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2 INTERVIEW On Syria and way
beyond By Lars Schall
It is obvious that the German government
has learned its lesson from refraining to support
the military intervention in Libya, which caused a
serious setback in the political relations with
its NATO partners and which has diminished the
chances of German enterprises benefiting from the
economic reconstruction of the North African
country. This time, Germany plays not only a
leading role in the context of the EU decisions
for economic
sanctions against Syria but
also in the united support of the Western powers
for the Syrian opposition, including the provision
of intelligence.
LS: What's
your perception of the role of Saudi Arabia and
Qatar?
GM: Both countries
are in the forefront of adversaries against the
Syrian regime. They are the main financial
supporters of the Syrian opposition, including
financing of the weapons supply for the rebels.
There are even reports from unrevealed sources in
Arab media that Saudi Arabia would be prepared to
pay the expenses for a full-scale military
intervention in Syria by NATO.
Why is this
conservative Sunni monarchy so keen on ousting
Bashar al-Assad? There is first of all the
religiously motivated objection against the
Alawite ruler and against the political, economic
and military alliance between Damascus and the
Shiite government in Tehran, which is perceived as
the major threat for the member states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council.
The fall of the
Syrian regime would be a tremendous blow for
Iranian political influence in the Middle East.
The government in Tehran is accused of supporting
the Shi'ite opposition in the oil rich eastern
province of Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, in northern
Yemen and especially in Bahrain. Here, the
uprising of the Shi'ite majority of the population
against the ruling Sunni minority could only be
suppressed by troops from Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates.
The Qatari ruler's
decision to support the Syrian opposition included
not only the provision of financial means but also
the use of Al Jazeera to spread propaganda news in
favor of the rebels. In the past, the Doha-based
TV channel had gained the reputation of the
leading independent, objective and highly critical
news channel in the Arab world. It had played an
important role as the most reliable source of
information about the revolutions in Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya.
The positive image was
shattered when the channel became a one-sided
voice for the Qatari government's policy against
Bashar al-Assad and when even falsified news about
the Syrian regime was produced. This became public
in a video documentation that appeared on YouTube,
showing how a film based on invented information
about the alleged brutality of the Syrian regime
was staged by a journalist of Al Jazeera. [18]
LS: And what about Turkey?
GM: Before the Syrian
uprising, the relations between the two countries
were very good. The major conflict of the past had
been settled, ie Turkey guaranteed sufficient
supply of Euphrates water and the Syrian
government stopped support of the Kurdish Workers'
Party. During the early phase of the Arab Spring,
the Turkish government had supported the uprising
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and Erdogan's
moderate Islamic state was hailed as the ideal
political model for the post-revolutionary Arab
states.
Soon after the unrest in Syria
started, the Turkish government joined the Arab
Gulf states in their support of the opposition,
provided shelter for the refugees and allowed
other NATO states to train Syrian fighters on
Turkish territory. [19] This position came more
and more under attack by the secular Turkish
opposition, which accused Erdogan of trying to
install an Islamist Sunni government in Damascus
and of sacrificing the lives of two Turkish pilots
whose warplane was shot down when it crossed
Syrian territory in order to test the efficiency
of the anti-aircraft forces in Syria. The original
support by the majority of the Turkish population
for a democratic change in the neighboring country
is dwindling while the apprehension is growing
that Ankara´s involvement in the Syrian crisis
will have a negative impact on the national
security and economy.
LS:
Given those influences, hasn't the war in Syria
ceased to be a civil war and has actually become a
combined operation of outside forces?
GM: It is still a civil war
but with increasing intervention from abroad. Many
political analysts refer in this context to proxy
wars between the US and Russia as well as Sunni
versus Shi'ite states.
LS:
What do you expect in the case that Assad is
toppled?
GM: First of all,
the regime is still in power and it is an open
question whether it will be ousted at all. Some of
my Arab colleagues point out that the support of
the regime has even increased as a result of the
recent atrocities committed by rebel groups.
The majority of the Assad loyalists are by
no means happy about the authoritarian political
system, but they are afraid that their situation
will be much worse when the opposition comes to
power in Syria. This applies not only to Alawites,
who represent about 13% of the population and who
fear massive revenge killings. The more than 2
million members of the various Christian
dominations and also other religious minorities
such as Druze and Ismailis are afraid of becoming
discriminated second-class citizens under an
Islamist Sunni government.
Other
supporters of the regime are to be found among the
people who are employed by the government,
including positions in the military, in the
security services, in the administration and
various public services. The report about a
postman who was murdered by Salafi rebels only
because he had received his salary from the
government [3] has been regarded by many public
servants as a strong warning of what may happen to
them when the opposition gains control in Syria.
From a regional perspective, the opponents
of the regime originate mainly from the rural
areas. The economic situation of the population
working in agriculture has deteriorated
significantly since 2006 due the liberalization
policy adopted by the government, which included
the abandoning of subsidies for agricultural
inputs.
In addition, a long period of
drought destroyed the economic basis of numerous
farmers so that about 1.5 million people migrated
into the cities. Numerous craftsmen belong also to
the losers of the economic reforms because cheap
industrial imports have flooded the Syrian market
and led to a decline in demand for their handmade
products. This may explain for example why Duma, a
suburb of Damascus with numerous small workshops,
turned into a center of resistance against the
government. [20]
One the other hand, the
urban middle classes, and here especially the
merchants, benefited significantly from the
liberalization of the economy. The majority of
them living in Damascus and the economic
metropolis of Aleppo are still loyal to the
government. This became obvious when the rebels
occupied some quarters in Aleppo. They received
support only from the inhabitants of suburbs with
a dominant population of rural migrants. In the
other parts of the city the rebels were met with
reservation and hostility, whereas the government
troops were warmly welcomed as rescuer who had
saved the inhabitants from the intruders.
The about 2 million Kurds in the northern
part of the country represent another group that
will play a vital role for the future development
of Syria. At present, government troops have
almost completely withdrawn from this area. There
are strong demands from Kurdish representatives
for a future autonomous or at least
semi-autonomous Kurdish region, resulting even in
fist-fighting between Kurdish and Arab
representatives of the opposition during a meeting
in Cairo. [21] However, the Kurdish population in
Syria is by no means united, but split into about
a dozen groups with different political
orientations. It is also unlikely that the Turkish
government would tolerate such a
partly-independent Kurdish region, which could
serve as a safe haven for PKK fighters.
Another problem is the "Arabic belt" along
the Turkish border in the northeastern oil-rich
Kurdish area. Here, 43 villages were established
in the 1970s for more than 20,000 Arab inhabitants
of rural settlements that were flooded after the
construction of the Euphrates dam. The land for
these new villages had been expropriated from
Kurdish landowners and was handed over the Arab
settlers.
I am familiar with the situation
of this Arab community because I carried out a
survey about the social and economic conditions in
all villages. [22] The number of the inhabitants
has in the meantime increased to about 100,000
people, who are now confronted with Kurdish
demands to return the land to the former owners
and even to leave the area completely.
I
have tried to explain that the above-mentioned
religious, socio-economic and ethnic groups have
quite different expectations for the future
development of Syria. Differentiated according to
the political orientation, there is a wide
spectrum of groups ranging from supporters of a
reformed Assad regime via promoters of a
Western-style secular democracy, to fighters for a
Sunni-dominated state based on Islamic law. The
latter model has the probably the best chances to
succeed due to the massive support from other Arab
states and the fact that the vast majority of the
Syrians are Sunnis.
LS:
Patrick Seale wrote in a recent tour d'horizon:
The Middle East is facing an acute
danger of war, with unpredictable and
potentially devastating consequences for the
states and populations of the region. A "shadow
war" is already being waged - by Israel and the
United States against Iran; by a coalition of
countries against Syria; and by the great powers
against each other. A mere spark could set this
tinder alight. [21]
Is this true?
GM: Such an ignition setting
the whole Middle East on fire could become true
through an Israeli attack on Iran or a foreign
military intervention in Syria. In the first case,
Syria and Hezbollah and perhaps also Hamas are
expected to attack Israel. In the second case,
Iran will defend its Syrian ally, according to
treaties of mutual assistance between Tehran and
Damascus.
LS: Mr. Seale also
wrote in the same article:
Instead of siding with the United
States and Israel in the destruction of Iran and
Syria, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies should
join with Iran in building a new security system
for the region free from external meddling. If
they act together, they can spare the region the
devastation of war. But they must act soon
because time is running out.
What is
your take?
GM: That's a very
nice recommendation, but far away from political
reality. The tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran
is increasing dramatically - not mainly because of
Arab monarchs siding with the US but first of all
because of rising sectarian hostility between
Sunnis and Shi'ites combined with the growing
threat that the Arab Spring and the idea of an
Islamic republic could also spread on the Arabia
Peninsular and result in the toppling of the
monarchies. Domestic opposition and resistance
against the political system is very strong in
Bahrain and is growing especially in Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, the confrontation with Iran as well as
the intervention in Syria and other parts of the
Arab world has also to be regarded as a fight for
survival of the ruling families in the Gulf
Cooperation Council.
LS: How
could a war of the West against Iran be prevented?
GM: We are talking here
about a unilateral Israeli strike against the
nuclear facilities in Iran. Tehran has always
declared that its nuclear program is peaceful. In
the final communique of the recent summit the 120
members of the Non-Aligned Movement confirmed
their support for Iran's claim that under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
it has the right to peaceful nuclear energy as
well as the right to ownership of a full nuclear
fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment. [24]
The government in Tehran has called many
times for the destruction of the Jewish state.
Therefore, Israel regards a nuclear-armed Iran as
a threat to its existence. Does this justify a
preemptive military attack against Iran? According
to a recent statement of Israel's Minister of
Intelligence Agencies, both governments in
Jerusalem and Washington have come to the
conclusion that it will require 18 months to two
years for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon from
the time it makes the political decision to build
one. [25]
In order to prevent Iran from
acquiring the necessary parts to start the
assembling of a bomb, the Israeli military has
finished all necessary preparations for an attack
on Iran at any time. Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are the
main promoters of the unilateral strike against
the Iranian installations - in spite of massive
public warnings from high-ranking members of the
military and the intelligence services in Israel
as well as growing political pressure from the US
government. Nevertheless, Netanyahu continued his
saber rattling and assured his followers that
President Obama would provide military support
once an Israeli attack has started.
That
this expectation was not to be taken for granted
became clear when the participation of US troops
in the joint annual maneuver for the defense of
Israel was drastically reduced and when US
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Dempsey declared in an interview that he would not
be "complicit" with an Israeli attack. Such a
strike could only delay Iran's nuclear project and
might unravel the strong international coalition
that has applied stiff sanction on the Islamic
Republic. [26]
As a consequence of this
public rebuke and similar criticism from Paris and
Berlin, Netanyahu changed his strategy and
demanded that the US provides Tehran with
unambiguous options to halt its nuclear activities
or face war when the “red lines” are crossed. This
demand was also immediately rejected by the US
Defense Secretary. Netanyahu`s latest attempt to
increase political pressure on the Obama
government mounted in the assertion that Iran will
be ready to produce nuclear arms within a period
of only six to seven months. This contradicts the
findings of all intelligence services and will not
change the US opposition against being drawn into
a new Gulf war. Under these circumstances there is
no immediate danger that Israel is launching an
attack against Iran - at least not before the next
presidential election in the United States. [27]
LS: Is the conflict with
Iran also a struggle related to energy issues and
possible oil and gas pipelines?
GM: For almost 70 years the
control of the oil-rich Gulf region has been a
priority for US foreign policy. It started in 1943
when president [Franklin] Roosevelt established an
oil-for-security-relation with King Abdel Aziz by
declaring the defense of Saudi Arabia of vital
interest to the US.
In 1953, the CIA
played a leading role in toppling the
democratically elected government of Mossadegh,
who had nationalized the Iranian oil industry.
With US help, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi was
reinstalled as ruler. He opened the door to the
exploitation of the Iranian oil resources by US
companies and became "the policemen of the US in
the Gulf" with the most powerful military force in
the region, and which was equipped with US weapons
bought for more than US$20 billion. The Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979 was a serious blow for
the US dominance in this region and started the
hostility between Tehran and Washington.
The occupation of Kuwait through Saddam
Hussein's army in 1990 offered a unique chance for
the United States to expand its military presence
in the region in order to protect the Arab Gulf
states against the danger of the Iraqi aggression
and to increase the size and number of American
military bases in the Gulf region. The US-led
invasion of Iraq under the pretext of countering
the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass
destruction in 2003 was entirely based on lies
prefabricated by the CIA. [28]
The
invasion was mainly intended to serve the
geostrategic interests of the neo-conservatives in
the [George W] Bush government who aimed at the US
control of the Iraqi oil resources. The execution
of this plan turned out to be a failure. After
tremendous expense and after about 4,000 Americans
and more than 100,000 Iraqis were killed, the
United States had to give up its military presence
in Iraq completely and the relations between the
Shi'ite-dominated government in Bagdad and
Washington are deteriorating while Iran's
influence has increased enormously.
Under
these circumstances, the rising tension between
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Gulf
monarchies is a blessing for the geostrategic
interests of the US. By protecting the GCC states
against the Iranian threat, the Obama government
can justify its military presence in the oil-rich
region and the US arms manufacturer profit
tremendously from the sale of weapons to the Gulf
states. The latest contracts to sell F-15 fighter
jets to the Royal Saudi Air Force is valued at $30
billion, the United Arab Emirates bought an
anti-missile system and Chinook helicopters worth
$4.5 billion, and Oman ordered fighter planes for
$1.4 billion. [29]
LS: How
do you assess the actions undertaken recently by
the Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, especially
in connection to his visits to China and Iran?
[30]
GM: It is highly
significant that President Mohammed Morsi paid his
first visit to a country outside the Middle East
not to Washington but to Beijing. This
demonstrates the attempt to distance Egypt's
foreign policy from its former dependency on the
United States during the reign of president
Mubarak. The ostentatious visit was applauded by
the majority of the Egyptian population and
especially by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose
members have not forgotten that the US government
had supported Mubarak's policy of persecution of
the Islamic opposition by jailing and torturing
the Muslim Brothers.
The strive for
greater independence was also underlined by the
decision of Morsi to attend the conference of the
Non-Aligned Movement in Teheran in spite of
criticism and political pressure from the United
States and Israel, which want to isolate the
Islamic Republic. Morsi used his opening of this
conference to call for the creation of a regional
group consisting of Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey in order to find a solution for the crisis
in Syria. This proposal clearly contravenes the
US-led initiative against the regimes in Damascus
and Tehran. It has to be regarded as another
attempt to regain Cairo's political weight in the
region.
LS: Do you see it as
a major problem, as David P Goldman has pointed
out, that the population of Egypt is economically
helpless because they have little or no means of
production in order to emancipate as clients of
the US, Saudi Arabia, or whoever else? [31]
GM: Such a statement is
completely missing the point that Egypt has to
offer quite a lot both from the economic and from
the geostrategic point of view. Egypt has the
largest population in the Arab world, with 82
million inhabitants. This represents a huge
consumer market, which is boosted by remittances
from Egyptians working abroad. The incoming money
from migrants reached last year an all-time record
of $14.3 billion, which is used mainly for private
consumption and which helped to counter the
decline of foreign exchange reserves in 2011. [32]
The largest Arab country is also of
tremendous geostrategic importance for the US and
Israel by stabilizing the political situation in
the region on the basis of the Camp David Accord.
Egypt grants fly-over rights to the US Air Force
and provides access to the Suez Canal, a key
channel for oil shipments and American military
transport to the Gulf region. In exchange for
these advantages, Washington has been paying $1.56
billion annually as financial aid to its important
ally, summing up to a total of $65 billion since
1979. The vast majority of this money has been
used to buy weapons from American arms
manufacturers. [33]
The political arena is
changing now. Morsi is inviting new competitors
which challenge the dominant American position in
Egypt. His visit to Beijing served first of all
the purpose of increasing economic cooperation. So
far, China has invested about $500 million and
additional contracts over large-scale investments
in infrastructure schemes were signed during
Morsi's visit. In 2011, Chinese commodities
exports to this Arab country reached $7.3 billion,
surpassing US exports to Egypt at $6.2 billion.
Some analysts ask already "Is China buying Egypt
from the US?" [34]
To secure its influence
in Egypt, the United States has to increase its
financial support for Egypt. The announcement by
the White House to provide Cairo with an
additional $1 billion in debt relief and economic
aid, the backing for a $4.8 billion loan package
from the International Monetary Fund and the
arrival of a large US delegation, including six
trade officials and representatives of dozens of
multinational enterprises, show quite clearly the
importance which the US government and the private
economic actors are attaching to Egypt. [35]
At the same time, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
are also competing to increase their influence in
Egypt. This started during the first free
parliamentary election campaign after the Egyptian
revolution, when Qatar supported the Muslim
Brotherhood while Saudi Arabia sponsored the
Salafis. After the victory of the Muslim Brothers
both in the parliamentary and the presidential
election it is not a surprise that the Qatari
ruler continues to be extremely generous in his
support for Morsi's government. This is underlined
by the announcement that $18 billion will be
invested in tourism and industry projects over the
next five years. Saudi Arabia is following suit.
[36]
Gulf enterprises and investment banks
which are benefiting from high oil prices are also
lining up to invest in Egypt. This applies
especially to the banking sector in which European
banks are selling their Egyptian shares to cope
with the banking crisis at home. [37]
It
is obvious that the decline of the post-revolution
economy in Egypt has passed its turning point. The
economic outlook is rapidly improving. Whether
this positive development will continue and create
a sufficient number of urgently needed new jobs
depends on the political stability, the
restoration of public security and the successful
execution of structural reforms of the economy.
LS: What are the political
implications of the violent protests against the
anti-Islam film concerning the relations between
Egypt and the USA?
GM:
Following the attack on the US embassy in Cairo,
the Egyptian president condemned only the
offensive film and added a general statement that
foreign diplomatic missions have to be protected.
By avoiding a condemnation of the violent
anti-American protests Morsi tried obviously not
to put his domestic alliances with the
ultraconservative Salafists at risk. However, this
behavior caused a rather harsh reaction by
President Obama who called Egypt neither an ally
nor an enemy of the United States. Although a
White House spokesman declared later on that the
status of Egypt has not changed as regards the
country's special privileges in cooperation with
the US, is it clear that the relationship between
the two states has deteriorated. This is also
underlined by stalling the negotiations about debt
relief and financial aid from Washington.
The anti-American protests in many Arab
countries and especially the death of the American
ambassador in Libya might also seriously affect US
support for the opposition in Syria. According to
Arab media reports, there is a wide-spread fear
among members of Syrian oppositional groups that
the fatal attack of militant Islamists on the
embassy in Benghazi will be regarded as a model
for the development in Syria after the toppling of
the Alawite regime. This could lead to a
readjustment of US policy and a withdrawal of
American support for the oppositional forces.
LS: Finally, the classic
question: who is gaining the most benefits from
what is happening in Syria and beyond?
GM: So far, Israel and the
US have been the main winners. The government in
Jerusalem has been able to rally significant
support for its fight against Iran from Washington
and the European capitals. This does not apply to
the military intervention demanded by Netanyahu
and Barak, but in respect to a significant
increase in sanctions against Teheran which cause
more and more serious problems for the economic
development of Iran.
The US is profiting
from the growing dependency of the GCC countries
on military protection by US troops combined with
record sales of weapons by arms manufacturers in
the United States, where tens of thousands of new
jobs are created and hundred thousands of old jobs
are secured.
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