Egypt goes to the polls on Saturday in the
first round of a referendum that will shape the
future of the regime there and perhaps even the
course of the Arab Spring in general.
Amid
continuing clashes and extraordinarily high
tensions - including allegations of fraud in early
voting of expatriates in embassies across the
world - Egyptians are set to approve or reject a
controversial new constitution that draws heavily
on Islamic law. The instability could have
wide-ranging consequences, and even scenarios such
as an army coup or an Islamist dictatorship are
not out of question.
Three weeks after
President Mohammed Morsi, the democratically
elected former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood,
assumed powers that would make most Middle Eastern dictators
blush, Egypt is aflame.
Rival demonstrations of his supporters and
opponents are taking place daily, the army has
been deployed on the streets, and several people
have been killed while untold numbers wounded in
the violence.
When 90% of judges, who
normally supervise polls, refused to have anything
to do with the referendum, the president was
forced to split the voting over two consecutive
Saturdays. Meanwhile, the International Monetary
Fund delayed a vital loan of US$4.8 billion, the
country's stock market plunged, and the largest
industrial city in Egypt, El-Mahalla El-Kubra,
symbolically declared itself an "Independent
Republic" free of Brotherhood rule.
The
secular opposition, led by figures such as the
former director of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, accused Morsi of
"pharaonic" dictatorship and charged that the new
constitution would essentially usher in an Islamic
regime. It would trample the country's diversity -
between 10 and 20% of Egypt's population consists
of Christian Copts - and would give Islamic judges
an extraordinary influence over the legal system.
News that an outspoken atheist from a Coptic
family had been sentenced to three years in jail
for "blasphemy" this week further fueled these
fears.
Ironically, when Morsi laid hands
on various judiciary prerogatives last month,
ostensibly in order to push through the new
constitution, he loosely mirrored a move made in
June by the Brotherhood's arch-enemy, the high
military command. [1]
The president
engineered a soft coup in August, at least
temporarily ending the bitter rivalry and forcing
into retirement the heads of the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces, the body that had ruled the
country for over a year after the ouster of former
president Hosni Mubarak. Now, it seems, he
appropriated their methods, seeking to cement
firmly the Brotherhood's hold on power.
The military, headed by younger officers
who are ostensibly Morsi's allies, so far has not
taken a side and has called for national unity in
order to prevent the country from slipping into "a
dark tunnel". Its efforts appear to have had a
constructive effect - in a surprise move days ago,
the main opposition parties announced that they
would campaign for a "no" vote rather than boycott
the referendum altogether and thus call into
question its legitimacy.
However, the
Egyptian military is an extraordinarily complex
and influential organization, the enmity between
it and the Muslim Brotherhood has run deep for
over half a century, and the situation is
explosive enough to raise fears that further
instability could lead to an army coup. The
metaphor of a "dark tunnel" may prove as accurate
as it is ominous.
Even more-scary
possibilities exist. If the referendum succeeds
and Morsi manages to shake off the protests, this
would leave him with unprecedented powers and
could inspire the Islamists to pursue an even more
radical social and political agenda. While it is
too early to claim that Egypt is following in the
footsteps of the Iranian revolution in 1979, such
a scenario is not altogether out of question.
The Muslim Brotherhood has made some
conciliatory moves in the past, but it is unclear
how sincere these are, and besides, the
Brotherhood is not the only Islamist movement on
the Egyptian scene. It is difficult to overlook
the fact that its extremist rival, the Salafi
al-Nour party, commanded 20% of the vote in the
previous parliamentary elections.
A more
optimistic outcome would involve a compromise
between the rivals, but the tensions are unlikely
to disappear. The rivalry between the Brotherhood
and the military - arguably the two strongest
camps on the Nile - would resurface in the months
and years to come, and transient alliances would
be formed as the country struggles to ameliorate
its political, economic and social climate. With
the whole region in flux, it is very difficult to
forecast the course of the developments or their
repercussions.
Several patterns, however,
are worth noting. One is the behavior of the
administration of United States President Barack
Obama, which strangely failed to condemn Morsi's
power grab. As the Washington Post's senior
analyst David Ignatius put it, "How did Washington
become the best friend of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt, even as President Mohamed Morsi was
asserting dictatorial powers and his followers
were beating up secular liberals in the streets of
Cairo?"
Ignatius explains: "The
administration's rejoinder is that this isn't
about America. Egyptians and other Arabs are
writing their history now, and they will have to
live with the consequences. Moreover, the last
thing secular protesters need is an American
embrace. That's surely true, but it's crazy for
Washington to appear to take sides against those
who want a liberal, tolerant Egypt and for those
who favor sharia [Islamic law]. Somehow, that's
where the administration has ended up." [2]
In a symbolic move that signals American
support for Mosri, the US announced this week that
it will begin delivery of 20 fighter jets to Egypt
next year, fulfilling a deal signed in 2010. The
F-16s will augment more than 200 advanced jets in
Cairo's inventory, and according to a Pentagon
spokesman will "enhance Egypt's capacity to
contribute to regional mission sets".
Moreover, it is worth noting that both of
Morsi's recent power grabs came on the heels of
important military and foreign policy
developments. In August, the president sacked the
army chiefs after a bloody cross-border terrorist
attack into Israel, which the Israelis parried but
which cost the lives of 17 Egyptian soldiers. Last
month, Morsi was credited with brokering the
ceasefire between Israel and Gaza militants, and
several influential analysts have argued that he
relied on the boost to his prestige in order to
make his domestic move.
The Israeli
connection in both cases may be purely
coincidental, but it would appear that in Morsi's
mind foreign and domestic policy are inextricably
linked. It could be that Obama, too, sees things
this way - perhaps even grooming Egypt for a
greater role in conflicts such as the Syrian civil
war.
If so, it is an extraordinarily risky
bet on a country whose economy is in ruins and
which is on the verge of political chaos. Egypt
was once, nearly two years ago, a source of
inspiration for the Arab Spring. Now it could
become its nightmare metaphor.
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