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The arming of Central
Asia
By Stephen Blank
Central
Asia and Transcaucasia are becoming militarized, with
the issue of military security and defense capability
coming to the fore throughout the region. Many factors
contribute to this multidimensional process; this
militarization undoubtedly stems from the prevalence of
war, insurgency, high levels of criminality (often
connected with narcotics), external threats and
terrorism. These threats oblige governments to allocate
more resources to defense and to welcome external
provision of military resources, training, advisors and
weapons.
The general resort to increased defense
spending, gunboat diplomacy and foreign arms sales
ultimately places greater emphasis on military threats,
the reply to them, and the buildup of local military
forces, responses that inevitably divert resources away
from urgent social, economic and environmental issues.
Another factor that contributes to this militarization,
especially with regard to naval forces, is the absence
of a legal regime for the Caspian Sea. This absence,
added to the promise of an energy bonanza in the region,
plus interstate rivalries involving both local littoral
states and the major great powers, has led to incidents
of gunboat diplomacy, promises or threats of foreign
intervention and heightened attention to the problems of
coastal and maritime defense.
This
militarization of Central Asia and the Caucasus
originated in the numerous small wars that dot these
regions. They include insurgencies in Central Asia, the
ethnic wars in the Transcaucasus, Chechnya, the Afghan
civil war and the post-September 11 war on terrorism.
But other regional security trends have also abetted
this process, for example, the widespread emergence of
paramilitary forces in the North Caucasus and
Transcaucasia and the links between
narcotics-trafficking and insurgency in Central Asia and
the Caucasus. And this militarization encompasses more
than just the eruption of war and terrorism and the
greater salience of military force in policymaking. It
also includes higher spending on defense, increased
foreign military presence (in the form of training,
advisors or participation in multilateral military
exercises such as those staged by the Partnership for
Peace or the CIS) and increased foreign arms sales to
threatened states.
A second contributing factor
is the strategic rivalry of external powers known as the
new Great Game. This too has assumed a more militarized
aspect in the last year - and not only due to the events
of September 11 and their aftermath. Iran's overt
military threats against Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in
the Caspian Sea, and Russia's and other (including the
US) governments' determination to resist those threats
have prompted predictable reactions.
Washington
sent naval forces to train Azerbaijan in coastal
defense, while Turkey proclaimed its readiness to assist
Azerbaijan. Those facts did not sit well with the other
Caspian littoral states which fear foreign intervention,
nor with Moscow and Tehran, which want to assert their
primacy over their respective spheres of influence. At
the same time, Moscow regards Iranian pretensions as a
threat to its own ambition to provide security
throughout the Caspian Sea. Therefore Russia, along with
Kazakstan and Azerbaijan, is mounting its largest
maneuvers ever in the Caspian Sea.
Putin ordered
those maneuvers immediately after the abortive Ashgabat
conference earlier this year, which aimed at resolving
the question of the division of the Caspian Sea. At this
conference, agreement proved impossible due to Tehran's
obstinacy in demanding a large share for itself and its
persistence in threatening other littoral states. Thus
these maneuvers, like Iran's original threats, evoke
classical examples of gunboat democracy. And, in fact,
the most recent news suggests Iran is hastily backing
away from its prior claims because it has nowhere else
to go but to Moscow for great power protection.
Turkey, as a rival to Iran (especially in regard
to Azerbaijan), likewise responded to Tehran's threats
by intensifying its military support for Azerbaijan and
programs to train Central Asian militaries. And NATO
allies like France and Germany are now deploying forces
to Central Asia in order to show their flag too. In
Georgia's case the "offer" of external provision of
defense "cooperation" from Russia in the form of joint
raids against Chechens inside Georgia's Pankisi and
Kodori Gorges is an unwelcome threat that obliges the
government to look to other governments, especially
Washington, for support.
But perhaps the
development that most needs scrutiny is the growing
tendency of foreign states to sell weapons or military
technologies to local governments. While the latters'
need of self-defense against real threats is quite
legitimate; these sales will surely add both
quantitatively and qualitatively to the "Kalashnikov
culture" that already pervades these areas and which has
made it difficult to enforce security or law and order.
In addition, the motives behind these arms sales are the
classic ones of economic necessity, as well as a desire
to extend the political or military influence of the
seller.
Russia is selling equipment to these
states, particularly Uzbekistan, not only to assist in
their self-defense against terrorism and insurgency, but
also in order to entice them to join various
Russian-sponsored organizations for the collective
defense of Central Asia. Russia also seeks to restore a
unified military industrial sector across the entire
Soviet Union led by its firms that would integrate
Transcaucasian and Central Asian economies into one unit
headquartered in Moscow. That outcome would recreate
something like the Soviet defense industry without the
Soviet planning mechanism but with a centralized
quasi-market directory in Moscow.
Finally
Russia's defense industry is so desperate for cash that
it is selling these weapons to Central Asia at
below-cost prices, ie, Russia is subsidizing the
purchase. Paradoxically, this effort to strengthen key
economic sectors and pursue priority political goals
entails a further weakening of the Russian economy,
since the subsidies cannot make up for the cost of
production and perpetuate already archaic defense
industrial plants. Meanwhile Russian policies have also
not led to any meaningful progress with respect to
Central Asian security.
Turkey similarly
provides military instruction and assistance to further
its aim of being a major player in the Transcaucasus and
Central Asia. But it also does so to show the United
States and NATO how reliable a partner it is in this
corner of the world and to sell arms so that its nascent
indigenous arms industry can find a niche and markets
abroad. China also sells arms and even has offered its
own forces under the Shanghai Cooperative Organization
Treaty of 2001 to assist in the defense of the members'
integrity and sovereignty against what Beijing calls the
threats from terrorism, secessionism and splittism. Thus
it is giving military assistance to Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan while also seeking to prevent
them from assisting Uighur insurgents in Xinjiang who
have resisted Beijing's rule for at least 20 years.
India, too, is joining this campaign, and these
moves constitute a part of its larger move into Central
Asia. In 2000, Indian media reports castigated New
Delhi's policy toward Central Asia as being
"directionless". Since September 11 and the terrorist
attacks against India and in Kashmir, this has changed.
Policymakers in New Delhi clearly see now how vital it
is to India that Central Asia be free of violence and
not subjected to threats emanating from the Taliban or
terrorists directly linked to Pakistan's military or
intelligence services. For this to happen, the Central
Asian governments and Afghanistan must be built up so
that they can defend themselves against threats of
insurgency, terrorism and the associated trade in drugs.
In pursuit of its greater visibility in Central Asia and
the overarching goal of a region freed from security
threats from Pakistan, India has moved forward on major
economic and infrastructure deals such as the
North-South corridor with Russia and Iran, major
investment projects in Central Asia and the first signs
of willingness to render military assistance.
Hitherto India has resisted selling military
weapons and associated systems abroad and been proud to
advertise its reluctance to do so. But as Indian
economic and military power grow, and as India seeks to
strengthen its indigenous capability to produce quality
weapons, it also perceives a new threat and a new
opportunity in Central Asia and an overall changing
strategic landscape. Like other states and defense
industrial establishments, it also sees the need to win
new markets if that new and homegrown defense industry
is to become profitable and commercially viable.
Following this logic India has recently signed deals
with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to sell Ilysuhin-76
military transports to Astana and helicopters to
Dushanbe. India is also working with American scientists
and officials to clear nuclear debris in Georgia
symbolizing its interest in raising its profile in the
Transcaucasus as well. It is likely that more such arms
sales as well as Indian arms sales to other countries
will take place.
This trend is not confined to
states having important direct interests at stake in
Central Asia. Ostensibly Great Britain pursues an
"ethical foreign policy" that bans arms sales to
countries already at war. However British manufacturers,
with government support, are actively targeting
countries where ethnic conflict could easily soon break
out. This program is not restricted to Central Asia;
since December 2001, Great Britain has granted sweeping
export licenses for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan to purchase military equipment. London
granted these states 32 "open" licenses to buy what the
Independent called "potentially unlimited amounts of
arms". Since then, sales of US$6.07 million have been
approved and The Independent reports that more sales are
likely to follow.
Finally, there is the American
military presence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.
This presence, now ratified by bilateral agreements,
extends to all of Central Asia except for Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Washington also can now render
military assistance to Armenia, and discussions to
provide genuine assistance are underway with Erevan. The
US presence comprises air bases, landing rights and
troops to defend those bases. Regular training and
advising for the host countries' troops also takes place
either through bilateral agreements, multilateral venues
like the Partnership for Peace exercises and/or
exercises with the Central Asian Battalion. US
commanders have publicly stated that these exercises and
the mutual relationships forged through them were vital
in bringing about local governments' speedy agreement to
host US military bases and personnel after September 11.
And they also indicate that those forces will remain at
least through 2003 to complete the mission of
extirpating terrorism in Afghanistan and securing that
country for the future.
While American officials
profess that they are not interested in long-term bases
in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, they do state
Washington's interest in consolidating long-term
security relationships that will undoubtedly surpass the
previous level of bilateral or multilateral
relationships. Although the final parameters and quality
of those relationships remain to be determined, we can
safely expect the United States to upgrade its overall
presence in these states; policymakers have already
given quite open statements to that effect. Therefore
bilateral and multilateral venues of military training,
assistance and cooperation will continue, along with
local governments' quest for something in the way of
guarantees against threats to their security. We can
also expect that the sale of US weapons and technologies
will soon be a feature of the region's military profile
as well, since those systems obviously go with
American-style training and organization. And those arms
sellers' motives will resemble those of the other states
cited here, a quest for revenues and markets to keep
those firms going and a political quest for influence
over the security institutions and policies of the
recipient states.
The Transcaucasian and Central
Asian states undoubtedly must build up their defense
structures and capabilities. They face many internal and
external threats, not least from states like Iran and
Russia. And in some cases these threats coincide with
each other, for example, foreign (often Russian, Iranian
or Pakistani) support for terrorists or separatists, a
problem which has plagued these regions since they
became independent of the Soviet Union. As they are poor
countries with no defense sector to speak of and little
experience in building armed forces, external help is
absolutely necessary and they are wisely diversifying
their purchases or investments in such assistance to
avoid exclusive dependence on any one provider.
Nevertheless, the trend toward militarization also could
contribute to some of the destabilizing factors in these
areas.
As these are all undemocratic
governments, there is little guarantee that increased
military assistance, whatever form it assumes, will not
be translated into the strengthening of forces of
domestic repression in any or all of these states. That
condition can only exacerbate existing tensions, as the
present unrest in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan
tell us. Second, the funds spent on the acquisition of
new forces, skills and weapons come at the expense of
vitally needed investments in socio-economic
improvements, ecology and overall infrastructure.
Postponement or shortchanging of these investments
contribute to the general domestic crisis of each
country and to the continuing inability to fashion
viable means of regional cooperation. Third, the flow of
guns and money into the defense sector raises the
possibility not only of armed coups but also of further
corruption of local police and military forces and the
further diffusion through that corruption of the
Kalashnikov culture. As it is, these areas are awash in
small arms. They also are favorite routes for the
smuggling of contraband relating to weapons of mass
destruction, as well as critical drug routes. More
weaponization only adds to those trends and makes it
harder to resist them.
The provision of weapons
and military training with a view to integrating these
areas in larger and to some degree competitive
political-military blocs further exacerbates the Great
Game in the former Soviet Union and the mutual suspicion
among the players. Iran's military moves demonstrate its
acute sense of betrayal and threat by Russia and from
the United States. Russia's military-political elite has
never accepted the US presence in Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus and is trying desperately to circumscribe
and eliminate it. China too publicly opposes this
presence and many of its leaders darkly fear that it is
one of the arms of an encirclement plot directed against
Beijing. At the same time it is equally clear that
American policymakers distrust Russian, Iranian and
Chinese motives in these areas and that the US presence,
though justified after September 11, is also a response
to those countries' threatening actions in Central Asia
and the Transcaucasus. Thus each of these states seeks
to augment its military presence throughout the CIS and
this competition could easily stimulate rather than
lessen interstate and regional tensions there.
But there does not seem to be any other way out
of the security threats that now affect Central Asia and
the Transcaucasus. Those threats may originate there and
threaten local governments directly, but as we now know
they can also threaten the West as well in its vital
centers. This analysis suggests there is no easy way out
of the the challenges to security in the former Soviet
Union. Any step in one direction raises possible
problems in another direction. But governments cannot
refrain from acting against visible threats based on
that observation, for then they would become vulnerable
to the immediate threats and those that would soon
follow upon their weakness in responding to the direct
threats to their security. The security challenges in
the Transcaucasus and Central Asia may not be absolutely
intractable but they are extremely complex,
long-standing and admit of no easy answers or responses.
Militarization may be an unpleasant response to
deep-rooted threats, but it also is also a logical one.
Unfortunately both those threats and this
response suggest that these phenomena will persist for a
long time, and that we are at the beginning rather than
at the end of a systematic effort to deal with military
threats to security in those parts of the world.
Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA.
(The views expressed here do
not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department
or US Government.)
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
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