South Asia

Pakistan's hackneyed political script
By Mushahid Hussain

ISLAMABAD - A popular joke in the Third World during the years of the Cold War went, "The only country in the world where there cannot be a military coup is the United States." Why? "Because there's no American embassy in Washington!"

A somewhat similar logic permeates the Pakistani military mindset when it comes to the issue of preventing future coups in this military-ruled country. During his August 21 press briefing in Islamabad, President General Pervez Musharraf said, "If you want to keep the army out, bring them in."

He followed this up by saying that, in the newly created civil-military defense body, the National Security Council (NSC), "the army chief would not take over".

But how exactly is institutionalizing the army's role in civilian affairs via the NSC the same as keeping the army out of politics? It is like a doctor suggesting that the only way of weaning a drug addict off heroin is by getting them onto another drug, since by following the good physician's directions the patient will no longer have any need for heroin.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan, it is true that the more things seem to change, the more they remain the same. Take the case of the country's fourth military regime, which is increasingly traversing familiar terrain.

Like past military coups, the coup of October 1999 was warmly welcomed by a large section of the politicians and political parties, many of whom sought the elected government's ouster through extra-constitutional means. This short-sighted, but predictable pattern of politics was based on the rather erroneous assumption that political opponents of the elected government would be beneficiaries of the removal of their rivals.

However, once in power, the new military regime invariably has its own ideas and agenda about how to govern, how long to stay on and whom to align with. Those who uncritically acclaimed the military takeover then start becoming critical, soon becoming born-again democrats seeking the "restoration" of democracy without delay. In the process, they are willing to align with the same parties and politicians in whose ouster they actively connived with the military.

Along the way, due to international factors, the military regime gets a wink from Washington to pursue its domestic agenda since it is willing to promote American interests in the region. To clothe the regime in respectability, the quest for "legitimacy" begins by seeking a democratic label to stick to the status quo.

Elections with "positive results" are seen as the answer to all embarrassing questions asked by influential foreigners who adore the regime, but find that they need some form of democracy palatable for their domestic audiences. To further this agenda, the military regime usually dusts off the covers of aging contingency plans, tucked away in old drawers, which are retrieved, updated and presented with a suitably appealing label. The form of such presentations may change, to suit new realities, but the content is a constant. It is always protecting the "national interest" by controlling the political system, ensuring the perpetuation in power of the military ruler and maintaining the khaki hegemony in the state structure.

And Pakistan's fourth military regime is following this script, down to the last comma and colon.

The only possible surprise in store is when people are asked to exercise their choice through a secret ballot. The danger of the script being overturned is most potent, with the potential to upset the game plan. The people's infinite and abiding capacity to spring a surprise during balloting - general elections are set for October 10 - is the one factor that can make things go awry.

As Pakistan's political track record shows, all these carefully devised scripts have a familiar finale, almost like a Greek tragedy. The American connection weakens after a while when US goals have been met, and Washington gets bored with its once-favorite ruler, seeking new linkages with other more alluring candidates.

The "system" created as a tactical maneuver for political longevity is unable to outlast or survive its sponsor, and once he goes, so does the structure erected to prop and perpetuate his rule.

However, two new factors in the current situation are noteworthy. First, the militarisation of politics is under way. The presence of the NSC is bound to lead to the politicization of the armed forces. Second, the NSC is a bad idea since it is borrowed from Turkey, a country whose track record for providing good governance, or promoting a sound economy, is debatable.

What's wrong with the NSC in the Pakistani context? Some aspects should be worrisome. First, in a federation like Pakistan, a permanent role for the military in the power structure evokes feelings of alienation among the smaller provinces, which would see it as a Trojan horse for what they deride as "Punjabi domination". This is certainly not a healthy basis to promote inter-provincial harmony.

Second, the NSC will create further confusion through a new troika of decision-making, over-lapping and competing with one another. Since the president will also be the army chief, he will naturally revert to his core constituency for support - the military's corps commanders. Then their guidance will compete with the "advice" of the National Security Council, which, in turn, will influence the decisions of cabinet and parliament, a hotchpotch of ideas what will only confuse and confound decision making.

At present, much of Musharraf's strength emanates from the weakness of the political forces, whose dilemma has been apparent. The majority of the political forces have been competing to curry favor with the regime, willing and ready to do a deal at their convenience for their interests.

Those among the mainstream parties who criticize the military regime do so in careful manner, without saying a word about the US-led war on terror and Pakistan's role in it, lest they end up offending the Americans.

Pakistan's irony is that basically the khaki and the mufti (civilians) are acting in the same general script - both see that the road to Islamabad lies through Washington.

(Inter Press Service)



 
Aug 27, 2002



 

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