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India falls behind in post-Saddam
jockeying
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - With the United States ever likely
to launch a unilateral attack on Iraq, the Indian
government finds itself in a sticky situation, and it
ambiguous approach to the crisis has come under fire.
While some sections in India are keen that the
government should act pro-actively to further its
economic interests in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, others
are criticizing the government for failing to
categorically denounce US warmongering.
Under
mounting criticism from opposition parties, Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told parliament on
Wednesday that the "use of force by a superpower to
change a regime is wrong and cannot be supported".
Vajpayee stressed that the UN Security Council
should decide on "what further action" was required.
When asked whether India would condemn unilateral action
against Iraq he said, "If this does happen, we will
condemn it." When pressed to clarify whether India would
allow its facilities to be used in the event of war, the
premier said that he believed that there would be no war
and so could not answer what stand India would take if
Iraq was attacked.
Incidentally, Vajpayee
avoided naming the US in either his written statement to
parliament or his verbal comments. And significantly, he
seemed to express a degree of dissatisfaction with Iraq
when he said that "if the pace of Iraq's cooperation
with the inspection process had been quicker, it may
have enabled UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission and] and the IAEA
[The International Atomic Energy Agency] to certify to
the Security Council that Iraq was in full compliance of
Resolution 1441".
This is the first time since
the outbreak of the latest round of the Iraq crisis that
the prime minister has clarified somewhat the Indian
position in parliament. That the Indian government is
reluctant to criticize the US position on Iraq has been
apparent for some months. Things reached a head early
this week, when at an all-party meeting convened to
discuss India's position the government rejected a
demand from the opposition parties that a resolution on
the issue be passed in parliament.
It appears
that at the meeting, Vajpayee justified his government’s
"middle path approach" to the crisis. He said that this
approach was preferred since India had cordial relations
with both the US and Iraq.
The government's
reluctance to take a categorical anti-war position came
under fire from the media, as well. An editorial in the
Deccan Herald said, "A 'middle path' is fine if both
sides are equally wrong or if diplomatic measures have
clearly failed. In the case of Iraq, there is no need
for war and the US is clearly wrong in waging a war
against Iraq. In the present context, India's adoption
of a 'middle path', its reluctance to criticize
Washington's warmongering only amounts to adoption of an
unprincipled position."
Accusing the government
of "pusillanimity", The Hindu said, "Such an approach to
global affairs, wherein the fear of alienating one side
or the other is the operative factor, not only
represents a total abandonment of principle but also
indicates a lack of sense of purpose ... by expressing
the pious hope that a peaceful solution will be arrived
at rather than taking a categorical position against
war, New Delhi appears to imply that it does discern
some justification for a US led military strike against
Iraq."
India is uncomfortable with the way that
the US has been undermining the UN. It is in favor of a
multipolar world. It is opposed to externally-engineered
regime change. It has had no problems dealing with the
Iraqi government. It has, in fact, consistently opposed
the sanctions regime on Iraq.
Few Indians
believe that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction or
that an attack on Iraq or regime change is required to
destroy them even if they do exist. A war against Iraq
is not in India's interest. For India, the economic and
political implications of a war in the Gulf are
enormous. Iraq is an important source of oil for India.
Spiraling oil prices can be expected to deal a huge
setback to the Indian economy. Around 3 million Indian
workers are in the Gulf. Their return to India in the
event of war will affect remittances.
Why then
the refusal to oppose war and to speak out against the
US warmongering? India's reluctance to criticize the US
has to do with its deepening engagement with that
country. After decades of troubled ties, things are
looking up between the two countries and New Delhi is
unwilling to throw that away.
Unlike in 1991
when New Delhi's strategy was influenced significantly
by the fact that hundreds of thousands of Indians were
working in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, this time
only 50 Indians reside in Iraq. And India has already
advised them to leave. Of course, the problem of
evacuating the millions working in the Gulf remains.
The government's ambiguous approach has come in
for criticism not only from anti-war sections but also
those who are arguing that a clear US tilt is in India's
interest. Strategic affairs analyst Raja Mohan wrote in
The Hindu, "The safe diplomatic position that India had
constructed for itself in the current Gulf crisis would
soon begin to unravel. Pious platitudes about avoiding
the dangers of war serve no purpose except deluding
oneself. Calls for restraint of the type the prime
minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, issued this week are of
no consequence when war is imminent.
"India’s
arguments that a war against Iraq could have grave
consequences for itself - from rising oil prices to a
political backlash in the Arab world - do have merit.
But if war is inevitable and India cannot prevent it,
New Delhi must begin to move to the next questions. How
does India minimize the negative consequences of war?
How does New Delhi protect its many interests in a
post-Saddam Iraq and the Middle East?
"India
should know that where it stands before the war will
significantly shape its influence when the peace
treaties are drafted and spoils from the war are
distributed. Sitting on the fence until it is all over
is a risk free option. But such timidity might also
marginalize India in the potentially historic
arrangements that could emerge in the Persian Gulf and
the Middle East."
Based on an interview with US
ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, a report in the
Times of India said that the US is holding out to India
the carrot of a "major role" in the post-war
reconstruction of Iraq. The Indian Ministry of External
Affairs and the US embassy in Delhi subsequently denied
the US offer of a piece in the post-Saddam Iraqi pie to
India.
It is very likely that New Delhi's
current calculations on how it should move with regard
to the Iraq crisis are determined significantly by its
economic/reconstruction interests in that country.
Chiding the US for its warmongering will only erode
India's chances.
New Delhi's adoption of a
"middle path" on the crisis, its relative silence on the
issue, is not as the government claims an unwillingness
to take sides between its two friends. It is really a
reluctance to criticize the US.
(©2003 Asia
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