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KASHMIR QUAGMIRE
A promising
move
By Navnita Chadha Behera
The Peoples Democratic Party-Congress coalition
government's decision in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
state to devolve powers to the Ladakh Autonomous Hill
Development Council is a promising move that has the
potential of re-shaping not only Ladakh's but J&K's
political future. This can be done in terms of
stimulating fresh thinking about creative and innovative
instrumentalities for self-governance; re-establishing
the legitimacy of non-violent means of attaining
political objectives; and safeguarding the plural
character of the state.
At the heart of the Hill
Council lies an idea of creating sub-state structures to
suit the special political, economic and social needs of
a particular community or region.
Ladakh's
demand for internal autonomy within J&K is as old as
Kashmir's demand for a special status within the Indian
union. In 1952, when Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah was
negotiating the Delhi Agreement with Jawaharlal Nehru,
Kushak Bakula, the spiritual leader of Ladakh, raised
the demand for a federal status for his territory. The
logic for both demands was the same - that their needs
were "different" and autonomy would accord them
opportunities to best realize their political
aspirations.
The underlying spirit of the
Article 370, which under the Indian constitution gives
special privileges to the state of Kashmir, was a
"bottom-up" model of power-sharing whereby the center
could legislate only on the three subjects of defense,
foreign affairs and communications, with the state
enjoyed residuary powers. Kushak Bakula argued that
Ladakh would bear essentially the same relationship to
J&K state, with the local legislature being the only
competent authority to make laws for Ladakh.
Sheikh Abdullah, however, reverted to the
"top-down" model of power-sharing in J&K and created
a unitary constitution with clear concentration of
powers in the Valley. If New Delhi was responsible for
taking apart Article 370, the Kashmiri leadership buried
its spirit by not adhering to the same principle on the
home ground.
The political masters in New Delhi
as well as Srinagar failed to understand that the two
were symbiotically linked. Thus, the story of New
Delhi's systematic erosion of Article 370 has run in
parallel with Srinagar's refusal to share its special
powers with minority communities in the state.
The early demands of Ladakhis included the
formation of a Ministry of Ladakh Affairs headed by a
popularly elected Ladakhi member of the Legislative
Assembly; adequate representation in the legislature and
civil service; establishing Panchayat and Rural
Development Departments; development funds for
constructing roads and canals and promoting agriculture
and horticulture; and replacement of Kashmiri police by
local personnel. They wanted Bodhi, the mother tongue of
the Ladakhis, to be made the medium of instruction for
school education, and special provisions made for
facilitating higher education and training in medicine,
law, engineering, agriculture and forestry.
Successive administrations in Srinagar made many
promises, drew up plans and constituted regional bodies,
but most of these remained on paper or, lacking
political will, proved to be ineffective instruments of
power-sharing.
To begin with, Sheikh Abdullah
never implemented the plan of creating five autonomous
regions, including Ladakh, prepared by the Basic
Principles Committee of the J&K Constituent
Assembly. His successor, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, made
Kushak Bakula Deputy Minister of Ladakh Affairs, but
without any powers to make changes in the
administration, to create posts or to allocate funds.
No major agricultural, industrial or power
generation projects were undertaken during 10 years of
his rule. Ghulam Sadiq's creation of the Ladakh
Development Commission also failed to make a difference.
Sheikh Abdullah returned to power in 1975, only to
backtrack from his renewed commitment to create federal
structures and reorganize the constitutional set-up of
the state. Thus, Ladakhis' long-standing demand for
direct administration from New Delhi emanates from
deep-rooted alienation and a widely shared perception of
having been treated as a "colony" by the Kashmiris.
While Kashmiris accused New Delhi of imposing
chief ministers on them, Ladakhi Buddhists denounced
Kashmiri hegemonism. The Ladakh Affairs Ministry, for
instance, was mostly headed by non-Ladakhis and did not
enjoy significant powers and responsibility in respect
of Ladakh. Not surprisingly, when Kashmiris raised the
secessionist flag in the late 1980s, Ladakhi Buddhists,
too, followed suit to adopt a separatist agenda.
Kashmiris wanted to secede from the Indian
state, but Ladakhi Buddhists wanted to sever their links
from the Valley. A violent agitation was launched in
1989 to demand a union territory's status. The religious
polarization in the Valley was also repeated in the
Buddhist-majority Leh district, albeit in a reverse
direction. The Ladakhi Buddhists accused the "Kashmiri
Sunni Muslims" of practicing majoritarian politics
driven by communal considerations and dominating Leh's
administration and economy and announced their social
boycott. Valley traders soon vanished from the Leh
market and their hotels and restaurants were shut down.
The entire Kashmiri officialdom fled Leh, Khalsi, Nubra
and Zanskar areas. The boycott was also extended to
local Muslims known as Argons, rupturing the
centuries-old bonds of amity between the two
communities.
Since then, however, the Ladakhi
Buddhists have mended their path and adopted a more
conciliatory course of action from which there is much
to learn. First, they secularized their political demand
by making peace with the Ladakhi Muslims and ending the
social boycott. The Ladakh Buddhist Association joined
hands with the Ladakh Muslim Association to present a
common front to the central and the state governments.
Secondly, they abandoned their separatist agenda of
breaking away from the Valley in favor of an Autonomous
Hill Council that was well within the parameters of
Article 370 and J&K's constitution. A Ladakh
Autonomous Hill Council for the Leh district was created
in 1995.
The Kashmiri leadership, ranging from
the militant groups to the National Conference, had
consistently opposed this demand. When Farooq Abdullah
returned to power in 1996, the National Conference
government sought to undercut the Hill Council by
limiting its powers and funds as well as floating
alternative options through the Regional Autonomy
Committee and Panchayati Raj institutions.
This
resulted in a revival of the union territory demand by
the Ladakh Buddhist Association in June 2000. It
acquired greater stringency during the recent state
assembly elections, as it came to be projected as a
common poll plank by virtually all parties across the
political spectrum.
It is against this
background that the PDP-Congress coalition government's
decision to strengthen the Hill Council acquires
significance. Empowering the Hill Council will redress
the long-standing grievances of the Ladakhi people and
make it an effective instrument of power-sharing. The
new amendments will mean greater executive powers over
the use and management of land, better control over the
staff at the higher echelons and enhanced sanctioning
authority over development works. It has also conferred
a higher status on the Hill Council's executive
councilors and the chief in the official hierarchy.
In the long run, it will strengthen Chief
Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's hands in negotiating
with New Delhi - a lesson other Kashmiri organizations
ranging from the National Conference to Hurriyat have
yet to learn. All of them have sought to represent the
"people of J&K state" without the backing of the
Ladakh and Jammu regions. That was an important reason
why Farooq Abdullah's parleys with the center on the
restoration of Article 370 (without simultaneously
devolving powers to Jammu and Ladakh) came a cropper.
Likewise, the Hurriyat's claims of being the sole
spokesman of the people of J&K lack credibility.
Mufti Sayeed's government should seriously
consider granting internal autonomy to Jammu as well.
This would not only end the long-standing friction
between the three regions - Jammu, the Valley and Ladakh
- but also show a political way out of the current
logjam in the Kashmir-New Delhi equation.
Mufti's government could then make a credible
case for exploring alternative mechanisms of
self-governance to meet the political aspirations of
Kashmiris. The Hill Council also shows that political
and constitutional channels can be used effectively for
realizing popular aspirations. In a state ravaged by
violence for more than a decade, this would help restore
peoples' faith in democratic methods of attaining
political objectives.
Finally, it underlines the
importance of safeguarding and nurturing the deeply
plural character of the state. This aspect needs more
attention from the Mufti-led coalition government. The
Hill Council as it is presently constituted does not
address the communal polarization between Buddhist Leh
and Muslim Kargil. Sheikh Abdullah's bifurcation of
Ladakh into these two districts in 1979 had set this
process in motion.
Kargil's consistent and
stringent opposition to the union territory demand has
been a key reason for its failure. It had also turned
down the offer of the Hill Council in 1995 because it
did not want to rub the Kashmiri leadership the wrong
way. However, a growing realization of the importance of
local control and participation in the district's
development processes as well as the changed attitude of
the new government in Srinagar has made Kargilis more
receptive to this idea.
Mufti Sayeed's
government has promised Kargil a similar body by June
2003. A better solution might be to hold a dialogue with
the representatives of Leh and Kargil in order to
transform the present Hill Council for the Leh district
into that for the Ladakh region, with ample provisions
for autonomy at the grassroots level. Ultimately, a
viable, just and lasting solution to the Kashmir problem
lies in a multi-layered federal arrangement that will
fulfill the political aspirations of all the communities
in the state.
Other article in this
series:
America has no dog in the fight
Olive branch or poisoned
chalice?
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