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BOOK REVIEW
Picture
imperfect
Jihadis in Jammu and
Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery by K Santhanam,
Sreedhar, Sudhir Saxena and Manish
Reviewed by
Sudha Ramachandran
An attempt at studying a
terrorist organization is quite like dealing with an
iceberg. What you get to see - if you see anything at
all - is only a fraction of the organization.
Consequently, information about terrorist organizations
is sketchy.
 While there are any number of studies on the
political factors that triggered the eruption of the
armed struggle in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), few
systematic studies exist on the various militant
organizations operating in this violence-torn state.
Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery
by K Santhanam, Sridhar, Sudhir Saxena and Manish is an
attempt to fill that gap.
All four authors are
with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses
(IDSA), a Delhi-based institute engaged in research on
national security issues.
The book consists of
two parts. Part One provides background information on
the evolution of the jihadi movement in Jammu and
Kashmir since 1989. Part Two, which is the bulk of the
book, provides pen sketches of 31 jihadi organizations
operating in the state. Among the organizations that the
book examines are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF), the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Dukhtaran-e-Millat,
the Harkat-ul Ansar, the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples
Conference, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jammu and
the Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party.
The
pensketches of the organizations includes data regarding
when the organizations were formed, their objectives,
leadership, structure, areas of operation, sources of
finance, links with political parties and groups, major
acts of terrorism and so on. This is followed by a more
detailed look at issues, such as recruitment and
training, inter- and intra-group clashes and strategy
adopted by the group.
The splintering of the
various organizations and the proliferation of groups is
well captured in the book. The book would help the
reader make sense of the fission and fusion of
organizations that has taken place in the militant
movement in J&K. The authors have done a good job of
bringing together from a variety of sources information
on the organizations. Unfortunately, the book is little
more than a compilation of data, of which there is
little analysis. Consequently, it is reduced to a mere
handbook on the militant organizations operating in
J&K.
And the book gives a skewed picture of
the scenario in the Valley. This is because of the
authors' one-sided, even flawed perception of issues.
The most serious flaw in the book is that the authors
use terms like jihadi, terrorist and militant as
synonyms. The title of the book is Jihadis in Jammu
and Kashmir. But some of the organizations that are
examined in the group cannot be described as jihadi.
The JKLF, for instance, notwithstanding the fact
that its outlook in the early 1990s had a distinct
Islamic favor, is certainly not jihadi. The JKLF is in
favor of an independent Kashmir, one that includes the
Indian- and Pakistan-administered parts of Kashmir. In
the early 1990s, the Kashmiri Pandits (Hindus) were
targets of its violence. But it is not a jihadi
organization.
The authors have failed to
distinguish between the various conceptions of Kashmiri
identity - the secular, the Islamic and the pan-Islamic.
They have not distinguished between the various phases
through which the armed struggle in Kashmir has evolved.
In 1988-89, there was an underground militant movement
that exploded into a mass political movement in 1990.
Since then there have been various changes in the way
the movement has evolved. While it took on an Islamic
flavor in the early 1990s, jihadi elements entered the
picture only in the mid-1990s.
With this
broad-brush treatment of all groups that have resorted
to violence as jihadi and terrorist, the authors fail to
see the shifts in strategy that various organizations
have made. Some of the militants used violence to
achieve political goals. Use of violence was a part of
their strategy, a strategy that included mass actions
such as demonstrations, bandhs (closures) and so
on. The book fails to look at the complex angles of the
strategy. It only records their use of "terrorist"
violence.
In tracing the roots of the emergence
of "terrorist and violent incidents" in the 1980-1990
period, the authors point to Pakistan's "adoption of
proxy war strategies" and its belief that the success of
jihadi strategies in defeating the USSR could be
replicated in J&K as well. The contribution of the
Indian government towards the alienation of the Kashmiri
people and the eruption of an armed uprising is
dismissed in one sentence. "India did commit some
political 'errors', though their political context from
circumstances, maturity, compulsions or calculations
need to be understood." (p 22)
What was blatant
rigging by the National Conference-Congress Party of the
1987 elections is described as "allegations of
"electoral fraud" by the ruling National Conference. (p
22). The state administration alone is blamed for the
rigging. No mention is made of Delhi's role over decades
in systematically undermining the Kashmiris' faith in a
democratic system and the fact that the Kashmiris tried
several political means to address their grievances and
that they turned to violence when these failed.
Even if one assumes that all the organizations
in J&K are indeed jihadi and terrorist, the book is
a disappointment. There is more to jihadi or terrorist
organizations than violence. Sadly, the authors have
failed to look at other issues, such as the ideology,
their propaganda tactics and indoctrination methods.
Why, for instance, are members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba or
the Jaish-e-Mohammed willing to blow themselves up? What
does Islam have to say about suicide killings? How do
these organizations justify suicide? Do they consider
them as suicide? Who are these boys who blow themselves
up? Do the Kashmiri people distinguish between the
Islamic and the jihadi groups?
While Pakistan is
undoubtedly responsible for the Islamization and the
subsequent jihadization of the movement in Jammu and
Kashmir, India's unwitting role in this cannot be
ignored. The marginalization of the "secular" JKLF was
started by India when its security forces went after the
JKLF cadres. What India didn't see coming was the
filling of the void (created by the weakening of the
JKLF) by Islamic groups. The process of marginalizing
the JKLF was completed subsequently by the Hizbul
Mujahideen (created by Pakistan), which decimated the
JKLF. The book does not look into this aspect of the way
in which things have evolved in the Valley.
But
despite its serious shortcomings, Jihadis in Kashmir:
A Portrait Gallery is essential reading for it
provides an insight into why India has failed to address
the problem. It is India's refusal to look within for
the roots of the Kashmir problem that in part has
prevented it from finding a lasting solution to the
Kashmir problem yet. Like the government, the four
authors (in the preface Santhanam, the director of IDSA,
states that the book does not represent the views of the
government of India or any of its ministries) simply
refuse to look at the domestic angles of the problem. So
long as every dissenting Kashmiri is perceived as a
terrorist or a jihadi and the militancy in Kashmir is
viewed as a problem created and nurtured solely by
Pakistan without addressing the local issues, the
problem will persist.
Jihadis in Jammu and
Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery by K Santhanam,
Sreedhar, Sudhir Saxena and Manish, New Dehli:
Sage/Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2003.
ISBN: 0-7619-9785-7. Price rupees 380 (US$8), 282 pages.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
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