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Kashmir's snake in the
grass
By Sudha Ramachandran
RAJOURI - Indian security forces have launched a
massive combing operation in the districts of Poonch and
Rajouri following the detection of a large militant base
in Hill Kaka in the Surankote area early this year. The
operation, codenamed Sarp vinash (Destruction of
serpents) has been described as among the largest
counter-insurgency operations mounted by the security
forces in recent years.
The Hill Kaka militant
base, situated about 35 kilometers from the Line of
Control (LoC) in the Poonch district of Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K), consisted of a network of over 100
bunkers where militants, after crossing over from
Pakistan, assembled before setting off on their
missions. About 350 militants are said to have stayed at
the base at any given time, making it the biggest
militant hideout south of the Pir Panjal range. The
Kashmir Valley lies to the north of the Pir Panjal.
Security forces found a huge stockpile of
ammunition and weapons and around 7,000 kilograms of
food rations at the base. What is more, the Hill Kaka
base was a command and control center. Its residents
used satellite phones to keep in touch with their
mentors in Pakistan, as well as with supporters in the
Indian states of Gujarat, Kerala Tamil Nadu, Uttar
Pradesh and West Bengal.
Documents found at the
Hill Kaka base indicate that most of its residents were
Pakistani Punjabis from Islamabad, Karachi and
Rawalpindi and not from the part of Kashmir that is
under Pakistan's control. They appear to have had links
with Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmetayar's
Hizb-e-Islami. They maintained meticulous diaries, and
in addition to writing down Islamic slogans and verses,
recorded details of some of their operations between May
1999 and July 2002, including the slitting of throats
and cutting to pieces of around 10 "informers" in Poonch
who "betrayed" the jihadis to the Indian security
forces. One diary records the death of a comrade in
Afghanistan in Osama bin Laden's Tora Bora complex. A
photograph recovered from the body of a dead militant
shows him standing in front of the Indian parliament
building in New Delhi.
So heavily-fortified were
the bunkers at Hill Kaka that the security forces were
forced to use air-to-ground missiles and helicopters
fitted with heavy machine guns. "There was no other way
to neutralize these bunkers except by using
helicopters," said Major General Hardev Lidder, general
officer commanding of the army's Romeo Force that led
the Sarp vinash operation. This is the first time
that aerial power is said to have been used in
counterinsurgency operations in the country.
In
the initial assault on Hill Kaka, which took place
around April 21 this year, the security forces killed
over 62 militants. Over 300 others are said to have fled
the base and melted into the districts of Poonch and
Rajouri. News that the assault was a major operation
emerged only in late May. Over 10,000 troops are now
combing the thick forests of these two districts.
The revelation of the Hill Kaka hideout has
kicked up a storm in India. Questions are being raised
as to why the armed forces failed to detect the base
earlier. Apparently, the Hill Kaka base has been
functioning for over four years. Yet it was only in
January this year that armed forces learned of its
existence when a militant was captured in the area.
The failure of the armed forces to detect the
Hill Kaka base early enough has been described by some
analysts as a more serious lapse than the one at Kargil
in 1999, where Indian intelligence failed to detect the
intrusion of Pakistani irregulars into Indian territory.
An editorial in the Times of India describes the base as
a "virtual Pakistani township" and goes on to point out
that "while Kargil was a series of shallow intrusions of
not more than eight kilometers at its deepest
penetration, the Pakistani occupation at Hill Kaka was
spread over an area of 100 square kilometers, 35
kilometers into Indian territory".
"The Indian
government never tires of pointing out Pakistan's double
game when it comes to turning the infiltration tap off.
Unfortunately, the sin of being caught napping at the
border post with the knowledge that there are constant
machinations under way which put the nation's security
in serious jeopardy is unpardonable. India has been
caught as much sinning as sinned against in this
department," pointed out an editorial in the Hindustan
Times.
A conspiracy theory circulating in Delhi
is that news of the Hill Kaka base was deliberately
leaked now with a view to derailing the normalization of
relations with Pakistan. According to this explanation,
the armed forces are not guilty of intelligence failure
- they have known of the Hill Kaka base for some time
now and have been carrying out assaults against it over
the past few years. However, news of the base was made
public in May by sections in government that are opposed
to the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan at this
juncture.
The overwhelming opinion, however, is
that Hill Kaka was a huge intelligence failure. The army
has rejected suggestions that Hill Kaka is a repeat of a
Kargil-type intelligence lapse and has described its
operations as a success. Senior army officers claim that
they did have specific intelligence on Hill Kaka from
the beginning and had carried out several smaller raids
in the area over the past few years with some success.
Around 400 militants were killed in the area, they said.
However, an assault on the scale of Sarp
vinash required planning and coordination. Supplies
had to be stockpiled, tracks had to be laid and even
helipads built in the upper reaches of the mountains.
Coordination among various wings of the armed forces and
between the military and civilian administration was
necessary.
Army officers in Rajouri told Asia
Times Online that military action had to be delayed
until the nomadic population agreed to leave the area of
operation. This was to reduce civilian casualties. The
Gujjars and Bakarwals take their flocks of sheep up to
the higher reaches of the mountains in summer and a
package had to be worked out with the civil
administration to keep them from going up this year.
While the army has come under considerable fire
for failing to detect Hill Kaka and destroy it early
enough, the forces work in the area under several
constraints. One is the tough terrain - a mountainous
area that is thickly forested. The condition of the
roads is appalling. It is easy for analysts sitting in
Delhi to suggest that the forces should have gone into
the upper reaches earlier. The situation on the ground
indicates that doing this without adequate logistical
support and planning would have be foolhardy. Besides,
in carrying out its counterinsurgency operations, the
Indian army has to work in conjunction with the civilian
government. The delay in decision-making slows down
operations.
The army is setting up a permanent
base at Hill Kaka and it has stepped up its presence and
operations in the surrounding area as well. As part of a
new aggressive strategy, the army has announced the
fencing of the LoC to curb infiltration of militants
from Pakistan into Indian territory.
Hill Kaka
reveals the extent to which militants from across the
border have entrenched themselves in Indian territory.
For long India has been saying that for terrorism in
J&K to end, Pakistan must shut off the terror tap
and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure located on
its soil. This is a reasonable demand. However, the
detection of Hill Kaka suggests that India will have to
do more to aggressively dismantle the immense and
well-entrenched infrastructure that militants have
systematically built up on Indian soil. A part of the
problem, it seems, lies within.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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