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Delhi, Islamabad try to shift
blame
By Ranjit Devraj
NEW
DELHI - After the United States-led invasion of Iraq,
South Asian nuclear rivals India and Pakistan are busy
pointing fingers and trying to draw Washington's
attention to the weapons of mass destruction possessed
by the other.
"If lack of democracy, possession
of weapons of mass destruction and export of terrorism
were reasons for a country to make a preemptive strike
in another country, then Pakistan deserves to be tackled
more than any other country," said Indian Foreign
Minister Yashwant Sinha during a parliamentary
discussion on Iraq.
To that, Pakistani
Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said, "It is
India which is a fit case for preemptive strikes - there
is ample proof that India possesses biological, chemical
and other weapons of mass destruction."
In
truth, many are keeping close watch on the implications
of the invasion of Iraq, especially after US Secretary
of State Colin Powell told the New York Times recently
that the "Indo-Pakistan and whole subcontinent problem"
was part of a "broader agenda" that Washington planned
to address as soon as the war in Iraq is over.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
Washington had serious plans to take out Pakistan's
nuclear assets to prevent the possibility of their
falling into the hands of the al-Qaeda terrorist
network, its main quarry in Afghanistan. Pakistani
President General Pervez Musharraf publicly acknowledged
that the one reason he was ready to support Washington
for its "war against terror" in Afghanistan was so that
he could hang on to the nuclear assets.
In
leading the invasion against Iraq last month, the US
government said its main reason was to rid it of weapons
of mass destruction, although this has come under
question since no huge cache of such weapons has yet
been found. As Washington seizes the military victory in
Iraq, military officials say they believe weapons of
mass destruction are there.
Weapons of mass
destruction were not the first reason the US attacked
Afghanistan in October 2001, but at one point Washington
officials were reportedly afraid that al-Qaeda had
acquired enough material for a nuclear device. After
Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington's gaze is likely to
fall on Pakistan's nuclear assets.
But relieving
Pakistan of its nuclear weapons would not be easy,
because top military strategists in both Islamabad and
New Delhi strongly believe that what deters the
neighbors from going to war is precisely the fact that
they possess nuclear weapons. That would leave
Washington with little room but to insist that India,
too, take apart its nuclear and missile programs - which
New Delhi loudly insists it needs to contain China
rather than Pakistan.
In fact, Indian Defense
Minister George Fernandes has announced plans to test a
long-range, nuclear-capable Agni III missile - it has a
3,000-kilometer range that can only have targets in
China. If Washington decides to take the United Nations
Security Council route to disarming India of its nuclear
weapons, it is sure to get the support of all the
permanent members, starting with China. Britain can be
counted on to follow instructions from Washington.
France, irritated by suggestions that its place in the
Security Council be given to India, is not likely to
show any sympathy for New Delhi. That would leave
Russia, which may depart from the traditional approach
of the former Soviet Union in its relentless use of the
veto in India's favor, especially on the question of
disputed Kashmir.
Though it is hard to see India
giving up its missiles and nuclear weapons, there is the
question of sanctions and a denial of concessions, which
may then go liberally to its rival Pakistan as a reward
for its acquiescence to Washington's plan that the
region must be rid of weapons of mass destruction.
India's nuclear program began in 1974 when it
first exploded a nuclear device in response to Chinese
tests, prompting Beijing to proliferate nuclear
technology to its "all-weather" friend Pakistan.
By 1982, Pakistan had made such advances that
Israel was ready to make a preemptive strike on its
nuclear research center at Kahuta, in the same way that
it had taken out Iraq's reactor at Osirak in 1981. What
stayed an Israeli strike was the realization that
Pakistan's nuclear program could be delayed but not
stopped, simply because Beijing had a vital interest in
it.
When India carried out its second series of
nuclear tests in 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee wrote to then US president Bill Clinton and
said that the tests were in fact aimed at China rather
than Pakistan. If that indeed was the aim, there is
reason for India's military planners and strategists to
believe that it has backfired.
The tests
prompted Pakistan not only to go overtly nuclear, but
also to launch an armed incursion across the Line of
Control in Kashmir in 1999. This was later prevented
from turning into a nuclear exchange only because of
Clinton's personal intervention. Pakistan has refused to
give up the option of a nuclear first strike against
India, and New Delhi says it uses this as the
springboard for continuing a "proxy war" through its
backing of killings and attacks in Kashmir and other
parts of the country.
India says these "proxy
war" attacks never stopped. Last year, India ordered
some 700,000 of its troops to the Pakistani border and
moved its air force and navy to forward position. Its
military leaders said they were prepared for a nuclear
strike, while Pakistan also beefed up troops on the
common border.
The present problem for India's
planners and strategists boils down to convincing
Washington that Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction
could fall into the hands of Islamic extremists and must
therefore be removed, while New Delhi is allowed to keep
its own as deterrence against China.
Washington
recently accused Pakistan of proliferating nuclear
technology to North Korea in return for missiles from
that country, but officials say that it refuses to
acknowledge publicly that both the missiles and nuclear
technology may, in fact, have originated in China.
(Inter Press Service)
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