The
many faces of Palestinian
resistance By Ramzy Baroud
Apparently, "popular resistance" has
suddenly elevated to become a clash of visions or
strategies between the Palestinian Authority (PA)
in Ramallah and its rivals in Gaza, underscoring
an existing and deepening rift between various
factions and leaderships.
Addressing a
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) meeting in
Ramallah on July 2011, PA President Mahmoud Abbas
sounded as if he had finally reached an earth
shattering conclusion, supposedly inspired by the
"Arab Spring".
"In this coming period, we
want mass action, organized and coordinated in
every place ... This is a chance to raise our voices
in front of the world
and say that we want our rights," he said.
Abbas called on Palestinians to wage
"popular resistance", insisting that it must be
"unarmed popular resistance so that nobody
misunderstands us," (Reuters). He made a similar
call at the UN General Assembly in September.
It was Abbas' way of escaping forward. He
needed to quell the mounting anger and resentment
of his lacking leadership. His message targeted
and continues to be aimed at dual audiences:
Palestinians, thus the word "resistance" and
international, thus "non-violence" and "so that
nobody misunderstand us".
Abbas has little
credibility as far as unleashing any form of
resistance against Israel. Since its establishment
in 1994 as a transitional body that would guide
Palestinians towards independence, the PA has
turned into an end in itself: dedicated to
self-preservation. This means even conspiring with
the Israeli government to manage the very
occupation that has tormented Palestinians for
over 45 years. Indeed, "security coordination"
between both sides predicates on the common
understanding of silencing any dissent that would
imperil the PA standing or how it is perceived by
Israel as a security threat.
There is
little if any evidence that the PA is leading a
sincere "mass action, organized and coordinated in
every place". The PA-staged rhetorical revolution
however served its purpose, at least for now, as
Abbas and his men survived the regional upheaval.
The term, "popular resistance" though is
still being generously infused as if its mere
repetition is a key to solving every political
dichotomy facing Palestinians. The context in
which it is used or manipulated is registering
unfavorably among Palestinian factions that have
long championed armed struggle and vehemently
opposed Oslo and its institutions. Particularly
irked by Abbas' version is the Islamic Jihad in
Gaza.
When Islamic Jihad secretary general
Ramadan Shallah addressed thousands of supporters
in Gaza in celebration of the 31st anniversary of
the movement's founding, he addressed this very
issue. He called for a new national strategy,
underscoring the failure of the so-called peace
process. "The Palestinian project of establishing
a state on the 1967 borders through negotiations
has obviously failed," he said.
Of course
he also lashed out at "peaceful non-violent
resistance", which provided very useful sound
bites quoted generously by the media.
Interestingly, however, Shallah's views on
non-violent popular resistance were combined with
his views on negotiations, thus interpreting the
strategy of popular resistance as part and parcel
of the PA's futile hunt for "Israeli concessions".
"Nineteen years of failed negotiations
have created a crisis which cannot be resolved by
insisting on more negotiations, or through
non-violent resistance," he said, according to the
Palestinian Ma'an News Agency on October 04.
A third and less factional reading of the
popular resistance strategy was offered by the
ever-articulate Palestinian activist Dr Mostafa
Barghouti, who was clear on Al Jazeera on October
18 when he defended Palestinians' rights to resist
by all means available, but asserted that popular
resistance can be a more effective strategy at
achieving political rights.
Obviously, the
problem doesn't exist within the non-violent
popular resistance strategy itself, but its
political contextualization and misuse by certain
parties. When placed within a truly genuine
framework aimed at devising a conducive and
beneficial strategy for obtaining Palestinian
rights, popular-resistance takes on a different
look and feel altogether. Moreover, as far as
Palestinian history is concerned, the strategy is
hardly an alien concept or a defeatist attempt at
not being 'misunderstood' by Western benefactors.
History is rife with evidence. In
September 19, 1989, the West Bank town of Beit
Sahour led a campaign of popular resistance and
civil disobedience that became the stuff of
legends. It was an effort that was part of the
awe-inspiring and massive mobilization of the
First Palestinian Uprising (1987-1993).
Numerous attempts failed to break the
collective will of Beit Sahour. The Israeli
government moved in its military in full force,
launching "the biggest taxation raid in recent
history": occupation forces moved in en masse, and
tax collectors worked their magic, confiscating
all that they could seize. Many families were left
with nothing.
Most of the confiscated
furniture and other personal belongings were sold
at auctions inside Israel. The small town fell
under a 45-day military curfew that started on the
night of September 21. Hundreds of Beit Sahour
residents were taken to military camps and many
remained in prison under various excuses.
The Israeli military may have thought it
won a decisive battle, but on that day a star near
Bethlehem shone in the night sky of Palestine. It
connected past and present, inspiring hope that
people, despite the many years of military
occupation, still had much power. It had even
enough power for a small town to vex the leaders
of Israel's political and military establishments.
The story of popular resistance in
Palestine is a century old. However, its origins
are often dated to 1936, when Palestinians,
Muslims and Christians, rebelled against the
Zionist colonial drive and the British role in
espousing it and laboring to ensure its success.
In April 1936, all five Palestinian political
parties joined in under the umbrella of the Arab
Higher Committee.
That unity was pressing
and was a reflection of the general attitude among
ordinary Palestinians. A general strike was
declared, ushering the start of Palestine's
legendary civil disobedience campaign - as
exemplified in its cry of "No Taxation without
Representation". The 1936 uprising sent a stern
message to the British government that
Palestinians were nationally unified and capable
of acting as an assertive, self-assured society in
ways that could indeed disturb the matrix of
British mandatory rule over the country.
The British administration in Palestine
had thus far discounted the Palestinian demand for
independence and paid little attention to their
grave concerns about the rising menace of Zionism
and its colonial project.
Of course these
are not distant histories. That collective action
was hardly a passing phase, but was repeated
throughout history, even after the signing of the
Oslo Accords in 1993 which institutionalized the
Israeli occupation and ruthlessly punished those
who dared resist.
The PA in Ramallah
should quit utilizing and referencing the notion
of "popular resistance" while doing everything in
its power to suppress it; and Abbas' rivals must
not associate popular resistance with Oslo and its
bankrupt institutions, for history can easily
delink that distorted connection.
Popular
resistance in Palestine continues to exist not
because of the Palestinian leadership but despite
of it.
Ramzy Baroud
(ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally syndicated
columnist and the editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My
Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story.
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