SPEAKING
FREELY Syrian coalition faces testing
time By Ahmed E Souaiaia
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
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Those who doubt
Lakhdar Brahimi's assessment of the crisis in
Syria ought to rethink their position. The United
Nations envoy's ostensibly naive initiative for a
ceasefire over the Eid holidays might have been a
brilliant maneuver that ended the existence of the
Syrian National Council, the previously prominent
face of the Syrian opposition.
Before
proposing an ambitious plan like his predecessor, Brahimi
wanted to make sure that
there are reliable representatives of both sides
who can exert influence and control over their
subordinates. After visiting Russia and China, he
proposed from Tehran that both the opposition
forces and the government stop fighting for four
days.
Apparently, he wanted to test the
influence of the Syrian regime backers and the
political leaders of the opposition (Syrian
National Council, or SNC) who accepted the
ceasefire. Even the military leaders of the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) accepted the Eid ceasefire. He
was aware that for the ceasefire to hold, the
opposition groups must stop fighting.
It
is one thing to claim control over armed groups by
simply supporting their actions, but it is a
different level of credible control to actually
order these groups to stop fighting and see
compliance on the ground. Brahimi wanted actual
proof of command and control over armed groups in
the form of four days of quiet.
The result
was embarrassing for the so-called opposition
leaders. During the four-day holidays, more car
bombs exploded in crowded cities and more attacks
on military checkpoints. Worse, some of the FSA
groups used the quiet time to attack Kurdish
neighborhoods in Aleppo and other Kurdish majority
areas to bring more territory under their control.
Deadly fights erupted between FSA fighters and
Kurdish neighborhood protection militias, forcing
the FSA groups to retreat.
The message was
clear: the Syrian National Council did not have
any significant sway over the armed groups inside
Syria. That message reached the Western backers of
the SNC. Bringing armed groups under control
became more urgent for the West after human rights
organizations released damning reports accusing
opposition forces of committing war crimes.
The US administration announced that the
SNC must expand its base and bring armed groups
under control.
Two weeks after US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made that
comment, the SNC was absorbed into a newly
established body, the Syrian National Coalition
for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNCORF,
or Syrian National Coalition). Leaders of the new
coalition have claimed that they now represent 90%
of the Syrian people.
Within days after
the establishment of the coalition, France
recognized it as the "sole legitimate
representative of the Syrian people." Several
other countries, including the UK, did the same.
Some other countries, including the United States,
simply recognized it as a legitimate
representative of the Syrian people. The rest of
the countries of the world remained neutral.
In reality, many opposition groups,
dissidents, and political parties did not take
part in the Doha meeting and therefore are not
represented in the Coalition. Moreover, the
peculiar enthusiasm of former colonizers of the
Arab world, like France, for recognizing Syria's
representatives without waiting for the Syrian
people to decide through ballots (not bullets),
was delegitimizing the Coalition in the eyes of
many Syrians. That fact was apparently on the mind
of some groups affiliated with the FSA, too, who
immediately issued a terse but emphatic rejection
of the Syrian National Coalition.
Last
week, more than 170 religious and political
leaders (including some opposition and government
representatives) met in Tehran to discussion
non-violent transition to democracy. Other
opposition coalitions, like the National
Coordinating Committees, boycotted the Tehran and
Qatar meetings.
Most recently, a prominent
Kurdish leader representing the Democratic Union
Party (PYD), Saleh Muslim, insisted that Coalition
does not represent the Syrians. "They're making
the same mistakes as the Syrian National Council.
They're one color, a cleric is the ruler. More
than 60% of the SNC were from the Muslim
Brotherhood and the religious groups, and they've
made the same mistake with this coalition," he
told Reuters in London, November 20. He contended
that the Coalition "has emerged from obedience to
Turkey and Qatar," and that the Kurds included in
the group were not representative of Syria's Kurds
and were handpicked by Turkey to follow its
agenda.
So here we are again, asking the
same questions: who are the Syrian opposition
groups?
Apparently, with time, the Syrian
regime rid itself of unreliable elements by
allowing military officers to defect. The regime
seems to find its balance by relying on a military
that has been purged of suspect elements. The
regime's regional and international backers, few
though they may be, are determined to support it
no matter the political cost.
The strength
of the military institution, the loyalty of
religious and ethnic minorities who are threatened
by Islamists' takeover, and the loyalty of the
regime's international allies are allowing it to
stay in power.
The opposition on the other
hand, is becoming more and more fragmented because
of division in the ranks of its regional and
international backers. For instance, the new
Syrian National Coalition came to existence thanks
to the handy work of Qatar and Turkey. These two
countries are major supporters of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has been always
suspicious of the Muslim Brotherhood and has
supported Salafi radicals.
A statement by
the elements of the FSA who rejected the Syrian
National Coalition is a signal that the Saudis are
dissatisfied with the growing alliance between
Qatar, Turkey, and the Muslim Brotherhood. That
means that the Saudis will continue to back Salafi
and radical Sunni armed groups. This split may
also mean that the FSA will be forced to start
purging its own ranks if it wants to continue to
receive Western support. Alternatively, the FSA
might be forced to split along different
international camps. They might form competing
armed coalitions reflecting the ideological,
religious, and political agendas of their regional
and international backers.
All these
developments suggest that the crisis in Syria
could become more complicated and long-drawn-out,
and that the Syrian National Coalition has a major
challenge ahead of it. If leaders of the world
community want to stop the bloodshed in Syria,
they must support the UN envoy. If they want the
UN envoy to succeed in his mission, they must help
him find reliable partners among the opposition
forces who can control the armed groups - not
necessarily all of them, just most of them.
Therefore, the Coalition will be called
upon to prove that it represents not 90% of the
Syrian people (which can only be ascertained by
participating in a fair election), but 90% of the
FSA armed groups. That was the test that the SNC
failed. Ambassador Brahimi will certainly ask the
Syrian National Coalition to pass this test, too,
if its leaders want to remain relevant.
Professor Ahmed E Souaiaia
teaches at the University of Iowa. Opinions
expressed herein are the author's, speaking as a
citizen on matters of public interest; not
speaking for the university or any other
organization with which he is affiliated.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their
say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
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