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A
wary eye on Pakistan
By Praveen Swami
Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf
watched stone-faced as United States President George W
Bush announced a meagre US$3 billion aid package for
Pakistan, and shot down that country's demands for new
F-16 combat jets. It opened him up to a barrage of
criticism from his domestic critics, Islamist and
otherwise, who charged that he had given away too much
to the US and received little or nothing in return. Four
days after the Bush-Musharraf press conference at Camp
David, two fidayeen (suicide) terrorists cut the
fence protecting the perimeter of the 36 Infantry
Brigade's camp in Sanjwan, on the outskirts of Jammu.
The terrorists made their way to a barracks and shot
dead a dozen soldiers, most of them in their sleep.
Clear cut? Not quite
Two major
explanations have been put out for the timing of the
Sanjwan suicide attack. First, it took place on the day
President A P J Abdul Kalam was due to visit the
Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, a political and religious
signifier of unequalled import in the Kashmir Valley.
Second, commentators speculated, the attack could have
been intended to signal that Musharraf simply "could not
contain" jihadi groups until India and the US gave
larger concessions to Pakistan. Commentators in Pakistan
pointed out that even the US Central Command had
conceded that Pakistan had lost $10 billion by allowing
the use of its air and land to US forces in the
Afghanistan campaign. Former dictator Zia ul-Haq, it was
pointed out, had secured aid worth $4.2 billion and 40
F-16s for his acquiescence to the US's war against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, while former premier
Benazir Bhutto secured $4.6 billion and 60 F-16s for a
similar stance.
Both explanations are plausible,
but not wholly satisfying. For one, the thesis that the
Sanjwan attack was intended to send a signal to India
rests on the assumption that jihadi groups can strike at
will, and at intensity levels of their choosing. That
simply isn't the case. Since January, seven attempted
fidayeen attacks have been reported in Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K), six of them on security force
installations. In only one incident was the number of
security personnel killed greater than the number of
terrorists eliminated during the response to the attack.
This was on April 25, when a Border Security Force (BSF)
camp near Bandipora was attacked, leading to the loss of
three soldiers and the elimination of two terrorists. In
several instances - an assault on the 24 Rashtriya
Rifles camp at Dragmulla, Kupwara, on April 29, or a May
1 attack on the BSF near Tral - the attackers were shot
with no security force losses at all. In one instance in
February, the army intercepted and killed Peshawar
resident Rizwan Khan even before he could commence his
planned suicide strike near Jammu.
Put crudely,
setting off bombs on buses or massacring villagers are
time tested and relatively more reliable means of
"sending signals": fidayeen attacks, for all
their drama, just aren't as sure or effective. Over the
years, Indian security forces have developed fairly
well-drilled systems for dealing with suicide attacks,
and the figures show that these have generally operated
with success. An April 26 attempt on the Radio Kashmir
building in Srinagar tried to mimic the tactics adopted
in the attack on India's parliament by using an
explosives-laden car with an official beacon. Central
Reserve Police Force guards, however, refused to allow
the car into the complex, compelling the terrorists to
detonate outside the building. Three terrorists were
killed, with none of their objectives achieved. That
fidayeen tactics are loosing their shock value is
also evident from the fact that, while 2001 registered
28 fidayeen attacks, the number fell to just 10
in 2002.
An internal investigation has been
ordered to find out just why the perimeter guards in
Sanjwan were unable to detect the terrorists who cut
their fence, but it is clear the lapse is not part of a
general pattern. What does seem probable is that the
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which is believed by intelligence
officials to have carried out the attack, used its
not-inconsiderable assets in Jammu to plan the attack
and provide shelter to the fidayeen for some time
in the vicinity of the Sanjwan army camp. Just last
June, Jammu and Kashmir police arrested Pakistani
national Zulfikar Rana, who also used the name Mir
Husain. A top Lashkar operative, Rana had purchased a
large, expensive home in Jammu's Ustad Mohalla area, a
short walk from the Sanjwan camp. He spent large sums
acquiring fake identification and "state subject"
papers. Posing as an inconspicuous businessman, Rana ran
a broad Lashkar network operating in the Rajouri, Poonch
and Doda districts.
But the fact remains that
the Sanjwan attack has shattered a brief lull that set
in after the end of April, when the India-Pakistan peace
process seemed briefly to be gathering momentum. Now,
Musharraf may well acquiesce in a sharp escalation in
hostilities, hoping to convince the US that he can only
rein in Islamist groups if India makes significant
progress towards concessions on Jammu and Kashmir.
Musharraf's persistent tactic has been to make covert
alliances with the jihadis, and use the threat that they
present to seek concessions from the US. Now, however,
there is some evidence that the jihadis are starting to
resent being used, and asking for payback. In a June 29
television interview, top Islamist leader Fazl ul-Rahman
described the general as "the American ambassador".
There are also signs of dissent in the Pakistan
army. Some reports suggest that Lieutenant-General
Mohammad Aziz Khan, a senior military figure known for
his Islamist leanings, who was kicked upstairs to the
mostly ceremonial position of chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee under US pressure in 2001, has
now begun to campaign against Musharraf. Accompanied by
retired Major General Mohammad Anwar Khan, the president
of the Azad Kashmir region of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir
(which excludes the Northern Areas), Aziz has been
holding meetings in the remote tribal regions of
northern Pakistan, delivering speeches that are
"virulently critical of India and Hinduism" and that
"also give hints of his disapproval of Musharraf's
refusal to shed the post of COAS [Chief of the Army
Staff]". The Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),
which Musharraf helped bring to power, is now starting
to growl at its creator, and is demanding that the
general renounce either his role as Pakistan's president
or as COAS.
It is much too early to say, of
course, whether the Musharraf-mullah honeymoon is truly
approaching an end. What is clear, however, is that
Pakistan is once again in flux - and, as a consequence,
Jammu and Kashmir is more than likely soon to be
subjected to uncomfortably "interesting times".
Praveen Swami, Special Correspondent,
Frontline
Published with permission from the
South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
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