Khamenei plays hardball with
Obama By M K Bhadrakumar
It was an extraordinary week in the
politics of the Middle East and it ended
appropriately by being rounded off with a reality
check lest imaginations ran riot.
Three
major happenings within one week would have to be
taken as the inevitable confluence of a flow of
developments and processes: the offer by the
Syrian opposition of a bilateral dialogue with the
Bashar al-Assad regime; the historic visit of an
Iranian president to Egypt; and the public,
unconditional offer by the United States of direct
talks with Iran and the latter's ready acceptance
of it.
Yet, they are interconnected.
First, the Syrian kaleidoscope is dramatically
shifting despite the continuing bloodbath. Unless
the European countries drop their arms embargo on
Syria (which
expires on March 1 anyway)
and decide to arm the rebels, the stalemate will
continue.
The mood in Western capitals has
shifted in the direction of caution and
circumspection, given the specter that al-Qaeda
affiliates are taking advantage. If anything, the
hurricane of militant Islamism blowing through
Mali only reinforces that concern and reluctance.
Suffice to say, what prompted the Islamist
leader of the Syrian National Coalition, Moaz
al-Khatib, last weekend to show willingness to
take part in direct talks with representatives of
the Syrian regime - and pushed him into meeting
with Russian and Iranian foreign ministers - was
as much the disarray within the Syrian opposition
and his failure to form a credible
"government-in-exile" as his acute awareness that
the Western mood is now cautious about Syria.
To be sure, Iran played a signal role in
the grim battle of nerves over Syria through the
recent months. Strangely, it is Iran today, which
is on the "right side of history", by urging
dialogue and negotiations and democratic elections
as holding the key to reform and change in Syria -
or, for that matter, in Bahrain.
The shift
in Syria has actually enabled Iran to cross over
the Sunni-Shi'ite barriers that were tenaciously
put up to isolate it. Thus, President Mahmud
Ahmedinejad's historic visit to Egypt this week
has a much bigger regional dimension to it than
the restoration of the Iran-Egypt bilateral
relationship. The trilateral meeting held between
Ahmedinejad and his Egyptian and Turkish
counterparts Mohammed Morsi and Abdullah Gul
signified Iran's compelling relevance as an
interlocutor rather than as an implacable
adversary for the two major Sunni countries.
Interestingly, Morsi added, "Egypt's
revolution is now experiencing conditions similar
to those of Iran's Revolution and because Egypt
does not have an opportunity for rapid progress
like Iran, we believe that expansion of
cooperation and ties with Iran is crucially
important and necessary."
Needless to say,
Iranian diplomacy has been optimal with regard to
the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime in Cairo -
neither fawning nor patronizing, or pushing and
pressuring, but leaving things to the Brothers to
decide the pace. Basic to this approach is the
confidence in Tehran that the surge of Islamism in
the Middle East through democratic process, no
matter "Sunni Islamism", will ultimately work in
favor of Iran's interests.
The cordial
welcome extended by Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, head
of Egypt's Al-Azhar, to Ahmedinejad and the strong
likelihood of his visit to Tehran in a very near
future also underscores the common desire to
strengthen the affinities.
Simply put, the
Syrian crisis has virtually receded from the
Iran-Egypt field of play as a serious issue of
discord. True, the Turkey-based Syrian National
Council (SNC) continues to reject any negotiation
with the Syrian regime, and the Muslim Brotherhood
dominates the SNC. But this may also provide the
window of opportunity for Turkey, Egypt and Iran
to knock their heads together.
Besides,
the SNC has no real influence over the rebel
fighters, and Ankara feels exasperated at the
overall drift of the Syrian crisis.
Thus,
it was against a complex backdrop that US Vice
President Joe Biden said in Munich last weekend
that Washington is ready to hold direct talks with
Iran over the country's nuclear energy program.
Iran's immediate response was one of cautious
optimism. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi
reacted: "I am optimistic. I feel this new [US]
administration is really this time seeking to at
least divert from its previous traditional
approach vis-a-vis my country."
However,
by the next day, he had begun tempering the
enthusiasm: "We looked at it positively. I think
this is a good overture... But we will have to
wait a little bit longer to see if their gesture
is this time a real gesture... so that we will be
making our decisions likewise."
Salehi
subsequently explained, "A look at the past shows
that whenever we have had talks with the
Americans, including efforts to bring stability to
Afghanistan, unfortunately the other side has
failed to fulfill its obligations. You cannot use
a threatening tone and say all options are on the
table, on the one hand, [because] this is an
apparent contradiction... Exerting pressure and
[invitation to] talks are not compatible. If you
have honest intentions, we can place serious
negotiations on the agenda."
Obviously,
Salehi spoke in two voices, and his retraction
finally proved to be the "authentic" voice of
Tehran. When the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei broke
his silence on Thursday, he rejected the
possibility of direct talks with the US. He said,
"You [Americans] are pointing the gun at Iran and
say either negotiate or we will shoot. The Iranian
nation will not be frightened by the threats...
Some naive people like the idea of negotiating
with America [but] negotiations will not solve the
problems. If some people want American rule to be
established again in Iran, the nation will rise up
to them."
One way of looking at Khamenei's
harsh statement on Thursday is to put it in the
immediate context of the announcement of further
sanctions against Iran by Washington the previous
day, which the US administration has explained as
"a significant turning of the screw" that will
"significantly increase the economic pressure on
Iran".
But it does not fully explain the
manifest harshness and the comprehensive rejection
by Khamenei. Meanwhile, three factors are to be
taken into account. First, Iran's domestic
politics is hotting up and the dramatic eruption
of public acrimony between Ahmedinejad and the
Speaker of the Majlis Ali Larijani last weekend
testifies to a rough period when Khamenei will
have his hands full as the great helmsman.
Indeed, a lot of jockeying is going on as
the presidential election slated for May draws
closer. Khamenei could factor in that the talks
with the US are best held after the elections. (By
the way, this may also be Obama's preference.)
Second, Khamenei has flagged by implication that
Tehran expects some serious goodwill gesture on
the part of the US before any talks take place. He
has recalled that the US did not act in good faith
in the past - such as when Iran helped out in the
US's overthrow of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.
A third factor is that
Khamenei genuinely sees that Iran is on the "right
side of history" as regards the regional upheaval
in the Middle East, whereas the US's regional
strategies are getting nowhere. In sum, whereas
the US propaganda is that the Iran sanctions are
"biting" and the regime is in Iran feels besieged,
it is in actuality a bizarre situation of
Washington believing its own propaganda while the
ground realities are vastly different.
If
the propaganda has us believe that the regime in
Tehran is living in fear of a Tahrir-like
revolution erupting in Iran, Khamenei's words show
no such traces of fear or timidity. On the other
hand, Khamenei would have carefully weighed
Obama's capacity (or the limits to it) to bulldoze
the Israeli lobby and to initiate a genuine
normalization process with Iran.
When
Richard Nixon worked on China in the early 1970s,
he had the benefit of a broad consensus of opinion
within the US political establishment. On the
contrary, when it comes to Iran, pride and
prejudice influence still rule the roost for most
consequential Americans.
Khamenei's
message to Obama is to get serious and think
through what he really wants instead of lobbing a
vague offer through Biden with no strings attached
and no commitments underlying it. The Iranian
leader who has continuously dealt with successive
US administrations through the past 22 years
simply threw the ball into Obama's court and will
now wait and see how the latter kicks it around
when he is in Israel next month.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His
assignments included the Soviet Union, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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