistic by
these developments.
As a result of the
growth of regionalism, US primacy and its unipolar
approach is being set aside. The deepening links
with Iran are a testament to the lack of US
domination in the region, and of its political
failure to isolate Iran. The challenge for the
Southern Silk Road will be in the character of its
developments: whether these actually benefit the
people or become sore spots that fuel insurgency
and unrest. To turn the Road into another
boondoggle for corporations would be more than a
pity. It would be a waste of a historic
opportunity.
Vijay Prashad's new
book, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter, is
published by AK Press.
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