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KASHMIR IN FOCUS
Changing face of
militancy
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), one of
the biggest militant groups operating in Kashmir, is in
the throes of a violent churning. Within the span of a
fortnight, two of its senior-most leaders, albeit
belonging to rival factions, have been killed. Besides,
fighting between the two factions is said to have
assumed serious proportions in recent weeks.
Last week, Indian security forces killed Saif-ul
Islam, the "chief operations commander" of the HM in
Indian-administered Kashmir. According to Indian
sources, Saif-ul Islam, second in command to the
Pakistan-based HM supremo Mohammed Yusuf Shah, alias
Syed Salahuddin, was captured by Indian security forces
on April 2. Indian sources say that Saif-ul Islam led
the security forces to a HM hideout where he was killed
in an exchange of fire between militants and the
security forces. Separatists contend that Saif-ul
Islam's death was the result of torture while in
custody.
Ten days earlier, Abdul Majid Dar,
Saif-ul Islam's predecessor as "chief operations
commander", was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in his
home town, Sopore. A "moderate" within the HM who is
believed to have been in favor of dialogue with the
Indian government, Dar fell foul of the pro-Pakistan
leadership of the HM when he announced a unilateral
ceasefire in July 2000. He was slowly sidelined, then
replaced by Saif-ul Islam (a Salahuddin loyalist) and
finally expelled in May 2002. The developments led to a
serious split in the HM, with a majority of the
Kashmir-based commanders throwing their weight behind
Dar. Pakistan's money and weapons, however, went to the
Salahuddin faction.
The rift between Dar and
Salahuddin was more than a mere clash of personalities.
They differed on strategy. Dar, the man who was active
on the ground in Indian Kashmir, had come to believe
that armed struggle was heading nowhere, that the mood
in the Valley was pro-peace and that a negotiated
settlement with India would prove more rewarding. This
shift in strategy was unacceptable to Salahuddin and his
mentor-benefactors in Pakistan's Inter-Intelligence
Services (ISI).
HM militants active in Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) are said to be deeply resentful of the
way in which Salahuddin issues orders and controls the
operations from the safety of Muzaffarabad, the capital
of "Azad" Kashmir (the part of Kashmir under Pakistan
control) while they face the fire on the ground from the
Indian security forces. They point to the fact that
while hundreds of other Kashmiris have sacrificed their
lives for the cause, Salahuddin's five sons are busy
carving out careers for themselves in India - none of
them joined the militancy.
Over the past two
years, the Dar-Salahuddin feud is said to have fueled
much bloodletting within the HM. Besides, both factions
have apparently provided the Indian forces with
information regarding each other's hideouts.
Dar's killing is believed to be the work of the
Salahuddin faction. It is said that Dar was preparing to
cross over to Pakistan-administered Kashmir to
consolidate support among his loyalists there. The
Salahuddin faction preempted that move by killing him.
The Dar faction, however, struck back quickly. It is
believed that it was on information provided by Dar
loyalists that Indian security forces were able to
locate, arrest and subsequently kill Saif-ul Islam.
Salahuddin is reported to have said that the
death of Saif-ul Islam "would not adversely affect" the
separatist movement. On the contrary, it would generate
a new sense of energy within the organization, he
claimed. However, the factional fighting within the HM
is unlikely to end soon. The tit-for-tat killings at the
senior level can be expected to result in more
bloodletting among the cadres. Indian Intelligence
sources say that while this could result in the
weakening of the HM, it could also mean an increase in
violence with the two factions seeking to prove their
relevance in a show of strength.
Of all the
militant groups operating in Kashmir, the HM has
received the most support from Pakistan. Initially,
Pakistan backed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF). However, the JKLF's goal of reunification of the
divided Kashmir and independence, not accession to
Pakistan, did not fit in with Islamabad's aims.
Consequently, after using the JKLF to mobilize the
Kashmiris to rise against the Indian state, Islamabad
dumped that organization and raised others that suited
its agenda better. The result of this was the ISI's
raising, funding, arming and training of the Hizbul
Mujahideen.
Describing the impact of the HM's
rise on the Kashmir movement and the militancy, Navnita
Chadha Behera writes in State, Identity &
Violence: Jammu, Kashmir & Ladakh (Manohar,
2000): "Using the prism of religion, the problem was
articulated in terms of the Muslim Valley waging
an Islamic movement against the Hindu Indian
state in order to accede to Islamic Pakistan
... Pakistan and Azad Kashmir's Muslims were considered
as part of the millat [the Islamic community
world-wide]. Interestingly, the Hizbul Mujahideen never
mentioned Indian Muslims as part of this millat;
it single-mindedly advocated Kashmir's accession to
Pakistan and demanded a plebiscite according to the
original UN resolutions (1948-49). It bitterly opposed
an independent Kashmir based on secular nationalism
because nationalism, according to Islam, was based only
on religion." (Emphasis in original)
Behera
points out that the HM faced three challenges in the
Valley - the JKLF's nationalist and secular ideology,
Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq's articulation of Kashmiris'
Muslim identity as opposed to the Jamaat-e-Islami's (the
HM's political patron) Islamic ideology, and the
Kashmiri Pandits (the Hindus in the Valley).
The
HM targeted the JKLF and killed hundreds of its cadres.
It leaked information about JKLF hideouts to the Indian
forces. In May 1990, HM militants gunned down the
Mirwaiz. And its terror campaign against the Pandits
accelerated their exodus from the Valley.
Despite the material and logistical support it
received from Pakistan, the HM's fortunes began to fade.
The tide started turning against the HM by 1993-94. For
one, India's counter-insurgency campaign in the Valley
began to yield results. More importantly, popular
support for the HM started to fall.
The HM's
predominantly Kashmiri membership contributed in
substantial measure to its popularity in the Valley.
However, its excessive Islamic orientation and
opposition to the Kashmiris' religious practices and
faith in Sufism alienated the people. In the context of
the criminalization of the militancy and the internecine
fighting, and with the masses turning weary of war,
popular support for the HM fell.
Indian
Intelligence sources believe that while Pakistan
continues to support the HM, it is the jihadi groups
like the Harkat-ul Ansar, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and more
recently the Jaish-e-Mohammed that have been favored by
the ISI in recent years. "If the HM cadres were seen to
be more disciplined and pro-Pakistan than the JKLF in
the early years of the militancy, today it is the cadres
of the Lashkar and the Jaish [both have a larger
Pakistani component than does the HM] that the ISI
perceives as more dedicated to the cause and hence more
useful in its strategy against India," Indian
Intelligence sources told Asia Times Online.
It
is likely that the factional fighting within the HM and
the mounting reluctance of the India-based militants to
take orders from the Pakistan-based leaders will lead to
Pakistan increasing the Pakistani/foreign component of
the HM in the coming months. And with Kashmiris
increasingly unwilling to join the militant ranks, the
HM could be transformed from a predominantly Kashmiri
militant group with Islamic orientation to a mainly
foreign/Pakistani group.
So far, India has not
banned the HM under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
This is despite the fact that the HM has been
pro-Pakistan and carried out many massacres and
terrorist acts in Kashmir. It is believed that this is
because given the HM's predominantly Kashmiri
composition, India recognizes that it would need to
negotiate with the HM at some stage. In fact, since
2000, senior Indian officials have been talking to the
Dar faction of the HM. Home Ministry sources admit that
not labeling the HM as terrorist would make the process
of talking to the organization much easier.
The
likely transformation of the HM from a Kashmiri to a
predominantly Pakistani/foreign group has implications
for the level of violence one can expect in the coming
months and the people's relationship with the HM.
Besides, it will have impact on how India refashions its
strategy. The possibility of India proscribing the HM
then cannot be ruled out.
(©2003 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contactcontent@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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