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KASHMIR IN FOCUS
The tragedy of
changed perceptions
By Sudha
Ramachandran
SRINAGAR - The 13-year armed
conflict between militants and the Indian security
forces in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) has had a devastating impact on the lives of
the Kashmiri people. Tens of thousands, many of them
innocent civilians, have been killed or injured. The
conflict has also had a significant impact on the
perception of the people on a host of issues.
Most noteworthy is the impact that the conflict
has had on the common man's perception of Pakistan. If
in 1989-91, the Kashmiri Muslims looked to Pakistan as a
friend, today they regard Islamabad as the main cause of
their suffering. Their perception of Pakistan has
clearly turned full circle.
In 1947-48, when
tribals backed by Pakistan invaded the Princely State of
Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmiris, including the Muslims,
welcomed the Indian security forces and joined hands
with them to drive back the Pakistanis. Two decades
later, in 1965, Pakistan sent several hundreds of
military and paramilitary personnel disguised as
civilians into Indian-administered Kashmir to foment an
uprising. The Pakistani government had thought that the
Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley would rise in revolt
against India. That did not happen. On the contrary, the
Kashmiris turned in the Pakistani infiltrators. The
common bond of religion notwithstanding, the Kashmiri
Muslims signaled that they were not with Pakistan.
However, the equation changed dramatically in
the 1980s as Kashmiri alienation from India deepened. By
1989, India had lost the hearts and minds of the
Kashmiri Muslims. The existing underground movement in
Kashmir, which had links with Pakistan, erupted into a
popular uprising against the Indian state. Thousands of
Kashmiri boys crossed over to Pakistan-administered
Kashmir to acquire arms and training and returned to
fight the Indian security forces. The militants were at
this time regarded as heroes.
Up to around 1992,
the Kashmiris thought that Pakistan would help them
achieve azadi (freedom/independence). It was only
when Pakistan created militant groups to crush the
pro-azadi component of the militancy and
engineered infighting between them that they realized
that Islamabad had a different game plan – that it was
backing the militancy not to deliver azadi to the
Kashmiris, but to occupy Indian-administered Kashmir as
well.
The fratricidal fighting between the
militants groups that Pakistan engineered to wipe out
pro-azadi groups pitted Kashmiri against
Kashmiri, brother against brother. This was followed by
the entry of foreign militants – Pakistanis, Afghans and
Arabs - and the gradual "Talibanization" of the
movement. In addition to the bloodletting, the Kashmiris
were suffering the effects of the growing
criminalization of the militant groups. By the
mid-1990s, the Kashmiris, particularly the women,
started turning their backs on the militants.
Today, most Kashmiris say that nothing positive
was achieved by the armed struggle. "It has only brought
us death and destruction. Our society has been
shattered," is what you hear over and over again.
In contrast, leaders of the separatist
organizations, especially those in the Hurriyat
Conference, point to the fact that today the world is
aware that there is a problem in Kashmir. The common
man, however, feels that this is hardly a gain worth
sacrificing their sons for.
Unlike the Hurriyat
Conference, which insists that it will participate in
dialogue with India only if Pakistan is involved too,
the average Kashmiri in Srinagar wants India to talk to
the elected government only. Those who wanted Pakistan
to be involved in the dialogue said that this is
necessary to "end the gun culture in the Valley".
Although Kashmiris are likely to support the
Pakistani cricket team when it plays against India in
the World Cup in South Africa on March 1 - Kashmiris say
that they do so to rile the Indian security forces - the
mood in the Valley today is clearly anti-Pakistan.
Although the majority in the Valley are Muslims, they -
even the Sunni Muslims - insist that the Islam they
practice is quite different from the one practiced in
Pakistan. The way in which the Musharraf government
abandoned the Taliban post-September 11 has made
Kashmiris wary of Pakistan’s reliability as a friend.
But more than this, it is Pakistan's role in the
militancy and its manipulation of the groups to further
its own interests that has turned the Kashmiris against
Islamabad.
But for sections in the Hurriyat and
militants, especially those with a fundamentalist
orientation, such as the Jamait-ul-Mujahideen or the
Dukhtaran-e-Millat, the average Kashmiri is averse to
any association with Pakistan.
No Kashmiri
civilian that this correspondent spoke to in Srinagar
wanted J&K to accede to Pakistan. Some said that
they wanted the status quo to be maintained, ie to
remain a part of India but with more autonomy. The
overwhelming majority wanted azadi from India and
Pakistan. But if azadi was not an option, they
say that they would prefer to be a part of India.
(Incidentally, the UN resolution that calls for a
plebiscite offers the Kashmiris two options – accession
to India or Pakistan.)
The immense suffering
that the past 13 years has brought them has made many
Kashmiris view with longing the peace they had in the
pre-1989 period.
Several Kashmiris say that
their quarrel is not with the Indian people; it is with
the Indian state and with the Indian security forces.
"We have no difficulty being a part of a secular
democracy – if only Delhi would allow that to work in
Kashmir," Iqbal Ganai, a 70-year-old retired
schoolteacher says. He, like several in Kashmir, is a
secular democrat, a staunch Indian but who feels
betrayed by India. Ganai was among those Kashmiris who
welcomed the Indian army into Kashmir in 1947. He
laments that the problem lies with Delhi treating
Kashmir not as a land with people living there but as a
piece of real estate.
If the Kashmiris'
perception of Delhi and Islamabad has undergone changes
over the decades, so has their view of the United
States. Kashmiris have generally favored US mediation of
the dispute as they believe - as do several in India -
that the US is in favor of an independent Kashmir.
Indeed, several Indian analysts have warned that it is
in Washington's strategic interests to have a pro-US,
independent Kashmir at the doorstep of China and India.
However, there appears to be a shift in their
perception of the US too. Many Kashmiris realize that
the US might not help them achieve an independent
Kashmir at the cost of its burgeoning economic and
strategic ties with India. Several Kashmiris, in fact,
now see Hurriyat leaders as being pro-US and call them
"American stooges" for doing what the US dictates to
them.
There have been no street protests in
Srinagar over the likely US attack on Iraq. Kashmiris,
especially those from the poorer sections, say that they
are opposed to a war on Iraq as it will hit only the
Iraqi people.
Incidentally, when the US launched
military operations against Afghanistan, the Hurriyat
led protest demonstrations in Srinagar. Today, it is
strangely silent. A lawyer points out that the
Hurriyat's opposition to the attacks on Afghanistan was
because of its sympathy for the Taliban. In the case of
Iraq, the Hurriyat does not have a comparable
relationship with the Iraqi government or the people.
Engulfed by problems generated by the 13-year
militancy, the average Kashmiri is simply too
preoccupied with issues of his own survival to be
bothered about the bigger political issues. If he seems
apathetic to international crises and bilateral
India-Pakistan problems, it is because he is struggling
to cope with his immediate problems. If he is cynical
today, it is because he feels betrayed by not just India
or Pakistan or the US, but by his own leaders.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contactcontent@atimes.com for
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