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Ominous Indian shift on
Tibet
By B Raman
In its
anxiety to further improve relations with China and to
wean Beijing away from Islamabad, has the government of
India taken the first step towards writing off the Dalai
Lama and the Tibetans and abandoning any role by India
in helping to preserve the unique Tibetan culture and
Tibetan school of Buddhism?
This question first
arose in the minds of Tibet-watchers after the recent
incident in which, perhaps for the first time, the
government of Nepal complied with a Chinese demand to
detain and hand over 19 Tibetan refugees fleeing
perceived persecution in their traditional homeland,
which is recognized by India and the rest of the world
as a part of China. Many, including this writer,
suspected that Kathmandu might not have taken a serious
and troubling step like this without a nod from New
Delhi.
The US reportedly expressed its concern
and unhappiness over this action of the Nepal
government. Despite this, there are reports that similar
action against another group of refugees is under way.
This question becomes even more troubling after
the six-day high-profile visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
the Indian Prime Minister, to China from June 22. The
visit, which took place a year before parliamentary
elections in India, was marked by much hype, apparently
with an eye on the polls. "Historic", "path-breaking", "
a new beginning" "never before have such productive
discussions been held" were some of the expressions used
by the spinmasters of the government and dutifully
played up by the embedded journalists who had
accompanied the premier.
To find more objective
and critical accounts, one has to search for the reports
of journalists who were not accorded this privilege and
honor and hence traveled independently, or those who
stayed behind in India and viewed the visit from there.
The fact that some of this kind felt troubled by the way
their fraternity went overboard in helping the
government to project the visit as "something like this
has never happened before" would be evident from the
comments of Inder Malhotra, a highly respected senior
journalist, who has covered Sino-Indian relations right
from the first decade of India's independence, starting
in 1947.
He wrote in The Hindu, a prestigious
national newspaper, on June 26, "As has happened all too
often in the past and is most certain to be repeated in
the future, the media contingent accompanying him went
into a tizzy of exaggeration and hyperbole."
Shorn of the hype, the outcome of the visit is
partly disconcerting, partly questionable and partly
gratifying. The disconcerting aspect relates to Sikkim
and Tibet. Until the middle of the 1970s, Sikkim used to
be a protectorate of India, which had overall
responsibility for its defense and foreign relations.
Barring this, the territory enjoyed some autonomy under
a ruler called the Chogyal. He got married to an
American student called Hope Cook, who had come to
Sikkim ostensibly for research. The Indian intelligence
and Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister, viewed her
as a mole of the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
allegedly planted on him to steer him in the direction
of independence for his territory.
One could
never prove whether or not she was a CIA mole, but it
was a fact that he came under her fascinating spell and
started moving in the direction of independence. He and
his wife, for reasons unconnected with India, became
unpopular and a movement against them resulted in their
overthrow and the territory becoming a state of India,
like any other state, thereby ending its special status.
Chinese intelligence, too, was as much concerned
as its Indian counterpart over her presence and
activities from Sikkim, which is on China's border.
Despite this, Beijing strongly condemned what it
described as the Indian annexation of Sikkim. It viewed
it as one more instance of Indian "hegemonism" in
action.
China had never claimed Sikkim as its
territory and never disputed its pre-1975 status as an
Indian protectorate. Thus, Sikkim is a non-issue in the
long pending border dispute between the two countries.
Beijing's apparent objection was to India's ending its
special status and making it an integral part of India.
Until - even after Vajpayee's visit - it has not
recognized it as an integral part of India, but Vajpayee
has claimed that the first steps towards such Chinese
recognition have been taken with an agreement called a
memorandum concluded during the visit for the resumption
of border trade through Sikkim.
The first step
towards the resumption of trans-border trade was taken
by the two countries through a memorandum signed in
December 1991, which designated certain points for the
trade and through a protocol for regulating it signed in
July 1992. The points identified under that memorandum
for border trade did not include the Sikkim sector.
It is said that in 1997 China took the
initiative in suggesting the resumption of traditional
trade through Sikkim too. The matter was under
negotiation between the two countries since then. There
are two possible routes for the border trade through
Sikkim - via the Nathu La pass and via Jalep La in
southeastern Sikkim. Before the Sino-Indian war of 1962,
most of the border trade took place through Jalep La.
From Jalep La, the Chinese/Tibetan traders used to enter
Kalimpong in West Bengal, where China had been allowed
by the Jawaharlal Nehru government to set up a trade
post, which was supervised by a Chinese consulate in
Kolkata (Calcutta).
Following the deterioration
of relations between the two countries, which led to the
war of 1962, the government of India ordered the Chinese
trade post at Kalimpong and the consulate at Kolkata to
close down. The Indian intelligence suspected them of
indulging in espionage and subversion. Till today, no
government in New Delhi has agreed to their being
re-opened, despite the improvement of bilateral
relations, reportedly because of continued misgivings
over the wisdom of such action.
It is said that
the original Chinese proposal was for the resumption of
the border trade through the pre-1962 Jalep La/Kalimpong
route or through both the Nathu La and Jalep La routes.
Apparently, the government of India agreed only to the
Nathu La route, which would not require the re-opening
of the Chinese trade post at Kalimpong.
In the
buildup that preceded the visit of the prime minister to
China, this impending memorandum on the resumption of
border trade through Sikkim was projected as a major
breakthrough of great political significance since it
amounted to a Chinese recognition of Sikkim as an
integral part of India. In my earlier article titled Understanding China:
The view from India, written before the prime
minister's visit, I expressed my doubts about the
validity of this projection.
Even as Vajpayee
was in Beijing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman
punctured the Indian euphoria by clarifying that it was
nothing of the sort. He described the Sikkim question as
an "enduring legacy" of the past and said that "it
cannot be solved overnight". Despite this, New Delhi has
maintained that the memorandum amounted to a de facto
recognition of the Indian position by China, even though
it might not amount to a de jure recognition. In support
of this, it has been pointed out that the preamble of
the memorandum talks of the two countries being
"desirous of opening another pass on the India-China
border" for border trade. If Sikkim's border with Tibet
constitutes India's border with China, the inference is
that Sikkim is a integral part of India. So the argument
goes, definitely with some validity.
China's
renewed interest in a presence in Sikkim, which resumed
trade would involve, and, ultimately in Kalimpong, has
economic as well as political motives. The economic
motive is obvious and needs no explanation. The
political motive arises from the fact that in addition
to the route through Nepal, Tibetan political refugees
fleeing perceived persecution have preferred the Jalep
La-Kalimpong route. The more sensitive refugees, who had
held offices of authority in Tibet, had avoided the
Nepalese route, as they were not sure even in the past
of how the Nepalese authorities would handle them. When
the Dalai Lama and his entourage fled Tibet in the
1950s, they used the route through Kalimpong.
The Chinese administration in Lhasa had always
been anxious to plug these routes of escape for the
political refugees. With the Nepalese route now
apparently ruled out, the only safe route which remains
for them is through Sikkim. By signing this memorandum,
has the government of India consciously or unconsciously
helped the Chinese in their efforts to plug this too?
Enhanced Chinese presence in this sector, which
resumption of trade would involve, could have a
deterrent effect on refugees wanting to flee Tibet
through the Sikkim route.
The over-attention
during the visit to Chinese sensitivities over the
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China with little
attention to Indian sensitivities either over Sikkim or
over China's nuclear and missile supply relationship
with Pakistan is equally troubling. According to the
prime minister, as quoted in the media, he did not raise
the Pakistan issue at all during the talks.
A
joint declaration signed by the two prime ministers
says, "The Indian side recognizes that the Tibet
Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the
People's Republic of China and reiterates that it does
not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political
activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its
appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that
it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at
splitting China and bringing about independence of
Tibet. The Indian side recalled that India was among the
first countries to recognize that there is one China and
its one China policy remains unaltered."
The
Chinese did not hesitate to emphasize that there is only
one China, of which Tibet is a part, and insist that
this be included in the joint declaration. Is it not the
responsibility of any government in New Delhi to
similarly emphasize that there is only one India, of
which Sikkim is a part, and insist on this being
included in the statement too. Our prime minister's
apparent acceptance of a Chinese oral assurance of a
change in their Sikkim policy in the future, without
insisting on this being recorded in writing, brings to
mind Indira Gandhi's acceptance in 1972 of Pakistan's
Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto's oral assurance that he would
accept the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as the
international border after preparing public opinion in
Pakistan to accept it, without reducing his commitment
to writing in the Shimla Agreement. He subsequently
denied giving any such assurance. We never learn from
our follies.
The India-China (Panchsheel)
Agreement on Tibet signed on April 29, 1954, had
referred to Tibet as the "Tibet region of China".
Thereafter, when the then Indian prime minister Rajiv
Gandhi visited China, a Sino-Indian joint press
communique issued on December 23, 1988, said that "Tibet
is an autonomous region of China". It said, "The Indian
side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy
of the government of India that Tibet is an autonomous
region of China and that anti-China political activities
by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil."
Strictly speaking, New Delhi is right in saying
that substantively there has been no change in India's
position on Tibet. What is new and troubling is the much
stronger language used now and the Chinese insistence on
this stronger formulation. In a media briefing, a
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman even went further
than this and claimed that the Indian prime minister had
accepted that the TAR is an "inalienable" part of China,
but this expression is not found in the joint
declaration.
Among the troubling questions that
come to mind are:
The Tibetan exiles have always alleged that the
present TAR is smaller than the Tibetan region first
occupied by China. According to them, part of the
Tibetan territory was separated by the Chinese after
occupation and merged with adjoining provinces. What was
left was named the TAR. By accepting the new
formulation, has India consciously or unconsciously
legitimized the Chinese action in doing so?
Will India's apparent yielding to Chinese pressure
for a stronger formulation mark the beginning of further
Chinese pressure on India to stop the non-religious
activities of the Dalai Lama's setup in Dharamsala in
India?
Will it cut the ground from under the feet of the
Dalai Lama in his efforts to achieve genuine autonomy
for the homeland of the Tibetans and protection of their
culture and religion through talks with Beijing?
Apparently anticipating criticism back home of
the new formulation, the prime minister has claimed that
the Tibetans were consulted during the negotiations. The
Hindu of June 28 has reported as follows, "The prime
minister revealed that 'Tibetan friends' had been
consulted by the government prior to his tour and even
during the course of the China visit. 'They are
satisfied with India's spin'."(The prime minister's
words as claimed by the paper) What spin, one wonders. A
spin on the Chinese or Indian people?
While
Dharamsala has not yet come out with any official
reaction, a web site maintained by Tibetan exiles abroad
has described Vajpayee's discussions with the Chinese on
Tibet as "semantic diplomacy" and said, "While political
scientists may be able to explain the implication of the
difference between these formulations, the statement
contained in the joint declaration seems to be an
attempt to meet Chinese desire to legitimize control
over Tibet. However, the fact that there was hot
discussion on the formulation seems to be clear from
leaked reports released by Xinhua in which China talked
about India recognizing Tibet as an 'inalienable' part
of China. The joint declaration does not contain any
such reference'."
The uncertain aspect of the
outcome relates to the agreement to "each appoint a
special representative to explore from the political
perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the
framework of a boundary settlement". Is this just
another layer of cosmetics to conceal the lack of
significant progress in the ongoing negotiations at the
official and expert level to find a solution to the
border dispute, or does it mark an innovative mechanism
to expedite the search for a solution in a time-bound
manner?
The prime minister has been quoted as
saying, "The kind of talks that I have had on the
boundary issue during this visit have perhaps never
taken place before." Only time can say how far his
optimism is justified.
The gratifying part of
the visit relates to the various measures agreed to for
further promoting bilateral trade and strengthening
economic cooperation. This is the non-controversial part
of the outcome and needs no comment.
B
Raman is Additional Secretary (ret), Cabinet
Secretariat, Government of India, and presently
director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai; former
member of the National Security Advisory Board of the
Government of India. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. He was
also head of the counter-terrorism division of the
Research & Analysis Wing, India's external
intelligence agency, from 1988 to August, 1994.
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