| |
COMMENTARY
New angle on the US,
Pakistan, India triangle
By Ehsan
Ahrari
When Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf
visited the United States this week, President George W
Bush gave him a reception at the presidential retreat,
Camp David, to symbolize his recognition of Pakistan as
a special friend. Pakistan was offered a US$3 billion
economic package to be divided evenly over five years.
But the long-standing ambivalence between Washington and
Islamabad still persists.
Given the primacy that
the Bush administration assigns to the global "war
terrorism", Pakistan is a frontline state, and a loyal
one to boot. Bush is grateful to Musharraf for his
intense campaign against al-Qaeda. Even though it is
also very much in Pakistan's interests to continue its
own endeavors to root out that terrorist organization -
since its activism remains an ominous threat to its
emergence as a moderate Islamic democracy - Musharraf
has shown ample courage by not letting up in that
cooperation at a time when anti-Americanism has been
quite persistent in his country.
The Bush
administration could have been more generous toward
Pakistan, especially in terms of making its economic
assistance less conditional, and even by selling it the
highly coveted package of 71 F-16s. However, the US
remains wary about the durability of Musharraf's
commitment to fight terrorism. The increased clout of
Islamists in Pakistan is capturing the attention of
Washington decision makers. Besides, it is always
befuddling to American intelligence whether Islamists
and government are two separate entities competing for
power, or are the flip sides of the same coin. That
might be the American thinking for conducting an annual
review of that commitment before continuing to assist.
More important, the Bush administration wants to
ensure that Pakistan has, indeed, ceased cooperation
with North Korea in its nuclear weapons program.
Regarding North Korea-Pakistani cooperation, the
national security of Islamabad clashes directly with US
national security interests. No US president has
assigned a higher significance to nuclear
nonproliferation than George W Bush. As much as he is
appreciative of Pakistan's cooperation with his "war on
terrorism", he is not willing to soft-peddle his
disapproval of the Pakistan-North Korea nuclear and
missile connection.
Pakistan is fully cognizant
of America's ongoing conflict with North Korea; however,
it must also maintain its own strategic competition with
a technologically superior arch rival in its
neighborhood - India. In this regard, North Korea has
not hesitated to supply its advanced Scud missile
technology to Pakistan, especially at a time when the
Chinese leadership is undergoing a process of
transition. Consequently, it is not very clear to
Islamabad how forthcoming the rulers in Beijing will be
in sharing their missile know-how with them. Therein
lies the Pakistani dilemma: it does not really want to
foreclose the option of cooperating with North Korea,
but it is not likely to have much of a choice.
As the US-India strategic partnership becomes
institutionalized, Pakistan's threat perception
regarding India's heightened military proficiency -
stemming from military-to-military contacts and joint
exercises between India and US air forces and navies -
also heightens, thereby further widening the gap between
the armed forces of the two South Asian rivals. It is
frustrating for Pakistan that, while it is going all the
way in ameliorating America's threat perceptions related
to al-Qaeda, Washington has remained seemingly oblivious
to Pakistan's own anxieties related to the US-India
strategic partnership.
The US also remains
unsure about the security of nuclear command and control
in Pakistan. As a nameless US official observed,
Pakistan "worries us the most because it's the only
nuclear power in danger of falling into the wrong
hands", and also because it has become a major source of
proliferation.
There is little doubt that the
security-related anxieties of the US and Pakistan are
genuine and deserve responsible considerations from both
sides, since they are also serious partners in the
battle against terrorism. The US ought to seriously
consider broadening the scope of the US-India strategic
partnership by including Pakistan in it. Such a
suggestion is based on the rationale that a weak and
paranoid Pakistan may look for avenues to enhance its
security, no matter how "irrational" or "illegitimate"
such avenues are envisioned by the US. Besides, it is
better for a nuclear Pakistan to be part and parcel of a
US-led strategic cooperation than belong to one to which
North Korea is a party. Imagine the vast possibilities
if Pakistan becomes part of the US-India strategic
cooperation. First, both India and Pakistan will find
ample reason to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Second, the
US may also use such an expanded strategic cooperation
to enhance the domestic security of both South Asian
nations' command and control, aimed at foreclosing all
ominous potentials for unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons or nuclear accidents.
It has been stated
that Pakistan and the US might not shed their mutual
ambivalence until the former becomes a democracy. By
incorporating Pakistan as a third member of the South
Asian strategic partnership, the US may also be able to
push it toward democracy. Only then will it stop being
not only a "wrong" nuclear actor, but also a
proliferator.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic
analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
