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COMMENTARY
The world outside the
castle walls
By K P S Gill
NEW
DELHI - There is, without doubt, truth in the argument
of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that
"defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st
century threats may well require that we take the war to
the enemy".
The political paralysis, vacillation
and policy reversal that have characterized
counter-terrorism responses in the democratic world
cannot generate an adequate response to the fanatical
forces that threaten civilization today, and the
initiative will have to be seized by those who stand for
freedom and order if these forces are to be defeated.
Success in this enterprise, however, depends on the
accuracy and effectiveness with which we define, engage
with, and neutralize the "enemy".
That's the
problem with Iraq. The autocratic and oppressive Saddam
Hussein regime is, without doubt, a problem - but it is
still far from clear that it is the most significant
problem within the context of the rising threat of
international terrorism.
The American case has
certainly been poorly argued on this count; but worse,
there appears, in the American strategy, no clear theory
of closure or coherent exit policy. America has an
extended record of untidiness in this context - and this
has been underlined in the recent past by the experience
in Afghanistan and the visible strategy on Pakistan.
The war in Afghanistan is far from over; the
stability and survival of the tenuous Hamid Karzai
regime are under constant threat; and, though
Afghanistan has been all but destroyed, terrorism may
well have emerged stronger, more dispersed and more
complex as a result of the US intervention in that
country.
On the other hand, Pakistan - which is
projected as America's strongest ally in the war against
terrorism - is fundamentally and ideologically in
conflict with everything that the US represents and is
presently and certainly the worst nest of Islamist
extremist terror in the world; and is probably - and in
the Indian perspective, unquestionably - the most active
state sponsor of international terrorism.
America's engagement with these two countries
does not appear to have sufficiently secured the ends of
the global war against terrorism, even as a new and
potentially immensely destabilizing campaign is planned
in Iraq.
The US itself still remains
substantially insulated from the consequences of
instability and disorder in Asia - though the threat of
an occasional terrorist act on American soil is great
and rising. If a particular situation remains "messy",
or worsens further, withdrawal to the now imperfect
"fortress America" can still be contemplated. Those who
are permanently located in this troubled neighborhood,
however, do not have this option, and would be required
to deal with the chaotic impact of unfinished wars,
collapsing states and a rootless, violent diaspora.
These dangers, precisely, are what underlie
India's cautiously disapproving line on Iraq.
Ironically, India voices many of the same concerns
regarding Iraq that the US does in its advocacy of a
peaceful resolution of, and disapproval of any
preemptive action in, the conflict between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir: that the existing regime can be
bribed or coerced to improve its record without recourse
to war; that the alternative to the present regime is
uncertain and likely to be worse; that the destruction
of an unsatisfactory but stable regime would plunge the
entire region into disorder, and would create wider
spaces for the operation of the forces of extremism and
terror.
But India's immediate concerns regarding
the impending war in Iraq are wider and far more direct.
The economic and political impact of such a war, and of
the possible destabilization of the Middle East, could
be substantial and immediate, and the memory of the deep
financial crisis into which the country was plunged by
the last Gulf War in 1990-91 is still fresh in the minds
of policymakers here.
Iraq is a significant
source of oil for India, but more importantly, the fear
is that a war would send the prices of oil spiraling
from all sources, feeding an inflationary spiral that
could undermine India's economy at a crucial phase of
its current transformation. Over 3 million Indian
workers in the Gulf are also threatened with a decline
in, or loss of, employment, and foreign exchange
remittances from these sources can be expected to fall
dramatically. The potentially dampening effect of the
war on the US economy also impacts on the Indian
economy, as America is India's largest trading partner.
The greater danger, however, is that a war
against Iraq may lead to more violence and instability
in the immediate neighborhood - and especially in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and, possibly, Iran and Saudi
Arabia as well. There are already indications of rising
terrorist action in Afghanistan, and this trend can be
expected to intensify when the campaign against Iraq
begins. In Pakistan, the Pervez Musharraf regime is
expected to attempt to deflect domestic discontent and
criticism of its support to the US war on Iraq by
intensifying cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir
and other theaters in India.
Despite these
specific risks to Indian interests, the Indian position
does accommodate the ambiguities of the situation and is
not defined by an inflexible opposition to war - but
reflects, rather, qualified opposition to unilateralism
and haste in this engagement. It recognizes, moreover,
that - irrespective of the decision and outcome of the
proposed Iraq campaign, and the tactical disagreements
on Pakistan and other issues - India is now
fundamentally and irrevocably committed to the
development and deepening of strategic ties with the US,
and the basis of this commitment is not a transient and
opportunistic convergence of interests, but a
convergence of basic ideologies and shared values of
pluralism, democracy, constitutional governance and an
open global system that comprehends and promotes these
values.
K P S Gill, president,
Institute for Conflict Management, a non-profit society
set up in 1997 in New Delhi committed to the evaluation
and resolution of problems of internal security in South
Asia.
Published with permission from the
South Asia Intelligence Review of theSouth Asia
Terrorism Portal
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