October peace surprise in
Syria By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
As improbable as it seems right now, we
may be on the verge of witnessing a much-welcome
October surprise in Syria in the form of a
three-day cease fire. After months of relentless
bloodshed, the warring parties might be persuaded
to pause during the upcoming Id al-Adha, starting
October 25.
A temporary respite is
desperately needed for the civilian population
throughout the country, many of whom have become
refugees or are bunkered inside their homes, as
well as by the plethora of stakeholders in the
Syrian theater, whose diverse interests may be
converging toward a ceasefire.
That this
is happening can be garnered from the Tehran visit
of UN's (and Arab League's) special envoy on
Syria, Lakhdar
Brahimki, who has
appealed to Iran's leadership to use their
influence with Syria to bring about a pause in
fighting, hoping to build on such a momentum for a
more long-lasting peace.
As the Syrian
conflict increasingly tears the country apart and
risks the stability of neighboring countries, the
timing of Brahimi's new push for a ceasefire is
right and in all likelihood the embattled regime
in Damascus will consent to his suggestion,
provided that the armed opposition also concurs
with the need to give the civilians a brief space
to breath free from the military claustrophobia
wrapped around them for nearly two years.
By all indications, the mood in Turkey is
also in favor of Brahimi's proposal, in light of
recent internal and external developments, which
have soured Ankara's relations with so many of its
neighbors - Iran, Russia, Iraq - and thus put its
hostile approach toward Syria under serious
question.
The Syrian government's
criticism of Turkey's "neo-Ottoman" ambitions in
the Arab world last week did not go unnoticed in
the Arab media, particularly Egypt, whose
president, Mohammed Morsi, has been trying to play
a constructive conflict-mediation role in Syria.
That criticism was leveled by Syrian information
minister, Omran al-Zubi, who criticized Ankara's
recent call for a provisional government headed by
the vice-president by stating, "Turkey isn't the
Ottoman Sultanate; the Turkish Foreign Ministry
doesn't name custodians in Damascus, Mecca, Cairo
and Jerusalem."
Much depends on Ankara
using its influence with the Syrian opposition to
turn Brahimi's idea into a reality. Certainly, if
Turkey agrees, then it would be rather difficult
for other stakeholders such as Saudi Arabia to
continue fueling a seemingly endless conflict in
Syria, given Riyadh's bankrolling of Sunni
fighters battling the Alawite-led regime. Another
aspect of Brahimi's proposal could be an unwritten
pledge by all stakeholders to refrain from
funneling arms into Syria during the three-day
halt in fighting.
Both sides in the
conflict must weigh the potential pros and cons of
such a lull in fighting, in order to determine
whether or not it is in their strictly military
interests. Damascus is likely concerned that the
rebels will full advantage to re-arm, re-supply or
take good positions. Even more important is the
question of how to make cease-fire a more
meaningful one that is accompanied with political
dialogue between the government and the rebels?
This needs to be addressed ahead of the
appointed hour of Id al-Adha, celebrated by all
Muslims. This would require skillful negotiation
by the UN envoy and a host of other players, on
the ground in Syria. In addition to an overarching
peace strategy, centered around the UN's "six
point" peace plan, this may require the
"micro-strategy" of negotiating an extension of
the three-day cease-fire locally, from one town or
city to another, in light of the heterogeneous and
diverse nature of the armed opposition groups,
headed by the Free Syrian Army. One advantage of
an extended ceasefire is that it might trigger a
more unified response by the rebels and close the
gap between the political and military arms of the
opposition.
Needless to say, the US and
other big powers have a major role, which can be
either constructive or obstructionist vis-a-vis
the Brahimi initiative cited above. If the White
House opts to lean on Ankara and Riyadh to consent
to this initiative, then not only this will
substantially increase its chance of success, it
also enables Brahimi to plot the next steps.
This may be achieved partly by drawing
from history and lessons in conflict-management,
including the seducement of warring parties toward
dialogue and negotiations by a "dance of
incentives", ie, a mix of rewards and tangible
benefits offered to lure the opposing parties
around the negotiation table.
No doubt,
there will be "spoilers" who would want to
neutralize Brahimi's efforts and, therefore,
Brahimi must come up with a sound strategy of how
to turn the "spoilers" into participants in a
peace dialogue. Case in point, if it turns out
that Saudi Arabia is unenthusiastic about the
proposed cease-fire, then Brahimi must rely on the
instrument of public criticism to bring the Saudis
into line. He could also enlist the support of
such UN sources as the Peacebuilding Commission to
help devise a sound "post-conflict" map of action.
At the moment, however, the first priority
is to bring about the three-day cease-fire that
would be a tiny step away from the humanitarian
catastrophe enveloping Syria nowadays, thus giving
Syrians a taste of normalcy that could hopefully
spur a great yearning for its continuation instead
of melting in the hot furnace of renewed fighting.
In this regard, Brahimi's challenge is less to
convince Iran and other supporters of the Syrian
government to go along with his script for
cease-fire, and more to persuade the
anti-government plethora of forces who are the
sworn enemies of the Ba'athist regime and, what is
more, include many "foreign fighters" who are not
answerable to any Syrian authority. Still, it is a
sure bet that once the government and the main
Syrian opposition groups consent to the three-day
armistice, the it would be difficult for the
others to ignore it.
A role for UN
peacekeepers? Undoubtedly, there is a role
for the UN peacekeepers in a conflict-resolution
scenario, whereby some of the "blue helmets"
positioned nearby, eg, Lebanon, could be loaned to
the noble efforts at creating a buffer between the
warring parties inside Syria. Damascus is unlikely
to agree to this, however, if it means a de facto
recognition of rebel strongholds around the
country.
If not done the right way, a UN
intervention may in fact spur the disintegration
of national unity, which is why at this stage the
idea of dispatching UN peacekeepers to Syria is
rather premature and must await the result of a
preliminary negotiation of a temporary pause in
armed conflict. In other words, only within the
confines of a comprehensive conflict-resolution
framework that envisages a transition to free
elections and s on, does the idea of dispatching
UN peacekeepers to Syria makes any sense. Until
then, it is more prudent to limit the UN's role to
acting as a catalyst for political dialogue
between the government and its armed opposition.
Meanwhile, the emerging October surprise
may turn out to be elusive of a broader
cease-fire, yet still significant as a timely leap
forward.
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