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COMMENTARY
'Dead on arrival': US diplomacy in
India
By K P S Gill
"Dead
on arrival" is how one observer described Colin Powell’s
latest visit (his third since September 11) to New Delhi
and Islamabad that ended on Monday. Earlier statements
downplaying the significance of this excursion suggest
that the US Secretary of State himself did not expect
much more.
India and Pakistan have become
mandatory stopovers for roving Western VIPs offering
non-solutions to non-problems in South Asia - Powell,
for instance, sees images of salvation in international
observers for the forthcoming elections in
Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
Meanwhile, the core problem in the region - the
persistence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and of the
armies and infrastructure of the Islamist jihad in that
country - is systematically downplayed.
The
trend started after September 11 (October 2001 saw
Powell’s first tour to the region), and intensified
after December 13, when India’s parliament was attacked
by Pakistan-backed terrorists groups. This -
particularly after the brutal Kaluchak massacre of May
14 near the capital Jammu - led to the largest military
mobilization the region has seen. Without exception,
none of these diplomatic delegations has had anything
concrete to offer beyond platitudes about "talks about
talks". And yet, to their home constituencies, they have
repeatedly reported "great breakthroughs" in the
Indian-Pakistan imbroglio as a result of their sagacious
interventions.
The greatest of these supposed
"breakthroughs" came in the wake of the artificial
hysteria that was whipped up over an ostensibly imminent
war - and possible nuclear holocaust - in South Asia in
the latter part of May 2001, after the Kaluchak massacre
tempted the Indian leadership to engage in an experiment
in brinkmanship.
The fact is, at no moment
during that entire counterfeit crisis was there even the
remotest possibility of war, and the ease with which the
tensions were abruptly dissipated by Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s sudden pronouncements
about "clear skies" bore out the absurdity of Western
projections.
This did not, however, end war
speculation, and "experts" continued to argue that the
next time there was a major terrorist strike in India,
the country’s leadership "would not be able to resist
public pressure" for military retaliation against
Pakistan - and Pakistan’s dictator, President General
Pervez Musharraf, sought international guarantees
against Indian "overreaction" in case of a major
terrorist attack in India by groups that he "cannot
control". But another massacre of comparable magnitude
did occur - at Kasimpura on July 13 - and there was not
even a suggestion of a military response across the Line
of Control (LoC).
This is crucial, because the
pattern of Western - and particularly American -
"peacemaking" initiatives has become a critical input in
the orchestration of tensions in South Asia, encouraging
the major players here to sustain tensions in order to
attract "favorable" interventions.
The Western
discourse has also set an unacceptable limit on what
needs to be done against terrorism, as evidenced by the
incessant harping on infiltration across the LoC -
Powell again saw fit to point out that it was
"difficult" to accurately monitor the movement of
terrorists from Pakistan into J&K.
The
result is that, every time international (read US)
pressure escalates, Musharraf makes a televised "address
to the nation" roundly condemning terrorism; for a few
weeks, infiltration rates drop; and the "international
community", goaded by their "friend" Musharraf,
immediately begins to pressure India to offer some
"concessions" to placate Pakistan in return.
There is something immensely offensive in this.
As offensive as the suggestion that, since Osama bin
Laden has not executed any further attacks on America
after September 11, the US somehow owes him something by
way of reciprocal "concessions". The logic appears to be
that if a mass murderer agrees - even temporarily - to
stop murdering our people, we owe him something by way
of reward. This is a position that should be rejected
with utter contempt. But it finds the most unlikely
defenders in the "free world".
This is not the
only distortion in the Western discourse on terrorism in
South Asia. The Americans continue to find it convenient
to project Pakistan as a "frontline state" in the war
against terrorism, and cite as evidence the fact that
Pakistan has "co-operated" with the US and has "handed
over" several al-Qaeda operatives, including some at
leadership levels in the shadowy Islamist terrorist
organization.
It is certain, however, that US
intelligence and policy officials are entirely aware of
the duplicity of these claims. The truth is, at no point
in the war against terror has the Musharraf regime given
a whit more than it has been forced to concede.
For example, take the much-touted capture of Abu
Zubaidah - the senior-most bin Laden lieutenant to be
arrested to date - in late March. Abu Zubaidah and more
than 50 other al-Qaeda cadres were arrested at
Faisalabad and handed over to US authorities only after
the FBI had intercepted their telephonic communications
and confronted local authorities, making it impossible
for the latter to refuse to take action.
In
another high profile case in December 2001, over 120
al-Qaeda fighters were arrested in the Kurram Agency,
and subsequently given over to the Americans - but only
when their presence could no longer be concealed or
denied as a result of a quarrel between local tribal
groups. There is ample intelligence regarding numerous
cases where Pakistani authorities have turned a blind
eye to the presence and activities of al-Qaeda until US
authorities have coerced action, or till the terrorists
have found it possible to relocate to undisclosed
destinations.
Much of this is incomprehensible,
particularly in view of the sheer horror of what was
done on September 11, and of the enormous danger that
the surviving al-Qaeda and its ideological affiliates
constitute. It appears, however, that domestic political
compulsions and the inertia of past policies are, once
again, taking America down a familiar path of supporting
an unconscionable Third World dictatorship - and a
sponsor of terrorism to boot.
K P S
Gill is president of the Institute for Conflict
Management, a non-profit society set up in 1997 in New
Delhi which is committed to the continuous evaluation
and resolution of problems of internal security in South
Asia.
Printed with permission from the South
Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism
Portal
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