Security firms eye African 'terror'
bonanza By Ramzy Baroud
Although recognized as the world's biggest
security firm, the image of Britain's G4S
plummeted during the London Olympics last year as
it failed to meet the government's labor demands.
Through growing unrest in North and West Africa,
G4S is eyeing a speedy route to recovery.
The January 16 hostage crisis at Algeria's
In Amenas gas plant, where 38 hostages were
killed, ushered in the return of international
perceptions of al-Qaeda not as extremists on the
run, but as well-prepared militants with the
ability to strike deeply into enemy territories
and cause serious damage.
For G4S and
other security firms, this translates into growing
demand.
"The British group ... is seeing a
rise in work ranging from
electronic surveillance to
protecting travelers," the company's regional
president for Africa told Reuters. "Demand has
been very high across Africa," Andy Baker said.
"The nature of our business is such that in
high-risk environments the need for our services
increases."
If Algeria's deadly encounter
with al-Qaeda was enough to add the North African
country to private security companies' emerging
African market, Libya must be a security firm's
paradise.
Following the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's (NATO's) toppling of the
regime of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and his
brutal assassination in Sirte on October 20, 2011,
numerous militias sprung up throughout Libya, some
armed with heavy weapons, courtesy of Western
countries.
Initially, such disturbing
scenes of armed militias setting up checkpoints at
every corner were dismissed as an inevitable
post-revolution reality. However, when Westerners
became targets themselves, "security" in Libya
finally became high on the agenda.
Many
private security firms already operate in Libya;
some were even present in the country before the
former Libyan government was officially
overthrown.
Some of these firms were
virtually unknown before the war, including a
small private British firm, Blue Mountain Group.
The latter was responsible for guarding the US
diplomatic mission in Benghazi which was torched
on September 11 last year. It later emerged that
the attack on the embassy was preplanned and
well-coordinated, resulting in the death of four
Americans, including ambassador J Christopher
Stevens.
It remains unclear why the State
Department opted to hire Blue Mountain Group, as
opposed to a larger security firm as is usually
the case with other Western embassies and large
companies, which sometimes vie to reconstruct the
very country that their governments conspired to
destroy.
The lucrative business of
destroying, rebuilding and securing has been
witnessed in other wars and conflicts spurred on
by Western interventions. Private security firms
are the middlemen that keep local irritants from
getting in the way of post-war "diplomacy" and the
work of business giants.
When a country
eventually collapses under the pressure of bunker
busters and other advanced weapons, security firms
move in to secure the realm at the same time as
Western diplomats are bargaining with emerging
local elites over the future of the country's
wealth.
In Libya, those who contributed
the biggest guns were the ones that received the
largest contracts. Of course, while the destroyed
country is being robbed blind, it is the local
population that suffers the consequences of having
foreigners with guns watch their neighborhoods in
the name of security.
It must be said that
the new Libyan government has specifically
rejected Blackwater-style armed contractors - as
in having boots on the ground - fearing
provocations similar to those that occurred in
Baghdad's Nisour Square and similar killings
throughout Afghanistan.
The aim in Libya
is to allow smooth business transactions without
occasional protests provoked by trigger-happy
foreigners. But considering the deteriorating
security in Libya, which has been created by the
systematic destruction of the central government
and its entire military apparatus, a solution to
the security vacuum remains a major topic of
discussion.
Private security firms are
essentially mercenaries who offer services to
spare Western governments without the political
cost of incurring too many casualties. While they
are often based in Western cities, many of their
employees come from so-called Third World
countries.
It's much safer this way - when
Asian, African or Arab security personnel are
wounded or killed on duty, the matter tends to
register, if ever, as a mere news item, with
little political consequence, Senate hearings or
government enquiries.
Mali, a West African
country that is suffering multiple crises -
military coups, civil war, famine and finally an
all-out French-led war - is the likely next victim
or opportunity for the deadly trio: Western
governments, large corporations and of course,
private security firms.
Mali is the
perfect ground for such opportunists, who will
spare no effort in exploiting its massive economic
potential and strategic location. For years, the
west African country has fallen under Western
political and military influence. The year 2012
represented a text-book scenario that ultimately
and predictably led to the Western intervention
that finally took place on January 11, when France
launched a military operation supposedly aimed at
ousting armed Islamic extremists.
Military
operations will last "as long as necessary,"
declared French President Francois Hollande,
echoing the same logic of the George W Bush
administration when it first declared its "war on
terror".
As inviting as the Malian setting
may seem, it is equally intricate and
unpredictable. No linear timeline can possibly
unravel in simple terms the crisis at hand. All
arrows point to large caches of weapons that made
their way from Libya to Mali following the NATO
war. A new balance of power took hold, empowering
the ever-oppressed Tuareg and flooding the country
with desert-hardened militants belonging to
various Islamic groups.
Two symmetrical
lines of upheavals developed at the same time in
both the north and south parts of the country. On
one hand, Tuareg's National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad declared independence in the
north and was quickly joined by Ansar Dine,
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.
On
the other hand, US-trained army captain Amadou
Haya Sanogo made his move in the southern part of
the country in March, overthrowing President
Amadou Toumani Toure.
The Malian storyline
developed so rapidly, giving the impression that
there was no other option but imminent
confrontation between the south and the north.
France, Mali's old colonial master, was quick to
wave the military card and worked diligently to
enlist west African countries in its war efforts.
The plan was for the intervention to
appear as if it's purely an African effort, with
mere logistical support and political backing by
their Western benefactors. Indeed, on December 21,
the UN Security Council approved the sending in of
an African-led force (of 3,000 soldiers) from the
Economic Community of West African States to chase
after northern militants in the vast Malian
desert.
That war was scheduled for
September 2013, however, to allow France to form a
united Western front and to train fragmented
Malian forces. However, the militants' capture of
the town of Konna, close to the capital Bamako,
has reportedly forced France's hand to intervene
in Mali and without UN consent.
A war
which was waged in the name of human rights and
Mali's territorial integrity, has already sparked
outcries from major human-rights organizations
regarding crimes committed by foreign forces and
their Malian army partners. However, what seems
thus far as an easy French conquest has left other
Western powers licking their chops over the
potential of having access to Mali, which is
unlikely to have a strong central government
anytime soon.
On January 25, the African
Press Agency's (APA's) page on Mali was filled
with news items about eager Western involvement in
solidarity with the French war buildup. It ranged
from "Italy to send aircraft to help transport
troops to Mali" to "Germany pledges aid to Africa
for Mali intervention."
All calls for
political dialogue, especially as ethnic strife is
likely to devastate the country for years to come,
seem to fall on deaf ears. Meanwhile, according to
APA, the UK is offering help to Mali in finding a
"political roadmap" aimed at securing the
"political future of the West African country".
As France, the US and EU countries
determine the future of Mali through military
efforts and political roadmaps, the country itself
is weakened and politically disfigured beyond any
possibility of confronting outside designs. For
G4S and other security firms, Mali now tops the
list in Africa's emerging security market. Nigeria
and Kenya follow closely, with possibilities
emerging elsewhere.
From Libya to Mali, a
typical story is forming of lucrative contracts
and massive opportunities. When private security
firms speak of an emerging market in Africa, one
can safely assume that the continent is once more
falling prey to growing military ambitions and
unfair business conduct.
While G4S is
polishing its tarnished brand, hundreds of
thousands of African refugees (800,000 in Mali
alone) will continue their endless journeys into
unfamiliar borders and unforgiving deserts. Their
security matters to no one, for private security
firms offer no protection to penniless refugees.
Ramzy Baroud
(www.ramzybaroud.net) is an
internationally-syndicated columnist and the
editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book
is: My Father was A Freedom Fighter: Gaza's
Untold Story (Pluto Press).
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