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Stay-away Hurriyat risks being
sidelined
By Navnita Chadha Behera
With elections having been announced for
Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir state in
September and October, political posturing has also
begun. The All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference and
the Democratic Freedom Party led by Shabir Shah - the
key political outfits among the separatist ranks - have
branded the polls an "irrelevant exercise" and refused
to participate.
The administration of Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has rightly been
criticized for its flip-flop policy that lacks a clear,
coherent and consistent strategy for resolving the
Kashmir imbroglio. But it is not clear, however, whether
the Hurriyat, too, has correctly calculated the
political costs of not participating in the elections.
Over the years, separatist leaders in Kashmir have lost
their advantage vis-a-vis New Delhi, and they need to be
conscious of their strengths and weaknesses while
devising a negotiating strategy.
When the
Kashmiri youth resorted to the gun in 1989-90, they were
inspired by the resurgence of Islam after the Iranian
revolution a decade earlier, the Palestinian intifada
and the mujahideen success in driving the Soviet Union
out of Afghanistan. The heady sweep of contemporary
liberation history from the dismantling of the Berlin
Wall and the overthrow of Romania's tyrannical rule to
the alluring echoes of freedom along the trans-Caucasian
Pamir also made azadi (freedom) appear as a
plausible alternative to Kashmiris.
The average
Kashmiri was very conscious of the "malleability of
borders" and the birth of new nations caused a euphoria
that it would be their turn next. By the mid-1990s,
however, the international situation had undergone a sea
change, belying their expectations. Afghanistan had
degenerated into a civil war between warring factions of
mujahideen, and by 1996 the Taliban's imposition of
medieval and anarchic Islamic practices had brought home
the dangers of Islamizing their own society. The breakup
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulting in several
ethnic conflicts had made world leaders wary of
disturbing international boundaries and creating new
states.
The second plank on which the separatist
leaders sought international support was the violation
of Kashmiris' human rights by Indian security forces.
Pakistan diligently acted as their spokesperson in all
international fora. After the initial barrage of
criticism of the Indian government, this too petered
out. As New Delhi improved its human rights record and
opened the Valley to diplomats and the foreign press,
the submissions of Pakistan's armed support to Kashmiris
gained credence.
By 1993-94, the tables had
turned on Pakistan. Islamabad was then persuaded by
"Islamic" Iran and its friend and ally China against
moving any resolution against India at the UN Human
Rights Commission in Geneva in 1993. The next year, even
the Organization of Islamic Conference Contact Group
decided to drop the resolution on Kashmir in the United
Nations International Security Committee for lack of
support among its members. Overall, beyond expressions
of sympathy, the much-anticipated international support
for Kashmiris over human rights and their right to
self-determination never materialized.
The last
straw for the Hurriyat leadership has been the
oft-repeated statements made in Washington along with
some European capitals that any resolution of the
Kashmir conflict must take into account the "wishes of
the people of Jammu & Kashmir". While the Hurriyat
has enjoyed the growing international attention it has
received in the past few months from visiting American
and European delegations, it has failed to recognize a
subtle yet significant shift in the US strategy which
views the forthcoming state Assembly elections as a
critical input into the peace process.
Except
Pakistan, no international players, including the United
Nations, support the modality of a plebiscite for
ascertaining the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Many,
therefore, believe the elections to be the next best
course of action for choosing the representatives of the
people of J&K. Notwithstanding New Delhi's stubborn
and rather misplaced refusal to allow international
observers in an official capacity, these elections will
undoubtedly be held under the watchful eyes of the
international community amid a large presence of the
foreign media. If there is a high voter turnout and the
elections are generally seen to be a "free and fair"
exercise by the international community, the Hurriyat
runs the risk of being completely marginalized in the
international arena.
If the Hurriyat leadership,
as its chairperson, Abdul Ghani Bhatt, has pointed out,
was looking for Pakistan's endorsement for elections to
be the correct process of choosing the representatives
of Kashmiri people, it was doomed to failure. The
Pakistani leadership has invested heavily in propping up
the Hurriyat as the sole spokesperson of Kashmiris. They
naturally equate Hurriyat's refusal to participate in
elections with the Kashmiris' rejection of the Indian
state. For Pakistan, therefore, the political relevance
and legitimacy of Hurriyat will last only as long as it
does not participate in the elections. Hence, the
mounting pressure by the United Jihad Council, a
Pakistan-based alliance of Kashmiri militant groups, for
the Hurriyat to call for a boycott of the elections and
the renewed threats of liquidation if anyone broke ranks
to consider participation in the elections. The
assassination of moderate separatist leader Abdul Ghani
Lone in May did convey this message very effectively.
Thus while this serves Pakistan's interest,
where does it leave the Hurriyat? They must surely
realize that Pakistan has neither the political will nor
the wherewithal to liberate Kashmir by force. It can, at
best, bleed the Indian state in Kashmir, but that
renders the Kashmiris to be a mere pawn in their bigger
game plan. In the post-September 11 world, Pakistan is
also under growing international pressure to stop the
infiltration across the Line of Control and not disturb
the Assembly elections. US Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, and his deputy, Richard Armitage, have both
underlined the importance of holding free and fair
elections and urged Pakistan to exercise its utmost
influence over the militants for not disrupting them.
The paradox is that while Pakistan has high stakes in
Kashmir, it lacks the muscle to force New Delhi's hands
in negotiating the future of Kashmir, and other
international players, such as the United States, that
may be in a position to exercise that influence have
little stake in doing so.
The only way that the
Hurriyat could negotiate with New Delhi from a position
of strength was for it to emerge as a viable political
alternative to the National Conference, backed by the
masses in Jammu & Kashmir. In the much-troubled
history of J&K, there have been only two occasions
when the Kashmiri leadership has forced New Delhi to
make concessions, or at least put it on the defensive.
This first happened in the 1950s when Sheikh Abdullah
negotiated the 1952 agreement with New Delhi. Pandit
Nehru's decision to grant a special status to Kashmir
rested on his belief that Sheikh enjoyed a mass
political base in the state, and New Delhi could count
on that for winning the plebiscite and bringing about
the accession of Jammu & Kashmir into the Indian
Union. And then in 1988-89 the central leadership was
unnerved during the initial phase of the militant
movement that was spearheaded by separatist leaders such
as Yasin Malik and Javed Mir.
However, the real
threat to the Indian state was not from the Kashmiri
militant struggle but from the mass upsurge of
Kashmiris, which symbolized total rejection of state
authority. India has had considerable experience in
successfully tackling insurgencies in the Northeast and
Punjab, but it has rarely faced mass movements demanding
secession. When the militants failed to channel the mass
demonstrations for their cause, nor sustain them, they
had already lost the battle.
Herein lies the
challenge for the Hurriyat. They must mobilize the
peoples' power, and notwithstanding their protestations
or claims otherwise, prove their representative
credentials. At present, they are widely perceived as
representing the political interests of the majority
community - Kashmiri Muslims alone. While this is
important, it is not good enough. If they must speak in
the name of "people of Jammu & Kashmir", they must
build coalitions with the people, political parties and
political outfits in Jammu and Ladakh as well.
Elections, despite all their flaws, remain the
only vehicle available to them to do so. An alternative
bargaining strategy will, thus, be to seek a
level-playing field where international players such as
the United States could quietly argue their case. At
home, too, the semi-official Kashmir Committee, led by
Ram Jethmalani, will stand a much better chance of
persuading the central government to postpone elections
and impose governor's rule in the state if the Hurriyat
were to give a firm commitment of contesting them. If
they are fighting the peoples' battle, they must not run
away from the battleground.
(©2002 Asia Times
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