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SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD
STORY
CHAPTER 52: President blamed for
assassinations
From June 11, 1990,
when the second Eelam war flared up, Sri Lanka was
turned into a killing field. Death and destruction
became the order of the day. On the one side, the leader
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began to
unleash terror with sickening regularity, targeting the
security forces, including policemen and Sinhalese
leaders as well as Sinhalese and Muslim civilians.
On the other side, the country's President,
Ranatunge Premadasa, matched the LTTE leader Velupillai
Prabhakaran with terror and brutality, which resulted in
the decimation of Tiger cadres, as well as the death of
civilians, including Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese.
The Sri Lankan Government and the Tigers
considered, and still continue to consider, falsely,
that the ethnic turmoil in the country can be solved
militarily.
To match Prabhakaran militarily, the
Government promoted Denzil Kobbekaduwa as Major-General
on January 9, 1990 and appointed him as the Commander of
the Northern armed forces, with headquarters in
Anuradhapura. Kobbekaduwa was a chauvinist,
unhesitatingly bent on the destruction of the Tamils.
For him, warmongering was his ideology and he planned
assiduously for the capture of the Northern province and
to rid the peninsula of the hold of the Tamil militant
organization, at any cost, even at the complete
extermination of the entire Tamil people.
Sinhalese in the south considered Kobbekaduwa a
hero, and they made killing a virtue in the military
campaign against the Tamil militants. And just as
Prabhakaran was hated by the Sinhalese, whilst
Kobbekaduwa was hated by the Tamils.
Nevertheless, although Kobbekaduwa fought to
free the country from the hold of the Tamil militants,
his mysterious death and the way in which it was handled
- without even a post mortem - should not have happened.
Even today his death is a mystery, though a
second and last Presidential Commission came up with
highly speculative conclusions.
According to the
Commission inquiry, General Kobbekaduwa was about to get
into a Land Rover affixed with two stars (UH8752), at
Kayts on August 8, 1992, when he saw Brigadier
Wimalaratne standing near another vehicle. Kobbekaduwa
called him and said in Sinhala, "we go in this vehicle".
Kobbekaduwa got into the front passenger seat and
Wimalaratne got into the driver's seat alongside
Kobbekaduwa. Lt.-Col. Stephen was about to get out of
Kobbekaduwa's vehicle, but the general told him to
travel with him to Araly Point.
According to
testimony, while proceeding towards Araly Point, about
one-and-a-half kilometers from the Point, Kobbekaduwa
made all three vehicles in the convoy stop. About 100
meters from where they halted was a wide open area, by
the side of the track lay a typical Jaffna grassland
without trees. It was at this location that, the blast
occurred on their return journey.
Kobbekaduwa
explained that, if the entire party went in three
vehicles they might arouse the suspicion of the LTTE,
who could observe them from the mainland, from where
they had the firepower to attack. Accordingly, all those
who were to die or be injured, including Corporal Upali
and Captain Weerawatte, got into Kobbekaduwa's vehicle
and proceeded to Araly Point - leaving the other two
vehicles behind. At Araly Point, they had discussions.
Captain Weerawatte in his testimony said that he showed
Kobbekaduwa records of tides, depths, silt etc that he
had been asked to maintain. According to him,
Kobbekaduwa examined these documents. Commodore
Jayamaha, the head of the navy in the Jaffna peninsula
was with them. Weerawatte was asked to give the
documents to the navy so that they could make a graph.
Kobbekaduwa and the party remained there for about 45
minutes.
According to Weerawatte's testimony,
Major Alwis asked him to give a message to Velany to
hold up the helicopter, which had just passed overhead
towards Velany, for 10 minutes. Therefore, Captain
Weerawatte went into a bunker to call Mandaithivu to
convey the message to Velany. While doing so, he heard
the vehicle leave, but because he had a sudden urge to
use the toilet he was left behind. According to the
Commission report, Captain Weerawatte's story was not
acceptable. It felt that Major de Alwis had a secure
handset from which he could have spoken either to Palay
or Velany, or else he could have used the communication
equipment available in Brigadier Thilakaratne's vehicle.
The Commission dismissed the idea that, there was a need
for anyone to ask Weerawatte to make a call for the
helicopter to wait for 10 minutes.
Captain
Weerawatte testified that, as he went to the toilet, he
was left behind and after a few minutes, he heard the
explosion and ran out and discovered the tragedy.
According to the Commission, it appeared that,
Weerawatte deliberately avoided getting into the vehicle
and he had given a false excuse for doing so in his
evidence.
According to available reports,
Kobbekaduwa had called for the helicopter from Palaly
that morning to take him back to Palay. Therefore, the
helicopter coming to pick him up would definitely have
waited for him and there was no necessity to give a
further message.
Major Weerasinghe was an army
engineer, but he was a captain on August 8, 1992. He
came to Velany brigade at Kayts from Welioya in June
1992, just two months before the explosion. He was from
bomb disposals, which used bulldozers to make roads and
bunkers. He had experience in bomb making, the use of
explosives and bomb disposal.
The Commission
reports, "Hence we have that; if an Improvised Explosive
Device [IED] was indeed used, set in or on the blasted
vehicle, there is a man on the spot capable of making an
IED, transferred to Velany headquarters in Kayts just
about two months before the blast, with access to the
blasted vehicle parked in the adjoining compound to
where Major Weerasinghe lived. Brigadier Thilakaratne
was on leave. Lt-Col Stephen was the acting Commander of
Velany."
Major Weerasinghe in his testimony told
the Commission that, he knew how to dismantle a LTTE
land mine. Anti-personnel mines were imported, he told.
They are not manufactured in Sri Lanka. He also told the
Commission that, he did not order two stars to be put on
the vehicle to be used by General Kobbekaduwa. The
Commission took into consideration the fact why
Weerasinghe send a vehicle with one star to transport a
general with two stars (a brigadier has one star) which
was quite abnormal. Witness Buddy Samarasinghe earlier
told the Commission that, he saw two uncovered stars on
the vehicle in which Kobbekaduwa traveled to Araly
Point. The Commission rejected Weerasinghe's contention.
Major Weerasinghe also told the Commission that,
he did not know where Kobbekaduwa was and he said that
he went in search of him. This meant that, he was not at
Araly Point to meet and greet the visiting commanding
general and the naval officials. By giving such
evidence, it was easy to distance himself from a
prepared vehicle. The Commission says, "But it is also
consistent of an awareness that there was a concealed
IED on the vehicle which was to be blasted en route".
When the Commission visited Araly in early 1995
and asked to be taken on the same route that Kobbekaduwa
was taken on, the commissioners were taken past the
police station through to the junction with Mandaithivu
road.
It was the evidence of Major Weerasinghe
that, at about 8am on August 8, 1992, Major Rodrigo told
him that General Kobbekaduwa was coming to Kayts. This
suggests that he had not heard anything about
Kobbekaduwa's intended visit to Kayts the previous
night. On the night of the 7th, the acting Brigade
Commander of Kayts, Lt-Col Stephen, attended a
conference at Karainagar with Kobbekaduwa. Stephen knew
of the intended visit of Kobbekaduwa the next morning to
Kayts.
Stephen went back to his station at
Madathivu that night. As he was returning past Velany,
the navy did not bother to send a special messenger
regarding Kobbekaduwa's trip the next morning. Major
Weerawatte said that Stephen did not return to
Mandathivu by passing his camp, which means that Stephen
would have gone past brigade headquarters at Velany.
Therefore, from all these circumstances the
Commission drew inference that Stephen had to inform
Velany headquarters that a vehicle had to be made ready
for Kobbekaduwa, which he did, and to do so, he would
have spoken with the senior officer Rodrigo and or
Weerasinghe. Stephen had to decide which vehicles were
to be sent to the pier, having regard to the number of
persons.
The vehicle was parked next to
Weerasinghe's Chalet in the adjoining compound.
Weerasinghe and Major Rodrigo lived in the same chalet.
So the Commission drew the inference in all those
circumstances that Major Weerasinghe was not speaking
the truth when he said that he learnt of the visit of
Kobbekaduwa only on 8th morning and he was casually
informed that a vehicle be sent to the pier and that it
was not necessary to put on two stars.
Major
Weerasinghe next told the Commission that, at about
9.10am Major Rodrigo, an artillery officer, who was at
the brigade headquarters, told him to go and ask General
Kobbekaduwa (1) Whether he would be going to Welioya
from Kayts, and (2) If so, how he would be going as
Palaly wanted to know - i.e., if he is going by
helicopter to Palaly - Anuradhapura - Welioya or Palaly
- Vavuniya - Welioya by road, to find out which of these
two routes he intend taking. According to Weerasinghe,
as he did not know where the general had gone, he went
in search of him, as even Major Rodrigo did not know.
The Commission took objection to Weerasinghe's
statement. The Commission in its report states Rodrigo
and Weerasinghe "both knew of the visit [General
Kobbekaduwa] the previous night. We observe that
Weerasinghe's evidence is tainted by frequent lies."
Major Weerasinghe continued his testimony - he
said that he then went to Araly Junction (the junction
of the Mandathivu Road and Araly Point - Velany Road).
He asked the soldiers there who told him the party had
gone to Araly Pont. So Weerasinghe set out in pursuit.
He told that after having gone some distance towards
Araly Point, he saw two vehicles parked by the roadside.
He said that he stopped his vehicles five to ten meters
away and walked up to and spoke to Major Rupasinghe and
Major Induruwa, who were there. He told them about the
message from Palaly to General Kobbekaduwa. It seems
that Major Rupasinghe had told Captain Weerasinghe not
to proceed to Araly Point.
At this point the
Commission asked Captain Weerasinghe: "Why did you not
use the radio at Velany to give the message?"
Answer: "I do not know why I was asked to go and
give a message when there was a radio contact from
Velanay with Thilakaratne's vehicle [Brigadier
Thilakaratne's Land Rover was the one used by General
Kobbekaduwa and others to go to Araly Point]."
Weerasinghe went on to say, "We could have
radioed the vehicle, also there was a radio operator in
the vehicle. We do not speak directly to generals - even
Col Stephen could have been contacted through
Mandaithivu."
In the light of the evidence of
signals and communications networks in the Northern
Command at the relevant time, Weerasinghe's evidence of
being asked to physically take a message to General
Kobbekaduwa was untenable, unconvincing, did not stand
to reason and intrinsically unacceptable. The Commission
rejected the statement as false.
According to
the investigating Commission, that was one of the
pillars on which a falsified picture of what happened in
Kayts that particular morning had been presented to the
general public of the country. The falsehood enabled
Weerasinghe to pretend to be an innocent bystander at
the scene of the blast.
To the Army Court of
Inquiry held in August 1992, he had not mentioned one
word of going towards Araly Point with a radio message
for the general or waiting with Majors Rupasinghe and
Induruwa, and of seeing the Land Rover returning from
Araly, of being present at that time of the explosion or
picking up five pieces of debris of a land mine and
handing them over to Justice Ismail at the Committee
hearings held in Palaly on 15 August 1992. He had failed
to mention his presence at the blast. Before the One Man
Committee of Inquiry, he has stated on 15 August 1992,
as follows:
"I came to meet Major Alwis. I
stopped my Land Rover 25 meters behind two Land Rovers
which were stopped by the roadside. I saw Major Induruwa
and Major Rupasinghe at that point. I gave a message
asking Major Alwis to contact Palaly, as there was a
radio message. Then I waited there chatting. Then I
heard a noise of a helicopter proceeding towards Velany,
then I saw this ill-fated vehicle coming at a distance
of 500 meters ... then my vehicle turned to go back.
Before I could get into my vehicle, I heard the noise of
an explosion. I ran to this spot. The vehicle was on the
other side of the road. I picked up some pieces of
debris from the exploded land mine. There were about
five pieces. I produced the five pieces."
To the
three-member Commission of Inquiry (consisting of
international judges) he has stated, "Captain
Weerasinghe had come from Velany with a message to the
general that there would be some delay on the onward
flight arrangements from Palaly to Anuradhapura."
According to this statement, the present
Commission noted that, in that statement of Captain
Weerasinghe there was no mention of the route the
general would take to get to Welioya. According to the
contention of the Investigative Commission, Captain
Weerasinghe's failure to disclose his presence at the
scene of the blast to the Army Court of Inquiry was a
very serious contradiction. His explanation that he was
not asked about it was not acceptable. At such inquiries
witnesses are expected to tell the court all the facts.
The Commission viewed that Captain Weerasinghe
had withheld and had true reasons for his presence at
the time of the blast. There must be a good reason for
doing so. At this point, the Commission began to
entertain suspicion that, it could be probable that he
himself might have blasted the vehicle by radio signal.
The Commission was confident of the fact that Captain
Weerasinghe knew everything about making bombs and IED.
They were fully aware that he had the knowledge to do
so. He had undisturbed access to the vehicle previous
night. There was every possibility for him to have fixed
the IDE on the vehicle.
The Commission was of
the view that, Weerasinghe told lies about the number of
stars fixed to the vehicle and also that he knew nothing
about the impending visits about General Kobbekaduwa and
others - the victims. He further told lies about his
presence at the scene of the crime.
The
Commission further speculated about whether Captain
Weerasinghe was purposely transferred to Kayts, two
months earlier as a part of a criminal conspiracy by
certain groups of army officers to plot to kill the
general, and the reason for such conspiracy will be
discussed later in this chapter. Overall, was he a tool
in the hands of others obeying strategies of politicians
bent on self preservation.
After the blast,
Weerasinghe said that pieces of body were scattered
everywhere. Commodore Jayamaha had fallen injured.
General Kobbekaduwa was down. Brigadier Wimalaratne was
in two pieces. He told that he remembered a navy person
taking photographs. And according to him, no search was
made for land mines at the scene after the blast before
other vehicles came. Lorries and tractors came to the
scene that day and removed debris of the blasted
vehicle.
After Kobbekaduwa and Jayamaha were
removed from the scene of the blast, Captain Weerasinghe
said that he collected four or five pieces of metal. He
said that one was warm. He said he collected it from
near where Kobbekaduwa was lying. He said that later
Brigadier Thilakaratne telephoned and asked for the
preparation of a sketch. He left the scene about 1?
hours after the blast and returned to make the rough
sketch at about 4.30 pm. Weerasinghe said that Brigadier
Thilakaratne wanted him to write things on the sketch as
told by him. According to what Brigadier Thilakaratne
had told him he wrote "disused Jeep track" as the track
where the crater is shown in the sketch.
Later
he told that, he went back to the scene with Brigadier
Thilakaratne and Major Rodrigo and made some corrections
to the rough sketch. Captain Weerasinghe said that he
had not made any marks on the ground where bodies had
fallen, or whose they are. He marked the positions of
the bodies on the rough sketch from memory. Neither had
he made any marks showing the place where the damaged
vehicle had rested or where Corporal Upali fell or where
he had found the pieces of metal he had picked up. The
scene was completely cleared he said when he revisited
the scene for the first time to prepare the rough
sketch.
Captain Weerasinghe said that he showed
the sketch to Brigadier Thilakaratne, who prepared the
index. Major Rodrigo made the key. Weerasinghe said that
he drew a bush. He told that Thilakaratne mentioned the
boundaries of the scene for preparation of the sketch,
i.e. the area of ground included in the sketch.
Brigadier Thilakaratne concurred that he
instructed Captain Weerasinghe to write "disused jeep
track" on the sketch. He explained that was because
there were signs of grass between the track marks.
Thilakaratne also told that he told Captain Weerasinghe
to keep the metal pieces safely as they may be needed at
an Army Court of Inquiry. He said that he was not shown
the metal pieces.
Brigadier Thilakaratne in his
disposition to the Commission said that, he did not
order security or static guards to guard the crater or
the scene. The damaged vehicle, he said, was at the
SLEME workshop in Velany school compound and not with
the Military Police.
He further said that, the
antenna was broken in two, but not separated, but he
could not remember if the radio was sill fixed to the
dashboard. He informed that later the spare wheel and
the signal equipment had been removed by the Signals NCO
and stored in a room in his office building.
The
brigadier also added that, the Land Rover UH 8752 was a
normal Land Rover and not a modified vehicle, having a
taller roof. He said that, they should have got his
permission to use his vehicle as he had left for Colombo
on the 6th. He said that it was improper that he was not
told about - conduct abnormal as he could have been
reached in Colombo on the night of the 7th.
The
Commission reported about Major Franklin Rodrigo as
follows, "29.1 (i) Major Rodrigo was at Velany at the
time of the blast. Captain Weerasinghe says that it was
major Rodrigo who told him to take a message to
Kobbekaduwa. We are of the opinion that this story of a
message was a mere pretext for Captain Weerasinghe to be
present at the scene. Major Rodrigo must have known of
the secure hand-held communication set. But that he had
motive to harm Kobbekaduwa is not apparent on the
evidence. Even if he had, we have been unable to find
it, or that he did any other act of cover-up. Brigadier
Thilakaratne goes off leaving him behind. Any evidence
of complicity with the conspiracy to kill is
inconclusive. The circumstances set out above are
insufficient to reach adverse inference against him."
The Commission's conclusion about Captain
Weerasinghe, now major, 29.2 (i) The evidence has been
established beyond all reasonable doubt that it was not
a buried land mine which exploded on the application of
pressure that destroyed the vehicle and its passengers.
29.2 (ii) This officer was at the scene of the
explosion at Araly at the time of the explosion. He was
waiting there for the vehicle carrying the deceased
persons and the injured one to return from the Araly
Point. Whilst it was so returning on a track often used
during that period, in a place which is a vast open
space with excellent line vision, an improvised
explosive device on board that vehicle exploded killing
10 of its passengers and grievously injuring another.
Considering all of the evidence before the
Commission as to the conduct of this officer, Captain
Weerasinghe, both before the blast and after it, of his
expertise in regard to explosives and the explosive
devises, of his transfer and placement in Kayts shortly
before this explosion, of the fact he had easy access to
the vehicle as and when he wanted, and other attendant
circumstances, the Commission draws the irresistible
inference that the evidence considered as a whole is
consistent only with Captain W A N M Weerasinghe of Army
Engineers as the person responsible for giving what must
have been a radio command to explode the Improvised
Explosive Devise placed in the vehicle."
The
evidence is totally inconsistent with any other
reasonable hypothesis that it was not him but someone
else. Someone had to be there at hand to give this
signal. As it was only the army that could have built or
placed the IED on this vehicle in secret, then it is an
army officer best suited to explode it. He does not need
to hide. Everyone is taken by surprise. Conversely, the
person who exploded it should know the mechanism of the
bomb in undertaking an assassination of this magnitude.
Captain Weerasinghe was there, as visible as anyone
else, and he could have given the signal, probably by
pressing a button or buttons.
29.2 (iii) The
Commission had already recounted the evidence against
him in serial. To summarize it: Weerasinghe was a
trained bomb disposal field engineer of the army
engineers; he therefore knew much about explosives, how
to make bombs and delouse them etc. He was at Welioya
before his transfer to Kayts. Brigadier Bohoran was
Coordinating Officer at Welioya when Weerasinghe went
there;
(a) He was transferred as a staff officer
to Velany Headquarters Kayts in June 1992 shortly before
this explosion; this give him time to familiarize
himself with the island, to get to know his superiors
and others, get to know the Araly area well. The
Commission bears in mind that Brigadier Chula
Senivaratne, then of the Directorate of Military
Intelligence, says he had warned General Kobbekaduwa in
June 1992 that, if an attempt on his life was made it
would probably be in the North in Kayts and not in
Colombo or Vettilaikerni, Elephant Pass, Palaly or
Anuradhapura. He had also warned Major de Alwis,
Kobbekaduwa's staff officer, not to permit the general
to stay overnight at Karainagar and proceed to Kayts the
following morning. There had been information that Kayts
was the chosen ground for murder. It is army-controlled,
no one can enter without permission. Movement to and
from Kayts is restricted.
(b) We are of the view
that, what he picked up from the ground were such
remnants of an IED and not fragments of the metal casing
of a LTTE land mine.
(c) Weerasinghe had handed
over five metal pieces to Ismail J at Palaly on 15-8-92.
He said he picked them as souvenirs. But five metal
pieces are sent in an irregular and improper manner to
the Govt analyst on 14-8-92 through the Defense Ministry
the day before, said to be from this explosion at Kayts.
What were those pieces? They cannot be the same that was
handed over at Palaly by Weerasinghe the following day!
The Govt analyst and Asst analyst Gunatilake decided
that the Defense Ministry parcel was not significant and
therefore no analysis would be done; but we find that
Gunatilake does testify about them. All the evidence of
a land mine casing is false;
(d) Weerasinghe
deliberately lies to the Army Court Inquiry on 20 August
1992 when he pretends he only heard about an explosion
at Araly and that one of their relief drivers died. He
withholds the fact that he was at the scene of the
explosion when it happened or that he picked up anything
from the ground or that he gave any metal pieces from
this explosion to be sent to the Defense Ministry before
15 August 1992. We have formed the view that the entire
story about fragments of a LTTE land mine being
recovered by Capt Weerasinghe and that more fragments
were in the crater is false evidence invented to shield
the real assassin.
(e) Weerasinghe deliberately
lies to the Army Court of Inquiry on 20 August 1992 when
he pretends he only heard about the explosion at Araly
and that one of their relief drivers died. He withholds
the fact that he was at the scene of the explosion when
it happened or that he picked up anything from the
ground or that he have gave it to the Ismail Committee
on 15 August 1992 or that he sent or gave any metal
piece from this explosion to be sent to the Defence
Ministry before 15 August 1992. We have formed the view
that the entire story about fragments of a LTTE land
mine being recovered by Capt. Weerasinghe and that more
fragments were in the crater is false evidenced invented
to shield the real assassins;
(f) Weerasinghe
together with Brigadier Thilakaratne deliberately
misdescribes the track on which the crater was found as
a "disused track" in the rough sketch provided to the
Dfence Ministry by Fax which in turn reached the
Surveyor General who sent his representatives to the
scene of the blast to prepare a sketch as evidence for
the Ismail Committee. The surveyor merely repeated that
descriptions given in that rough sketch on this plan,
but says it appeared to be in regular use. Several other
witnesses such as the Police Officers at Kayts to whom
General Kobbekaduwa has spoken that morning have
contradicted the description in the sketch as "disused
track " and stated it was in regular use at the time of
the explosion."
(g) Weerasinghe had easy access
to vehicle UH8752, which was parked unprotected next to
his lodgings. Brigadier Thilakaratne was on leave
between 31 July and 2nd August and again from 6 August
afternoon. The usual driver of the vehicle Samaraweera
was also on leave from 2 August to 20 August. The spare
wheel and antenna have been removed from the vehicle,
when Wimarathne visited on 17 August - vide photographs
taken by them, but replaced; detonating mechanism
ingredients could have been removed in the process.
(h) Weerasinghe's story about going in search to
Kobbekaduwa to Araly to give a message is obviously
untrue, as Kobbekaduwa and Major Alwis had a Sabre
secure hand held communication set at their disposal
wherever they were, even at Araly Point and any message
could have been given to that set. Major
D.J.R.Rupasinghe has informed the Commission by way of
an affidavit after open court proceedings concluded at
the end of March 1997, that he saw Major Alwis having
the secure hand set in his hand, when they finally set
out for Araly Point in one vehicle with 12 persons on
board. Captain Weerawatte remained behind at the Point,
as he had an urgent call of nature or so he would have
made us believe. Weerasinghe has withheld his false
story to the Army Court of Inquiry, that he was at the
scene of explosion because he wants to give a message to
Kobbekaduwa, whilst pretending he only heard of the
explosion later obviously because, they would have
queried such conduct which would have aroused suspicion
on account of the availability of secure hand set;
(i) Capt. Weerasinghe had ample opportunity on
the 7th night to prepare the vehicle, fixing two stars
to it to entice Kobbekaduwa and his troop to get into
it. These metal stars and their metal holders can easily
be turned out at any Army Headquarters camp. There would
always be sufficient stars to fix to senior officers
vehicles. We say this because Lt.Col. Stephen attended
the conference at Karainagar, learnt of the General's
decision to visit Araly Point next morning, must
necessarily have had to go to Velany headquarters on his
return to Mandathivu which was on his way to give that
information to Major Rodrigo the senior officer at
Velany and to Captain Weerasinghe. We have evidence of
driver Samaraweera that Major Rodrigo and Captain
Weerasinghe lived in the same house used as their
quarters at Velany and in the adjoining compound was
UH8572 parked there in Brigadier Thilakaratne's absence.
As there has undoubtedly been a conspiracy to
assassinate Kobbekaduwa, they would have been prepared
with stars etc. Captain Weerasinghe has denied that, he
learnt of the General's proposed visit to Kayts on the
8th and not on the previous night, but learnt of it only
on 8th morning itself from Rodrigo. In view of the above
circumstances both Rodrigo and Weerasinghe were sharing
the same quarters and Stephen as acting Commanding
Officer necessarily would have informed them of the
visit, we conclude that Captain Weerasinghe has falsely
denied knowing of the impending visit on 7th night;
(j) Major Weerasinghe testified before the
Commission. The false aspect of his testimony was put to
him. He was examined regarding contradictory positions
he had taken at earlier inquiries on the self same fact
(e.g.) his omission to tell the Army Court that he was
present at the time of the explosion, that he was there
because he carried message to Kobbekaduwa and that he
picked up metal pieces from the ground; It was suggested
that he had lied to the Army Court by telling them he
only heard of this explosion afterwards; he was examined
regarding the false description given by him to the
track which had the crater; he was informed that his
demeanor was unsatisfactory and warned.
According to the above position taken by the
Commission, it decided to inform Captain Weerasinghe
that it was of the opinion that he was implicated or
concerned in the matter under inquiry. Furthermore, the
Commission informed him of his right to be represented
by one or more attorneys. The Commission further
informed Captain Weerasinghe that he had already
testified before the Commission and he might even file
written submissions or file an affidavit, if he so
desired. The Commission made this move as it wanted to
conclude sittings by March 31, 1997.
In response
to the communication of the Commission, Captain W A N M
Weerasinghe submitted an affidavit to the Commission
consisting of five short paragraphs in which he denied
having had anything to do with the matter under inquiry.
He failed to inform the Commission whether he would be
represented by attorneys.
And as no attorneys
communicated with the Commission on his behalf, the
Commission decided to take into consideration his denial
contained in the affidavit in the assessment of the
evidence against him. Meanwhile, before concluding the
case against Major Weerasinghe it is necessary to
understand the views and the final decision of the
Commission regarding those responsible for the
assassination. In the words of the Commission:
25: Those responsible for the assassination:
25 (i) After careful consideration of all the
evidence, real, direct and circumstantial evidence
available to this Commission, oral, documentary and
opinion evidence, of motive opportunity and preparation,
previous conduct and subsequent conduct of all those
persons whose conduct is relevant to this inquiry, this
Commission is able to come to one conclusion only, and
that Defence Minister President R Premadasa himself
targeted Major General D Kobbekaduwa for assassination
for the reasons discussed in this report and had his
will and decision executed through those loyal to him or
those prepared to do his bidding for whatever reason in
the Ministry of Defense and in the army which resulted
in mass murder. Ten people were killed. The evidence
proves beyond any doubt that President R Premadasa was
directly responsible for the assassination and causing
grievous injuries to Cpl Upali. But the Commission
failed to come up with the details regarding the
preparations made to kill the deceased people.
The motive adduced by the Commission to
physically get rid of Denzil Kobbekaduwa was as follows:
24:3 (iii) It is the view of the Commission that
President Premadasa may well have believed that General
Kobbekaduwa, who was a close relative of former SLFP
Minister and who had been a Presidential candidate, at a
previous presidential election [1982 contested against J
R Jayewardene, in the first-ever presidential election],
had political backing and may well be influenced into
accepting a presidential candidature nomination at a
future date, as the general was very popular and known
as a fair minded, honorable person, who cared for the
small man. He had all the attributes of an electoral
winner. Military heroes of the Second World War became
famous presidents in the United States of America and
France. Premadasa must have been all too well aware of
it.
This writer is of the opinion that, the
Commissioners who wrote this motive must have been
living in another world. In 1989, when the question of
the presidential candidature arose within the ruling UNP
and when R Premadasa, an ordinary person from the lowly
gutters of Colombo, without any usual leadership social
or feudal aristocratic background, was selected to
compete against Srimavo R D Bandaranaike, from the
Kandyan aristocratic stock, everybody thought that
Bandaranaike would win overwhelming after 12 years of
misrule by J R Jayewardene.
But despite all the
odds, Premadasa won handsomely. The Commissioners wrote
about the forthcoming presidential election, which would
have to be held in the latter part of 1994 or early part
of 1995, as the main reason for Premadasa to target
Denzil Kobbekaduwa.
This writer had been in
contact with President Premadasa from 1963 until 1977
and as far as this writer knows, he was a workaholic and
he believed only in political achievements. He started
his national politics in 1956 by contesting in
parliamentary elections.
In 1955 he joined the
United national Party and came forward to contest
Ruwanwella seat, a rural electorate far removed from his
Colombo base. Ruwanwella was the seat that had been
represented since 1936, from the days of the State
Council, by the redoubtable leader of the Lanka Sama
Samaja Party (LSSP) - Dr N M Perera.
As a rookie
in parliamentary politics and far away from his own
turf, he contested and polled 7,885 votes against the
winner Dr N M Perrera, who polled 14, 083 votes. After
that, in the 1960 March elections, he was the third
member of the three-member Colombo Central electorate,
but he lost in the 1960 July elections. After 1965 he
won all the elections he contested,.
Premadasa
was identified with rowdy elements and managed his
political campaigns with the help of such elements, but
he ditched them after being elected as the president of
the country. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the
motive attributed by the Commission for targeting Denzil
Kobbekaduwa.
Even the Inquiry Commission which
alleged that President Premadasa was the chief culprit
had second thoughts when it included the following
observation:
32. (i) The Commission in its
report has discussed only one aspect concerning
President Premadasa relevant to the terms of reference.
This does not include and is not meant to detract from
other aspects of his political life or achievements over
the years as MMC [Member of the Municipal Council] MP,
Minister, Prime Minister and President. His achievements
on other spheres of activity may be many. What we have
had to say is not meant to be wholesale condemnation of
the man, the politician, his vision, his objectives his
administrative skill etc. It focuses on the aspect of
his character of using power selfishly, without
principle in some situations, which is amply
demonstrated by the evidence. It left a permanent scar
on the politics of that period. Nor was the army left
unscarred.
It should be remembered that, in
discussing an assassination there have to be initial
preparations. There must have been, in the first
instance, a small group of conspirators led by President
Premadasa. The conspirators must have discussed many
things connected with preparations to eliminate
Kobbekaduwa.
Arrangements must have been made to
watch the habits and movements of Kobbekaduwa. The place
of the assassination would have to be determined and the
means of eliminating the enemy finalized. Though we take
it for granted that the place of assassination had been
selected as Araly and the mode of destruction as IED,
the Commission did not come up with any evidence of
preparations, the nature, size, shape, power or precise
placement of the actual explosive devise on the vehicle
or how or when it was so placed. There was no evidence
for these matters with the Commission. Nor was there any
direct evidence as to who exploded it or in what manner.
The Commission managed to infer from certain
circumstances, and even conjecture, though the
Commission denies it. It has to be presumed that one
person may have made the IED, another placed it on board
the Land Rover and a third person been responsible for
exploding the IED. Unfortunately, the Commission did not
level charges or accuse anyone for such criminal acts.
Yet according to the Commission's final
conclusion:
29:2 (vii) This Commission draws the
irresistible inference after deliberation and
consideration upon the evidence taken as a whole that it
is consistent only with the following: (a) Captain W A N
M Weerasinghe was a member of a conspiracy with others
in Government and in the army to assassinate General
Kobbekaduwa and many others who may be present with him
at that time;
(b) That the conspirators agreed
that the assassination was to take place in Kayts
island;
(c) That the assassination was to
stimulate the explosion of a pressure-activated LTTE
buried land mine; all evidence indicative of the
explosion of a buried land mine is false having been
fabricated and invented to conceal the true facts so as
to protect the real assassins;
(d) That the
assassination was to be by means of an explosion of an
Improvised Explosive Devise on the vehicle in which
General Kobbekaduwa was to travel;
(e) All
evidence of an IED was to be destroyed thereafter,
whilst a landmine explosion was to be invented; and
false fabricated evidence presented to the public that
the vehicle had driven over an old LTTE buried mine.
(f) Captain Weerasinghe was a person directly
responsible for giving the command by radio signal to
explode the IED, which was on board the vehicle in which
General Kobbekaduwa and 10 others were traveling at the
time; thereby causing the deaths of 10 persons and
grievous injury to another and that evidence is totally
inconsistent with any other reasonable theory or
hypothesis that Weerasinghe was not a conspirator to
assassinate Kobbekaduwa or was not a person directly
responsible for exploding the bomb on the vehicle or
that he had nothing to do with these killings.
29:2 (viii) We reiterate that we are of the view
beyond all reasonable doubt that Major W A N M
Weerasinghe was directly responsible for the
assassination and causing grievous injury to another as
set out in the warrant. He is also guilty of fraudulent
acts in relation to the administration of justice as he
has falsified and invented evidence of a land mine
explosion in order to shield the Defense Minister
President Premadasa and other conspirators from exposure
as assassins of General Kobbekaduwa, General (Brigadier)
Wimalaratne, Vice Admiral Jayamaha and all the others
who died in the explosion and who suffered grievous
injury.
29:2 (ix) But the Commission does not
recommend that Major W A N M Weerasinghe be made subject
to civil liability in terms of section 9 of Law 7 of
1978 as he has been involved in this transaction due to
external influence and in the absence of evidence that
he was in politics. The offences he has committed are
punishable under the Penal Code, to wit: Conspiracy to
murder, abetment and commission of murder. Disciplinary
action may also be taken under the army act for his
outrageous conduct. The attorney-general and the army
commander may be sent copies of this report.
The
Inquiry Commission also blamed Lt-Colonel Hapugoda
Roland Stephen (deceased) as a member of the conspiracy
to assassinate Gen Kobbekaduwa and all others who were
with him at the time act was committed in consequence of
which conspiracy all the deceased persons came by their
deaths and Cpl Upali by his injuries by the explosion by
radio command of an IED on board the vehicle in which
they were traveling at Araly Kayts on August 8, 1992.
NOTE
This writer had a chance meeting
with Mathy, the LTTE commander of Kayts before it was
captured by Government forces led by General Kobbekaduwa
in Operation Thrivida Balaya. This meeting took place in
Bangkok some time in December, 1992.
Three Sri
Lankan infantry battalions had successfully achieved the
aim of strengthening Karainagar naval base by capturing
Kayts and Mandathivu Islands.
As the ferocity of
the fight was so intense, LTTE fighters were ordered to
withdraw from Kayts and Mandathivu islands by their high
command. Mathy sustained serious injuries, but before
withdrawing from Kayts the LTTE laid land mines.
This writer was told that those mines were not
pressure mines, but remote controlled ones. And when the
LTTE learnt that Kobbekaduwa was organizing an offensive
operation against them, an LTTE reconnaissance team
informed of the activities on the island of Kayts and
even of the arrival of Kobbekaduwa to Karainagar on the
evening of the 7th, 1992.
Accordingly, on August
8, 1992, this writer was told by Mathy that, it was the
LTTE who pressed the buttons of their remote to rid them
of their long time enemy, General Kobbekaduwa, who had
led Operation Liberation in 1987 at Vadamaradchy, during
which LTTE supremo Prabhakaran had been trapped at
Valvettiturai. It took 300 LTTE cadres to fight
hand-to-hand battle with the surrounding Sri Lankan
forces to get Prabhakaran out to safety.
So,
more than anything, there was the desire for personal
revenge on the part of the Tiger supremo to get rid of
General Kobbekaduwa.
Chapter
51: Commission fails to contact the LTTE
CHAPTER 53: The Kilaly massacre
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