A
day after the United States and more than 100
countries formally recognized the new Syrian
opposition council as the sole legitimate
representative of the Syrian people, American
officials told The New York Times that the regime
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had fired at
least half a dozen Scud missiles at rebel forces
in the north. This is a major escalation that
could point to an impending foreign intervention
in the country - although such an outcome is still
not guaranteed and its scope is unclear.
Analysts are divided on how to interpret
the information: some point out that these
missiles can carry chemical weapons, while others
suggest that Assad may have used them to destroy
major military bases and ammunition depots that
had recently fallen into
rebel hands. Over the past
couple of weeks, the Syrian army allegedly
combined the precursors of sarin gas, a deadly
nerve agent, to form a number of chemical
warheads. Most reports, however, claim that these
devices were prepared for loading onto airplanes
rather than Scuds.
Militarily, the firing
of heavy missiles would be yet another indication
of the regime's weakness. Assad's army - even his
armored units - has been taking heavy casualties,
and has been forced to rely increasingly on air
power in the second half of this year. More
recently, a number of fighter planes and
helicopters were shot down by the rebels (who
claim to be using for the purpose anti-aircraft
guns and shoulder-launched missiles captured from
army depots), and it could be that the regime now
considers many bombing missions too costly. In
addition, while inaccurate, Scuds cause greater
destruction than most airplane bombs in the Syrian
army's inventory. They are particularly
well-suited for large, lightly fortified targets.
It is unclear what the targets of the
missiles were, and the US has not supplied any
evidence to back its claims. An anonymous American
official quoted by the Times did not miss an
opportunity to score a propaganda point: "Using
Scuds to target tanks or military bases is one
thing... Using them to target rebels hiding in
playgrounds at schools is something else."
However, the notion that schools were the
primary target of the missiles appears
unrealistic. At the very least, what would be the
six or so schools that are such important targets
as to merit, from Assad's point of view, the use
of Scuds?
On the speculative side of
things, some reports coming out of Syria indicate
that facilities holding chemical weapons,
particularly in the north, may have fallen - or be
close to falling - into rebel hands. If this is
indeed the case, it would make sense for Assad to
use Scuds against such bases.
It is very
important to pay attention to the build-up of
anti-Assad propaganda and diplomatic preparations
for a Western military operation in Syria. The
forming of a new rebel council last month in Qatar
took place under intense Western pressure. The
move to recognize this council would make it
easier for the rebels to request official
assistance in the near future.
In order to
clear out some last remaining hurdles before such
a step, the US blacklisted one of the most
problematic and extremist rebel groups, the Al
Nusra Front, days ago, labeling it a terrorist
organization. "The move, which was expected, is
aimed at building Western support for the
rebellion against the government of President
Bashar al-Assad by quelling fears that money and
arms meant for the rebels would flow to a jihadi
group," wrote The New York Times on Monday.
The claims about chemical weapons and Scud
missiles, while mostly unconfirmed, add a
rhetorical boost to this well-coordinated effort.
A number of recent reports issued by the rebels
even go as far as to claim that Assad has already
used weapons of mass destruction - "toxic gases",
for example - in urban centers. [1]
In
parallel to the public policy juggernaut, the
deployment of Patriot missiles to southern Turkey
and various other military preparations indicate
that an operation is being considered very
seriously by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and its Middle Eastern allies. Still,
it is hard to tell how far exactly these powers
are willing to go in order to topple Assad. It is
possible that even they are not entirely clear on
this point among themselves.
Given the
growing chaos in the country, a limited campaign
to secure and/or destroy the weapons of mass
destruction may become unavoidable in the near
future. A more extensive operation, however, is
likely to meet stiff public resistance in Western
societies, and would cause a headache to even the
most committed hawks.
An elaborate bluff
may, in fact, be enough to make the Syrian regime
think twice before using some of its most potent
arms, and in this way blunt the capabilities of
its war machine. Add to this mix an extensive air
lift of weapons to the rebels, and perhaps also a
limited form of a no-fly zone (such as
anti-aircraft missiles stationed near the border),
and one could have an opposition victory almost
without lifting a finger.
According to an
optimistic scenario, Assad would collapse
financially, if not militarily, very soon. In a
recent interview, the Jordanian king specified
four months as the timeframe when the Syrian
president would go broke. Meanwhile, even the
capital Damascus is under rebel siege.
In
reality, however, a collapse of central authority
in Syria - should that happen - is unlikely to
bring an end to the civil war. Assad's supporters
would most probably withdraw to the Western
coastal region, much of which is inhabited by
members of his Alawite sect, and continue to fight
from there. Kurdish militants would lay claim on
the northeastern parts of the country, and a
protracted conflict between various militias would
be the most likely outcome. Massacres perpetrated
by rebel forces - such as that in an Alawite
village days ago - are expected to harden the
resolve of the minorities to fight on.
Increasingly, it appears that only a
full-scale ground intervention could stop the
carnage which has claimed more than 40,000 lives
so far. Such an operation, however, would require
long-term commitment of forces, and would be
extremely costly and dangerous. It is hard to
believe that anything of this scope is in the
making - or that an end of the violence is within
sight.
Note: 1. See, for
example, Syria
Today, LCCS, December 7, 2012.
Victor Kotsev is a journalist
and political analyst.
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