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KASHMIR IN FOCUS
A body-blow for
moderation
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - The Indian government's effort to
rope "moderate militants" into the dialogue process in
Kashmir has suffered a serious setback with the
assassination of Abdul Majid Dar, the former chief
operations commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).
Fifty-five-year-old Dar was shot dead by unidentified
gunmen in his brother's house in the town of Sopore,
north of Srinagar.
Two little-known
organizations, the Save Kashmir Movement and the
al-Nasireen have claimed responsibility for Dar's
killing. While the former accused Dar of being "an
informant of Indian agencies" and an "enemy of the
Kashmiri people", the al-Nasireen, in a message to the
CNS (a local news agency), accused Dar of "anti-movement
activities". Meanwhile, a person claiming to be a
spokesperson for the HM called up the news agency and
condemned Dar's killing. Soon after, a Pakistan
government spokesperson said that Dar's killing was the
work of Indian intelligence agencies.
Indian
intelligence agencies believe that the Save Kashmir
Movement and the al-Nasireen are mere front
organizations of the HM and that the pro-Pakistan
faction of the HM killed Dar.
Differences in
strategy between Dar and the Pakistan-based hardline
leadership of the HM culminated in Dar's expulsion in
2001. This resulted in a vertical split in the HM.
According to Indian intelligence sources based in
Srinagar, Dar was due to cross over to
Pakistan-administered Kashmir to consolidate support
among the moderates in the HM. His assassination, it
appears, was to prevent him from doing so as the move
could have changed the complexion of militancy in the
Valley.
A front-ranking commander in the HM for
many years, Dar shot into prominence when, as chief
operations commander in Indian Kashmir, he announced a
ceasefire in July 2000. Even as the Indian government
quickly reciprocated the ceasefire and even initiated
talks with Dar, the HM's Pakistan-based supremo Syed
Salahuddin opposed Dar's move and, in an attempt to
subvert the process, insisted that the ceasefire was
conditional on Pakistan being included in the dialogue.
Salahuddin also quietly encouraged his loyalists in the
HM to violate the ceasefire. The ceasefire collapsed
within a fortnight.
Trouble between Dar and
Salahuddin had been brewing for a while and erupted into
the open in 2000-01. Their quarrel was more than
personal rivalry. The two differed on strategy. Dar, as
the man active on the ground in Kashmir, felt that
Salahuddin was out of touch with the changing situation.
Dar had come to realize that India would never loosen
its grip over Kashmir, that the Kashmiri people wanted
peace and were fed up with the decade-long violence. By
2000, Dar had come around to the view that the armed
struggle had failed in its objectives and was futile,
and that there was more to be gained from dialogue with
India. His ceasefire initiative in 2000 was a result of
that changed perception.
Salahuddin, in
contrast, being based in Pakistan, has always been more
in tune with the line of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence. He is against any political compromise
with Delhi and has violently expressed his opposition to
those Kashmiri leaders who have pursued dialogue or
participated in elections.
Dar's fate was sealed
the day that he announced the ceasefire, and then even
entered into talks with Indian officials. By end-2000,
Dar and other Valley-based commanders stopped taking
orders from the Pakistan-based leadership. Salahuddin
struck in 2001 when he replaced Dar and the moderate
commanders with pro-Pakistan hardliners. In May last
year, Salahuddin expelled Dar and other moderates.
The split in the HM and the subsequent
bloodletting between the factions came as a shot in the
arm to India's counterinsurgency operations in the
Valley. However, more than this, it was Dar's seeming
moderation that raised hopes in Delhi. Indian
intelligence officials who were in touch with Dar were
hoping to persuade him to contest the recent assembly
elections. He did not. While that was a disappointment,
Indian officials admitted at that time that it was an
unrealistic expectation. After all, Dar's expulsion came
just a few months ahead of the polls.
Indian
officials were keener that Dar would be involved in the
dialogue process with Delhi. It appears that they were
making steady progress in this regard. Had India managed
to get Dar on board the dialogue process, it would have
been a major victory as Dar was the senior-most leader
of the HM in Kashmir before the organization split.
Dar lived by the gun. A bloody end was more or
less inevitable. Yet as a possible convert to mainstream
politics, "his value to India was considerable and
therefore India should have done more to protect him",
says a Kashmiri journalist. It is said that Dar, though
"underground" was being provided security by the Indian
forces. His assassination proves that it was not tight
enough.
In May last year, militants gunned down
Abdul Gani Lone, a moderate in the Hurriyat Conference.
Lone, it was said, was considering contesting the
assembly elections. His killing not only tilted the
balance within the Hurriyat in favor of the hardliners,
it also deterred other moderate separatists from
participating in the elections.
The killing of
Dar is not only a setback to Delhi's dialogue initiative
but also a blow to India's efforts to woo "moderate
militants" and moderate separatists. The unambiguous
message sent out by the assassination of Dar is that
India is simply unable to provide effective security to
those who are willing to engage with it in the Valley.
It could deter other "moderate militants" from
challenging, as Dar did, Pakistan’s control over the
militant movement.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contactcontent@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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