THE GULF'S BLACK
TREASURE Conflict without
end By Hossein Askari
This is the 22nd article in a special
series on oil and the Persian Gulf. For previous
articles, please see the foot of the page.
Just consider the conflicts of the past 30
or so years in the Persian Gulf:
The Iran-Iraq War (over historic border
disputes and territory, with oil in the mix);
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (over historic
territorial claims, with financial claims and oil
reserves clearly in the mix);
The First Persian Gulf War (over territory and
oil reserves);
The Second Persian Gulf War (for control of
oil reserves);
Sectarian conflicts in Iraq (a Shia majority's
dominance over a
large Sunni minority);
Uprisings in Bahrain (a Sunni minority's
dominance over a Shia majority);
A sectarian uprising in Saudi Arabia (a Sunni
majority's dominance over a Shia majority);
Saudi military intervention in Bahrain (in
support of a fellow Sunni monarchy's domination of
a Shia majority);
Conflict between Iran and the United Arab
Emirates (over ownership of Abu Musa and smaller
and bigger Tombs islands with oil in the mix);
A surrogate sectarian conflict in Lebanon (the
Sunni camp of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the
Gulf Cooperation Council - GCC - pitted against
the Shia faction of Iran and Syria);
Ethnic conflicts between Kurds and Iran, Iraq,
Syria and Turkey, and
A sectarian conflict in Syria (the GCC on the
side of the Sunni majority and Iran on the side of
the dominant Shia minority).
Add to this
mix the long list of "dormant" conflicts:
Iran's historic claim over Bahrain (a claim
that the late Shah renounced but was recently
revived by some mullahs in Iran);
territorial disputes - between Bahrain and
Qatar;
between Saudi Arabia and the UAE;
between Iraq and Kuwait;
between Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE;
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia;
between Oman and the UAE (some with tribal
implications and all with possible oil rights),
and
between Iran and Iraq.
Given the vast
size of proven oil (and gas) reserves and the
likelihood that much more may be discovered and
proven under the waters and under the soil of the
Persian Gulf, oil (and gas) reserves are the
ultimate prize that is in contention (and the goal
of domination) within the region.
With
this prize up for grabs, foreigners - in the shape
of governments, corporations and influential
individuals - are also in the mix. What a
breathtaking mixture of conflict swirling around
in the confines of the Persian Gulf. Let's also
recall our discussion of the nuclear issue in the
Persian Gulf. These are conflicts with lots of
legs and with fallout far and wide.
These
conflicts could be categorized as (i) sectarian,
(ii) tribal, and (iii) territorial, or
alternatively and more simply, struggles over
resources and economic power and control. No
matter how these conflicts are categorized, there
are a number of reasons pointing to their
evolution and continuation for decades into the
future, with the likelihood of much more armed
conflict and economic fallout for the rest of the
world.
First and foremost, as we have said
before in this series, about three quarters of all
the region's conflicts are not new but are renewed
conflicts. The reason is simple: most do not end
with reconciliation but evolve and are reborn.
Intrastate conflicts in the Persian Gulf
may be viewed as sectarian, tribal or ethnic but
what is the underlying reason for them?
Surely, Sunni-Shia conflicts today,
whether in Iraq, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, are not
to get Sunnis to concede Ali ibn Abu Talib's
rightful succession to the Prophet Mohammad. It
would be near impossible to get all Sunnis to
accept this Shia belief, and if they did what
practical good would it bring?
The
practical reason for the Sunni-Shia divide today
is economic. A family or a faction in power in any
of these countries views (and divides) the country
along sectarian (tribal, ethnic) lines; appeals
for sectarian support; rewards his sect with
political and economic benefits. As a result,
discrimination and conflict ensue.
If
governments were elected and accountable, if
national constitutions recognized the equality of
all citizens in every sphere of life, and if
religious freedom were acknowledged, these
conflicts would soon disappear. As it is, rulers
receive unimaginable economic benefits and are
unwilling to give up any power. They wield
illegitimate power, consciously divide and conquer
along sectarian lines (tribal, ethnic) and use
economic rewards (derived almost solely from oil
resources) as the instrument to exercise power.
If and when the rulers are overthrown, be
the rulers a sectarian majority or minority, a
tribal family, or anything else, the conflict will
continue because the new group grabbing power will
do exactly what those in power had done before -
divide and reward along sectarian, tribal and
ethnic lines.
It is thus naive and
simplistic to believe that regime change in any of
these countries will quickly lead to modern
functioning states any time soon. The future is
indeed bleak.
Foreign support for these
illegitimate rulers has made matters much worse
and less open to solution. Foreigners have
prolonged the harsh control by illegitimate rulers
with all of their discriminatory practices,
increasing and magnifying ethnic animosities and
pre-empting gradual transition, albeit with
instability and fits and starts, to the rule of
law with modern functioning economies.
A
third reason for simmering and erupting conflicts
in the region is the vast oil (and natural gas)
reserves of the region and the differences in per
capita endowment across the region.
Just
imagine some of the differences. Iran's combined
oil and gas reserves (oil equivalent) are about
twice Qatar's, but its population is about 240
times Qatar's, making the average Qatari about 120
times richer than his/her Iranian counterpart.
Iraq and Qatar's combined oil and gas
wealth is of the same order of magnitude, but
Iraq's population is 75 times that of Qatar's
population, making average Qatari's 75 times
richer.
Iraq and Kuwait's proven oil
reserves are roughly of the same order, but Iraq's
native population (ie excluding guest workers) is
25 times that of Kuwait's. In other words, the
average Kuwaiti is about 25 times richer than
average Iraqi. No wonder, if for no other reason,
why Saddam Hussein ventured into Kuwait.
There are vast differences in per capita
oil and gas wealth, with Qatar the richest,
followed by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait,
then a big gap, followed by Saudi Arabia, another
gap, followed by Iraq, Iran, Oman and Bahrain
(relying on Saudi support for oil output).
Just imagine how the economic failure of
the bigger countries - Iran, Iraq and even Saudi
Arabia - could be quickly "remedied" by the quick
acquisition of a sparsely populated neighbor with
vast oil and gas wealth. This was a temptation
that Saddam Hussein could not resist.
On
top of Kuwait's vast oil wealth, there were its
vast foreign assets. The UAE (Abu Dhabi) and Qatar
have even more wealth locked away abroad.
Countries have gone to war for much less. If the
bigger countries continue to have economic
problems, slow growth and high unemployment, the
temptation for adventure will increase.
Beginning in 1987, in lectures to US
diplomats going to the Middle East and North
Africa, I predicted that Kuwait would be swallowed
up by either Iran or Iraq before the decade was
up. Yes, I was a few months off, but a four-star
US general said that I had a wild imagination; as
you can tell, he was the person who lacked one.
Future conflicts in the region will have
repercussions far and wide. Foreign powers will
get into the mix. Oil supplies will be disrupted,
prices will spike and the global economy will be
adversely affected.
The global economic
fallout will depend on conditions in the oil
market at the time and the state of the world
economy. The oil market will be affected by
declining production outside of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, reduced
exploration and additions to reserves in the
Persian Gulf and especially in Iraq, and by world
economic growth.
Today, the US and Western
European economies are buried under mountainous
debt that must be deleveraged before normal
economic growth can resume - something that has
taken Japan more than a decade. The US cannot
afford another costly adventure in the region and
must resist intervening as a mercenary to prolong
the rule of a favorite dictator in the name of
"stability" and "security".
These and
other predictions will be the focus of the final
and longest article in the series two weeks. Next
week, we turn to the bumps in the road - for the
world and for the region - as we transition to an
oil-less world.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
