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Kashmir militancy in the firing
line
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Having helped unleash militant groups
in the Kashmir Valley, Pakistan now has the task of
reining them in if there is to be any chance of peace -
or a settlement - in Indian-administered Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) state.
However, unlike claims
widely bandied about in India, Pakistan has little
direct influence over the militant groups, bar
one. But it is now said in Pakistani intelligence
quarters that a formula may have been agreed on between
Islamabad and Washington under which militancy could
finally be brought under control.
For without
doing this, militancy will remain the main hurdle in the
peace road map on Kashmir that is slowly taking place.
For instance, on Monday India again reiterated in clear
terms that dialogue on all issues between the countries
- including Kashmir - would be held as long as Pakistan
ensured that militant infiltration across the Line of
Control (LoC) that separates the Indian and Pakistani
sections of Kashmir was brought to a halt, and its
infrastructure crushed.
An Indian Foreign
Ministry spokesman has confirmed that the presidents of
India and Pakistan have already talked over the
telephone about the current situation in the region, and
that a number of troubleshooting measures have been
discussed that could be raised when, and if, Pakistani
President General Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee finally sit down for talks
for the first time since the last abortive efforts at
Agra in July 2001.
On the thorny issue of
militancy, Pakistan's position is that there is
currently little infiltration from Pakistani soil as the
militants are already positioned in different parts of
J&K, and that except for the al-Badr, a splinter
group of the Hizbul Mujahideen, none of the Kashmiri
groups are under Pakistani control. For instance, Hizbul
Mujahideen has an indigenous network in the Valley so it
does not need Pakistan's assistance, or so the argument
goes. Therefore, they follow their own agenda.
Indeed, areas of conflict have surfaced between
some of the militant groups and the government of
Pakistan. Some jihadi sources, for example, cite the
mysterious killing of top Harkatul Mujahideen leader
Maulana Allah Wasaya Qasim, whose body was found in
Multan.
This correspondent knows of Qasim from
the time he arranged a trip for Pakistani journalists to
Afghanistan to attend a press conference of Osama bin
Laden in the mid 1990s. Prior to his murder, Qasim was
in Islamabad, apparently in an attempt to ensure a role
for the Harkatul Mujahideen in the current peace
process. Otherwise, he is believed to have said, the
government would have to face the consequences. Qasim is
also said by security experts to have been irked at the
importance being given to the leader of the banned
Jaish-i-Mohammed, Maulana Masood Azhar. Azhar is meant
to be under house arrest, but he has been seen all over
the country calling for a jihad in Kashmir.
The
Pakistani government is attempting to put pressure on
organizations such as the Harkatul Mujahideen for them
to stop their operations, and for their fighters in
Kashmir to merge with, for example, the
Jaish-i-Mohammed. The purpose is apparently to reduce
the number of splinter groups so that the Pakistan
government can negotiate with them more easily.
Under US pressure, given Washington's increasing
interest in defusing tensions in South Asia, Pakistan is
attempting to de-escalate militant activities in
Kashmir. In the case of the al-Badr, this can be done
relatively quickly as it was directly established and is
controlled by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The
activities of the Pakistan-based organizations on
Pakistani soil, such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba,
Jaish-i-Mohammed and Harkatul Mujahideen, would be
clipped. Efforts would then be made to force those
fighters based in J&K to first merge under one
umbrella outfit, and then - under a deal to be made with
the Indian authorities - they would lay down their
weapons and receive a safe passage to Pakistan.
As far as indigenous organizations like the
Hezbul Mujahideen are concerned, if they refused to
buckle to the ISI's instructions to surrender, the ISI
would hand over maps of their arms caches and training
camps, one by one, forcing them to ultimately compromise
on the new road map for the Kashmir dispute.
This strategy is not without major pitfalls, but
since the three main parties involved - Pakistan, India
and the US - have a deepening resolve to settle the
issue within a few years, the militant factor could
finally be marginalized.
(©2003 Asia Times
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