South Asia

The US, anti-jihadis and the Pakistan myth
By Ramtanu Maitra

The US-led invasion of Iraq has raised hopes within a section of India's pro-Israel, pro-United States anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan power structure that the US neo-conservative anti-jihadis will soon train their sights on Pakistan.

This hope surfaced in New Delhi recently, after acknowledgment by the US State Department that Pakistan and North Korea have been involved in a missiles-for-enriched-uranium transfer policy for decades.

This "hope", though, may soon turn into active manipulation of a not-so-unwilling government in New Delhi to revive an aggressive pursuit of the one-dimensional anti-Pakistan policy that has already made it something of a laughing stock in Washington and other world capitals. New Delhi's credibility was damaged significantly last December when it brought back 700,000 troops amassed along the India-Pakistan border. As US assistant secretary of state for South Asia Christine Rocca told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently, the withdrawal was made on the advice of the administration of President George W Bush.

Those who keep their ears close to the ground will have little difficulty in divining what drove the United States to its war against Iraq. For certain, it was not to suppress Islamic fundamentalism, as Iraq was never a fundamentalist nation. The so-called neo-conservatives within the US power structure say very clearly: this war was waged to rid Iraq of a bloody tyrant. More important, they claim the objective is to export American values of democracy, market-based economy and the rule of law to the Muslim world. What they do not say, and only can be surmised at this point, is that the war will help Israel in its feud against the Palestinians and also ensure a steady flow of cheap Middle East oil to the United States and its allies.

Pakistan in the crosshairs?
Those in Washington who agree with the anti-Pakistan cabal in India claim that Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf is a military dictator who possesses weapons of mass destruction and the Pakistani Islamic movements have direct ties to international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Until recently, Musharraf was supportive of the Taliban. But then, so was Washington. They also accuse Musharraf and the Pakistani army of bringing the region under the threat of a nuclear war. They like to think these echo the reasons Saddam Hussein had to go. But that argument is merely self-serving.

Besides the pro-Israeli and anti-Muslim groups within India, there are others who think that Pakistan could be a target. Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, for instance, told al-Jazeera television recently, "Today there is a cooperation between Pakistan and other countries on nuclear technology, and it is believed to possess weapons of mass destruction." To have a dictator as a "friend" is annoying to the US neo-conservatives, but Pakistan's nuclear capability is a fait accompli, as is India's. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, which has taken the shape of anti-Americanism, is another issue that irritates the anti-Jihadis in Washington, but only to a certain point.

On the other hand, there are many very clear reasons why Pakistan is not in America's crosshairs. To begin with, the Pakistani government, despite what it says publicly, has never acted against Israeli interests. Its support of the Palestinians was at best lukewarm. Of course, Pakistan does not produce cheap oil and Islamabad is more than willing to accept market-based capitalism if money in the form of aid under US blessings flows into Pakistan. Therefore, the pro-Israel anti-jihadis in the US cannot build a strong enough case to attack Pakistan.

There are other considerations. Pakistan is the cornerstone of US policy to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan is ready to give up most of the al-Qaeda members sheltered within and along its borders, but not the Taliban. Washington, which once quietly supported the Taliban in the mid-1990s, could live with that. Moreover, the Pakistani army has long been a close ally of the Pentagon. Washington knows fully well that the Pakistani army is the single most important institution left in Pakistan; and a large section of the Pakistani army, in order to keep battle-fit, wants to maintain strong ties with the United States.

Importance of the Pakistani army
But the Pakistani army serves a greater role for Washington. If and when the US wants to bring a political party to power in Pakistan in support of its own democratic values, it must depend on the Pakistani army to do so. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League (Nawaz) can come to power only when these political parties manage to broker hands-on support from the army. Washington knows that very well, because under US ambassador Robert Oakley ("Viceroy Oakley") such brokerage was done time and again in the 1990s.

What Washington also knows is that street Islam, an extremely disruptive anti-American power base, can only be controlled by the Pakistani army. The so-called democratic political parties of Pakistan cannot hold their own against the Islamic militants, and never did, without support from the barracks. (It is another matter that the barracks, having taken the responsibility of bringing political parties to power, also hold the "right" to remove them.)

More important, despite getting into a very rough spot in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Islamabad has not pursued a unidimensional foreign policy. Pakistan's close relationship with China is not to be underestimated, particularly in light of America's growing problems with North Korea. Whether Washington likes it or not, China is a very important power and may not look aside if Pakistan is in fact militarily threatened by the United States.

Those pro-Israel, anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan Indian powerbrokers who are trying to straitjacket India's foreign policy inside a narrow tunnel ought to know that the neo-conservatives in Washington may be calculating and ruthless, but they are not reckless. They know full well on which side their bread is buttered and who are the enemies to be taken on. The neo-conservatives are, in fact, not very happy with India. Despite India's vaunted democratic system, the neo-conservatives do not like India's continuing protection of its economy. Their attitude toward India may get downright nasty if India accelerates a closer relationship with China and Russia, tries to play a meaningful role in Central Asia, or tries to break out of the present unidimensional, anti-Muslim, pro-Israel foreign policy.

(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
 
Apr 17, 2003



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