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Understanding China: The view from
India
By B Raman
Romanticization of our relations with our
neighbors, a consequent readiness to make unwarranted
gestures toward them and a reluctance to defend our
vital national interests in the name of "bhai-bhaism"
(brother-brother syndrome) have been the bane of Indian
strategic thinking and policymaking.
The
unfortunate results are strewn right across our history
ever since we became independent in 1947. In the case of
Pakistan, they could be seen in the ill-advised action
of Jawaharlal Nehru in taking the Kashmir issue to the
United Nations Security Council instead of letting our
army expel the Pakistani invaders from the entire state;
the Indus Water Treaty signed with Pakistan, which is a
shocking example in the world of an upper riparian state
voluntarily surrendering three-fourths of the waters of
a river system to the lower riparian state and agreeing
to provisions that enable the lower riparian state to
hold the upper riparian to ransom; the failure of Indira
Gandhi to force Pakistan to sign a formal agreement with
India on the future of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in
return for the release of the thousands of Pakistani
prisoners taken during the 1971 war; the action of the I
K Gujral government in ordering the winding-up of
India's covert action capability as an unilateral
gesture to Pakistan, which has not been reciprocated
until today; and the "kabi garam, kabi naram"
("Sometimes hot, sometimes soft") policy followed by the
present government, which are misinterpreted in
Islamabad as indicating a welcome (to Pakistan)
woolly-headedness.
In the case of China, the
results could be seen in our failure to stand by the
Tibetans in the 1950s and to protect our territories all
along the Sino-Indian border; the Sino-Indian war of
1962; our failure to adequately strengthen the
capability of our intelligence agencies to cover China
so that India is not taken by surprise again; the
decision of the present government to divert some of the
new institutions created after the 1962 war to keep a
better eye on China away from the purposes for which
they were created; and the re-emergence of the
romanticizing trait in our policymaking toward China as
seen in the debate on the forthcoming visit of our prime
minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to China from June
22-26. Our lotus-eating habit was seen again in the
manner in which the government undertook an exercise
after the Kargil war of 1999 to revamp our intelligence
apparatus. The exercise was almost totally
Pakistan-centric and paid little attention to
strengthening our capability vis-a-vis China.
More self-confident than in the past because of
its growing economic and military strength and
international stature, would China forget what it
regards as the historic wrongs of the past and prove
itself a benign force of the region?
The Chinese
themselves have been keen to reassure the people of the
region that they have nothing to fear from the new and
strong China that is rising in their midst.
But
its reassuring words and demeanor have not calmed the
inner disquiet in the region because of the unpleasant
reality that China has never been lacking in reassuring
words. What it has often been lacking is in matching
action.
When China chooses to enforce its
"historic claims to sovereignty" over a certain
territory, whether it be in relation to India, Vietnam
or the Philippines, it does not look upon it as an
expansion or aggression against other countries.
Instead, it views it as a justified action in
self-defense undertaken in its own territory, which was
unjustifiably under the control of others.
India
has been repeatedly a victim of this dichotomy in
relation to China's clandestine assistance to Pakistan
in the fields of nuclear and missile technologies -
proven actions hostile to India's interests, which were
totally at variance with its reassuring denials of any
such actions.
It is this trait of determination
in action, which it looks upon as justified in its
national interests, concealed behind a facade of feigned
goodwill, that makes the countries of the region uneasy
over the China of tomorrow and that should make our
policymakers equally uneasy. They are concerned not only
over its growing economic strength and military
capability, but also over the increasing emphasis on
Chinese nationalism as the cementing force to prevent a
fate similar to that of the erstwhile Soviet Union
overtaking the country.
In Chinese perception,
the collapse of the Soviet Union could be attributed to
Mikhail Gorbachev's mistimed priority to political
liberalization without first achieving economic
modernization and prosperity and the failure to
substitute a new uniting force in the place of the
dissolving communist ideology. They are determined not
to commit this mistake in China.
Keeping in view
the Chinese sensitivities to anything appearing as
external pressure or containment, the emphasis in
policymaking in the region is not on how to counter the
growing Chinese power, which is an inevitable reality,
and the reassertion of its nationalism, but on how to
manage and moderate it so that it remains a force for
the benefit of the region.
Managing the emerging
Chinese giant has inevitably meant welcoming it to
regional and international for a for greater
interaction; and encouraging the flow of investments and
trade to it in the hope that a China dependent on
external elements for its prosperity, stability and
strength would develop a stake in regional peace and
stability and in maintaining harmonious relations with
its neighbors.
Would a prosperous and
self-confident China forget what it looks upon as the
historic wrongs of the past and focus more on the
future? One hopes it would, but one should not overlook
the Chinese trait of viewing mutual accommodation as
eventual accommodation on its terms.
However,
Chinese external policies are rarely static. They keep
constantly evolving, taking into consideration the
changed circumstances of the moment and its dynamic
perceptions of its national interests. Nowhere is the
impact of such evolution on its policymaking more
evident than in respect of its relations with Pakistan.
Giving to the Pakistani armed forces a feeling
of psychological parity with India and keeping India
preoccupied with Pakistan are still important objectives
of Chinese policymaking in the South Asian region. It
was these objectives, which have made China
clandestinely help Pakistan in acquiring military
nuclear and missile delivery capability, disregarding
Indian concerns and US threats to impose sanctions
against Chinese companies.
It was again these
objectives that made China help Pakistan in reinforcing
the capability of its air force after that capability
stood in danger of degradation after the US sanctions
under the Pressler Amendment since 1990. It was again
these objectives which made China organize an emergency
supply of missiles, aircraft and military spare parts
for Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway last year,
after India mobilized its troops and moved them to the
Pakistan border following the abortive attack by
Pakistan-backed terrorists on the Indian Parliament
House in December 2001.
It is again these
objectives that are behind China's recent decisions to
help Pakistan in developing the Gwadar port on the
Mekran Coast in Balochistan in order to reduce its
economic and strategic dependence on the vulnerable
Karachi port; strengthening its naval capability to
overcome the deficiencies noticed during the
mobilization of last year; and making full use of its
share of water under the Indus Water Treaty for
hydro-electric purposes in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in
order to make it even more difficult for India than at
present to seek a review of the treaty in India's favor.
While China's core objectives to keep India
confronted with a credible military threat from Pakistan
in order to reduce its strategic maneuverability and to
hamper its efforts to catch up with the Chinese economy
remain unaltered, its political stance on Indo-Pakistan
issues has been evolving in a direction less detrimental
to India. It has been showing greater sensitivity to
India's views and concerns on the Kashmir issue. The
automatic reflex of the past of supporting Pakistan on
Indo-Pakistan bilateral issues is less evident now.
There have been positive developments in India's
relations with China since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China
in 1988. The Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border
problem has been meeting periodically. Though there may
not have been any significant progress on substantive
strategic issues of concern to India, the JWG meetings
and other bilateral interactions have led to important
confidence-building measures on the border. The two
countries have not allowed the persisting border problem
to come in the way of the development of relations in
other fields. Bilateral trade has increased fourfold
since the last visit of an Indian prime minister (P V
Narasimha Rao) to China in 1993. Subjects such as
collaboration in the software industry, other joint
ventures and encouraging investment flows into each
other's economy, which would have been avoided in the
past on grounds of security, are now discussed with
growing interest and followed up.
China's White
Paper on Defense of 1995 referred to the 1993
Sino-Indian Agreement on the maintenance of peace and
tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as an
example of how bilateral problems could be handled
rationally.
Despite such positive developments,
one should not overlook that Tibet continues to be a
major area of concern to China. It has been paying more
attention to the economic development of Tibet. Even
independent reports speak of a change for the better in
its economic landscape. Investments for improving the
communications infrastructure, developing a tourism
industry and improving the quality of life of the people
have brought benefits to the people.
The
economic prosperity has not helped the Chinese to
eradicate the influence of the Dalai Lama and the
Buddhist religion on the people. Despite this, at
present, they feel reasonably confident of their
continuing hold over Tibet. Their recent invitation to
the representatives of the Dalai Lama to visit China for
talks is reflective of this confidence.
However,
if the situation in Tibet deteriorates in the future
threatening the Chinese position, the presence and
activities of the Dalai Lama and his followers in Indian
territory could again become a major issue of
contention, leading to the Chinese rekindling the border
to exercise pressure on India.
So long as Tibet
is not finally and totally pacified to their
satisfaction with the Dalai Lama out of the way, China
may not agree to any substantive progress on the border.
It would be inadvisable to believe that Chinese appetite
for territory at Indian expense has been satiated and
that it is only a question of time before an agreement
is reached on the border with only minor adjustments
from the LAC in various sectors.
Media
speculation speaks of a welcome change in the attitude
of China toward accepting India's claim of Sikkim being
an integral part of India. One hopes this is true, but
one doubts whether it could be. It is not at all certain
that the Chinese have reconciled themselves to the
existing position in the Sikkim and Arunachel Pradesh
sectors. Should anti-India political ferment develop in
those areas in future because of alienation of the local
population from the government of India, the Chinese may
be only too ready to exploit it to reinforce their
claims.
The present policy of constructive
engagement with China, which was initiated by Rajiv
Gandhi, has evolved satisfactorily despite the temporary
hiccups after India's nuclear tests (Pokhran-II) of May
1998, but the positive results achieved so far should
not lull us into thinking that we may have to worry less
about China in the future. Chinese policies toward India
and its neighbors, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, would and should continue to
be of major concern to India's policy-makers, whether
they openly admit it or not.
Similarly, India's
policies toward China, and particularly Tibet, and its
relations with the United States would continue to be of
major concern to China, even though it may not openly
say so. China had always suspected that despite its
overt policy of non-alignment, India had been over the
years covertly collaborating with the US to monitor
China. US media reports in the last decade of a possible
India-US hand in the Khampa revolt of the 1950s in Tibet
and the details given in a recent book Spies in the
Himalayas of an alleged joint project of the US
Central Intelligence Agency and India's Intelligence
Bureau to keep track of nuclear and missile developments
in China would have only added to the Chinese concerns.
India need not be unduly worried over this. If continued
cooperation with the United States is considered
necessary in our national interests, we need not shirk
from it, but without giving a wrong impression that we
are ganging up against China.
China does not
heed our concerns over its clandestine collusion with
Pakistan, which poses serious threats to our security.
Why should we be unduly sensitive to its concerns over
our cooperation with the US, which is motivated more by
our need to protect ourselves than by any desire to
hamper China's emergence as a major power?
Vaypayee will be in China at two important
points in its transition from a developing to a
developed country aspiring to overtake Japan and catch
up with the US by 2020, economically, militarily and
technologically. Its aspirations of catching up with the
United States militarily and technologically may remain
pipe dreams, but its catching up with the US
economically is within the realms of possibility.
The first transition, which is already under
way, is economic. It marks the beginning of the
transition of the coastal regions of Guangdong, Fujian
and Shanghai, which were the first to open up their
economy to the outside world, from a low-tech (textiles,
leather articles, sports goods etc) to a medium and
hi-tech economy (computer hardware, software etc) and
from a predominantly manufacturing to the services
sector. It also marks the beginning of the transition of
the interior regions of China (central and western),
which had until now not benefited from the opening-up,
from a predominantly agricultural and mineral-producing
economy to a manufacturing (in essence low- and
medium-tech) economy.
The economic transition is
also marked by a vigorous modification of the
manufacturing sector in order to weed out unprofitable
state-owned enterprises. Before China opened up in 1979,
most of its manufacturing industries were located in the
interior areas for reasons of security. Thus, the
modification already under way and the weeding out of
the inefficient state-owned enterprises are likely to
have socially a more destabilizing effect on the
interior and outlying provinces than in the coastal
regions.
This economic transition is being
accompanied by a transition in the quality and expertise
of the political leadership, which would manage it.
Between 1979 and 2002, when the opening-up of the
coastal regions received priority over that of the
interior regions, the leaders, who were chosen by the
party to manage this, came to Beijing after having made
a name as successful political and economic managers in
the coastal belt. Typical examples are those of former
president Jiang Zemin and former prime minister Zhu
Rongji. They made their names as managers in Shanghai
before being shifted to Beijing.
Many of the
personalities of the new leadership, which assumed
office in March, seem to have won their spurs as
political and economic managers in the interior areas
and understand them better than their predecessors. A
typical example is that of Hu Jintao, who has succeeded
Jiang as the president and party chief. He pacified
Tibet between 1988 and 1992 after the youth unrest of
the middle 1980s. The new leadership is more law and
order and political stability oriented than the
preceding. It is as much wedded to economic reforms as
its predecessors, but is expected to be cautious in
implementing them in the interior areas, lest there be
uncontrollable unrest and resulting instability.
In the past, Hu was known as a faithful follower
of the party line and not as a policy innovator and also
as an over-cautious man. As a British analyst
sarcastically remarked last year, he had never mistimed
a step in his political career because he never took
any. That is how he managed to rise to the top despite
periodic speculation whether he would do so ever since
Deng Xiaoping reportedly chose him as the No 2 to Jiang.
It remains to be seen whether he lives true to this
reputation or breaks away from it and takes China to
greater heights.
B Raman is additional
secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, government of
India, and currently director, Institute for Topical
Studies, Chennai, and convenor, Advisory Committee,
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter.
E-mail: corde@vsnl.com
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