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Religious parties hostage to radical
Islam
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - The United States celebrated its first
victory in its war on terror with the ousting of the
Taliban from Afghanistan more than a year ago. Now the
first manifestations of a Muslim backlash come with the
electoral successes of Islamic forces in Pakistan,
Bahrain and Turkey, with more possible in Bangladesh,
Indonesia and Malaysia.
These victories are
widely viewed in the West without fear, as they are seen
as a vindication of democracy in action, with more
moderate Islamic forces being drawn into, and therefore
curtailed by, the establishment.
This could well
prove to be a dangerous oversight.
To be sure,
the religious political parties that have entered
mainstream politics represent a new trend in Muslim
societies, which is rooted in the reaction to the
changed world after September 11, 2001. But the elected
representatives of the religious Muslim parties are not
revolutionaries, and they are unlikely to bring about
any drastic social, political or economic change in
their respective societies.
Such changes,
instead, will be introduced into society by splinter
Islamic groups operating beyond the parliamentary
process. These groups used to be a part of the religious
parties, but they refuse to abandon what the West calls
their "radical Muslim" policies.
And crucially,
the Islamic forces within government will be unable to
act against these splinter organizations. They fully
understand that the real driving force behind the voters
is the radical element, and should these radicals feel
betrayed or oppressed, whether overtly or covertly, they
can just as easily mobilize the masses to have the
Islamic forces within government tossed out.
This leaves the splinter groups a relatively
free hand to carry on with their mission, while those in
power play the democratic game. In this, Pakistan serves
as an example.
The Islamic movement in Pakistan
was the vanguard of other movements all over the world,
with Syed Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the
Jamaat-i-Islami in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, still
the leading ideologue. This movement calls for the
introduction of an Islamic system of life, and it
believes that Islam should be enforced in the country in
letter and spirit, but only by the will of the people,
and not against their will.
An alliance of six
Muslim religious parties - the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal -
fared well in last month's national elections, and will
form a coalition government with a pro-democracy
grouping dominated by former premier Benazir Bhutto's
pro-US, secular Pakistan People's Party
(Parliamentarian) PPPP. The new prime minister is likely
to be firebrand Maulana Fazlur Rehman, once described as
the "teacher of the Taliban".
The result is that
one can expect at best cosmetic changes in the country,
as they will have to be acceptable to the PPPP, not to
mention the man in the background with the power to make
life very difficult for the new government: President
General Pervez Musharraf.
How, then, will the
leaders of the religious parties now in government, many
of whom were until recently considered hardliners, deal
with extremist trends in Pakistan's Muslim youth? Simply
put, they will not be able to interfere with a process
that began many years ago.
After the Afghan
jihad against the Soviets ended in the late 1980s, most
Islamic movements fell out of the spotlight (except in
Lebanon, where Hezbullah and its splinter groups
flourished). Rehman, then head of the
Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, even went as far as not to
recognize the jihad in Indian-administered Kashmir,
saying that it was of no religious significance.
However, this was not a popular interpretation
among many Islamists. They believed the philosophy
recommended by the Harkatul Mujahideen and the
Jaish-i-Mohammed, splinter groups of the Deobandi school
of thought and the main engines in the Kashmir struggle:
it is a jihad.
Going further back in the Islamic
movement, the same conclusion is suggested. The
al-Iqwanul Muslamum (Muslim Brotherhood) is the parent
organization of all Islamic movements across the world.
It started as a missionary group in Egypt with the aim
to restore self respect among Muslims and to educate
them in the difference between vice and virtue.
A major development took place in 1948 when
Egypt supported the Palestinian struggle against Israel,
and the Iqwan sent volunteers to fight against Israel.
But the war was soon over and the volunteers returned to
Egypt, where they were trained and organized under the
umbrella of the Iqwan. King Farooq felt this a threat to
his political crown, and after the mysterious murder of
its founder, Hasanal Bana, a crackdown was launched
against the Iqwan.
In the early 1950s, another
round of crackdowns was launched against the Iqwan, and
it was then banned. It was at this time that 15-year-old
Aiman Al-Zawari (later to become Osama bin Laden's
righthand man) was arrested for the first time. The
Iqwan divided into many splinter groups. And from that
time, although the writings of Hasanal Bana and others,
such as Syed Qutub, exist in books, the popular vision
among Islamists is that suggested by the splinter jihadi
groups, not that of the Iqwan.
They no longer
believe in peaceful revolution and democratic change.
Nowadays, the jihadis take their inspiration from the
Koran and the life of the Prophet Mohammed, which
suggests Islam as a mission and a complete way of life
(not a religion): "Islam is the way of life, the Koran
is the book, the Prophet Mohammed is the leader, jihad
[struggle] is the way, martyrdom is the desire."
Modern jihadis and their
inspiration
The jihadis, therefore, have emerged
as the real driving force and on whose support the
religious political parties won their elections. The
jihadis are inspired by two things - the Koran and the
life of the Prophet.
These groups are not
apologetic about the concept of jihad and freely quote
Koranic verses, such as: "Fight in the cause of God
those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for
God loves not transgressors." (Koran 2:190)
When
challenged that their jihad is based on aggressive
ideas, they admit so, but say that they have a cause:
"And why should you not fight in the cause of God and of
those who, being weak, are ill-treated [and oppressed]?
Men, women and children, whose cry is: 'Our Lord! Rescue
us from this town, whose people are oppressors, and
raise for us from You one who will protect; and raise
for us from You one who will help'." (Koran 4:75)
But these are clearly defined ideas with
boundaries: "But if they cease, God is oft-forgiving,
most merciful. And fight them on until there is no more
tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith
in God. But if they cease, let there be no hostility
except to those who practice oppression." (Koran
2:192-193)
And jihadis are clear that they are
followers of Islam, which is universal, and is not
restricted by religious boundaries or by political
ideologies, such as Nazism.
"To those against
whom war is made, permission is given [to fight] because
they are wronged and verily God is most powerful for
their aid. [They are] those who have been expelled from
their homes in defiance of right [for no cause] except
that they say, 'Our Lord is God'. If God did not check
one set of people by means of another, there would
surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches,
synagogues and mosques, in which the name of God is
commemorated in abundant measure ..." (Koran 22:39-40)
These are the core beliefs of all jihadi outfits
nowadays. Their primary goal is to create a Muslim way
of life in the regions in which they live, and as such,
their primary enemies are those in their immediate
region, be it India, the Philippines, Chechnya or the
Middle East. However, US intervention in the conflicts
of these countries has forced the jihadis to elevate the
US as their final enemy.
In this respect, the
jihadis have already begun to take steps towards
creating regional jihadi bases, beyond al-Qaeda, which
is largely shattered and in the process of rebuilding.
The first alliance of its kind was in Afghanistan, where
different Islamic groups, including renegade elements of
the Ittehad-i-Islami and the Jamiat-i-Islami, which were
a part of the Northern Alliance, Arab fighters, the
Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan and some former Taliban merged
into the Jamiat-I-Shababul Muslameen (Muslim Youth
Party).
Different elements of other jihadi
groups, including the Jaish-i-Mohammed, the
Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen, have also
coordinated their activities and started forming
combined groups, like the Harkatul Mujahideen Al-Almi.
The Rabitatul Mujahideen, meanwhile, is an alliance
formed by Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah to act as a
central committee for leaders of the various militant
groups in Southeast Asia.
Their strength can
only be expected to grow, while their brothers in the
corridors of power can only sit by and watch.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co Ltd. All rights
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