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Iraq: Indian hopes, Pakistani
fears
By B Raman
As the
United States and the United Kingdom ready themselves
for their coming military intervention to overthrow the
Saddam Hussein government in Iraq, the attitudes of India
and Pakistan on this subject require careful analysis.
The Indian policy has been tactically correct
and strategically calculating. It is correct in the
sense of keeping in step with the prevailing opinion in
the so-called non-aligned world, which supports the
deprivation of Iraq of any weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), which it may still have, under the United Nations
auspices, but opposes any externally-engineered regime
change and any unilateral intervention by the US and the
UK bypassing the UN.
At the same time, it is
strategically calculating in the sense of seeing
long-term benefits for India by not overplaying its
opposition to an unilateral intervention by the US and
the UK. An anxiety to sustain the improvement in Indo-US
relations, which has gathered additional momentum under
the Bush administration. There is also a faint hope that
the US, after depriving Iraq of its WMD, might turn its
attention to Pakistan's WMD capability. India's policy
reflects both of these concerns.
Pakistan's
policy, too, is tactically correct in the same sense as
India's, but the underlying factor behind its strategic
calculation is a fear that India might succeed in adding
to the fears of the US over Pakistan's WMD capability.
There is a convergence of fears between the
military-intelligence establishment and the religious
fundamentalist parties on the dangers of the US turning
its attention to Pakistan's WMD capability after it has
disposed of Iraq's and they have not hesitated to give
open expression to these fears.
President
General Pervez Musharraf did so while talking to a group
of intellectuals at the Governor's House in Lahore in
January. His significant address to them was analyzed in
four installments by Jang, the Urdu daily. Some of his
remarks as cited in the analysis need to be quoted, "Our
people are saying that if Iraq is attacked, then we will
fight for Iraq. Before saying such things, we should see
whether such commitments are in the interests of
Pakistan. We should give priority to our interests
overall other issues.
"Instead of sentimental
statements and slogans we should behave sensibly. We
should think over how we can protect ourselves from the
possible effects of US policies. We can choose a path of
confrontation. Whenever we disagree with the US, we can
adopt an inflexible and aggressive stand, but would it
be in our interest? The other way out is that we should
follow prudence, far-sightedness and a cautious approach
... our nuclear capability has become a matter of
concern for many countries and we should try to protect
our nuclear assets. By adopting a sentimental course, we
should not provide an opportunity to others to destroy
our nuclear capability."
Similar fears and the
consequent need for caution can be seen in the
statements of some of the leaders of the Islamic
fundamentalist parties despite their support of al-Qaeda
and the Taliban and despite their virulent rhetoric
against the US presence in Pakistan and its policies on
Iraq. For example, Lieutenant-General (retd) K M Azhar
of the Jamaat-ul-Ulema Pakistan says in a statement
cited by the News, the English daily, of February 20,
"The countries where the masses are holding protest
rallies are economically strong and are not dependent on
the US. There is a general impression that Pakistan
would be the next target of the US after Iraq. That is
why the religious parties are behaving realistically and
cautiously. The US administration is already displeased
with the role of the religious parties in Pakistan and
is terming them fundamentalists. Any unwise decision of
religious parties could cost the country its nukes and
security. The US changes its behavior once it achieves
its purposes. The religious parties and the government
should adopt the same policy keeping in view the
solidarity and security of the country."
This
desire and advice for caution were largely responsible
for the initial hesitation of the religious parties to
organize any mass street demonstrations against the US.
As Yahya Mujahid, a leader of the Jamaat-ul-Dawaat, the
political wing of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, a member of Osama
bin Laden's International Islamic Front, said, "The
masses in Europe are holding street marches against the
war because they would not be its [the US's] target. The
people in the Muslim countries would be the target of
the US-led coalition and so they are avoiding reaction."
This caution of the religious parties came to be
branded by their political detractors as one more bit of
evidence of the fact that they were the surrogates of
the military-intelligence establishment. Their rank and
file, too, started expressing their unhappiness over
this cautious approach of their leaders. It was only
then that they decided to organize huge demonstrations
against the US in different cities, starting with
Karachi on March 2.
To borrow an expression from
a Pakistani analyst, Musharraf's mind, in this matter,
is with the US, but his heart is with the religious
fundamentalist parties. He has three objectives - first,
to protect Pakistan's strategic WMD assets and to ensure
that they do not cause fears in US minds similar to
those caused by Iraq's; second, to make Pakistan an
economically strong power; and, third, to force India to
the negotiating table on Jammu and Kashmir by continuing
to maintain a high level of terrorist violence there,
which he considers a freedom struggle, through the
jihadi cadres of the fundamentalist organizations which
are allied with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
To
achieve the first objective, he needs the continued
confidence and trust of the US and for the second he
needs its continued benevolence. Both would depend on
his continued cooperation with the US in its war against
al-Qaeda, his responsiveness to its concerns over Iraq
and his ability to ensure that the anger of the
religious parties against the US does not exceed
permissible limits and become the object of concern to
the US .
To achieve the third, Musharraf needs
to continue to resist the US pressure for action against
terrorists operating against India and close his eyes,
to the extent possible, to the complicity of the
religious parties with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizbe Islami, which has joined
hands with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
The task
before Musharraf now, on the eve of the US invasion of
Iraq as since September 11, is how to marry the
contradictory objectives of collaboration with the US
and complicity with the religious fundamentalist
parties. Thus far, he has succeeded in doing so without
suffering any damage to the goodwill of the US. Will
Musharraf continue to do so? He seems to be confident
that he will.
B Raman is Additional
Secretary (ret), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of
India, and presently director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai; former member of the National Security
Advisory Board of the Government of India. E-Mail:
corde@vsnl.com. He was also head of the
counter-terrorism division of the Research &
Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence agency,
from 1988 to August, 1994.
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