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Deep roots to Pakistan's sectarian
terror
By
Kanchan Lakshman
Even as President General
Pervez Musharraf was addressing a news conference in
Paris to round off his 18-day trip to the United States
and Europe, at least 53 persons were killed and 57
others injured when three armed terrorists, including a
suspected suicide bomber, attacked a Shi'ite mosque in
Quetta, capital of the southwestern Balochistan
province, during Friday prayers on July 4.
Hundreds
of worshippers were praying at the mosque, the Jama
Masjid-o-Imambargah Kalaan Isna Ashri, when the
terrorists opened indiscriminate fire with automatic
weapons and set off explosive devices. The head of the
Federal Interior Ministry's national crisis management
cell, Brigadier Javed Cheema, said that at least one of
the assailants was a suicide bomber as he had grenades
tied to his body and was blown up.
The massacre,
the first sectarian attack in Quetta in which a suicide
bomber has been used, appeared to be an effort to ignite
a cycle of violence between Sunnis and Shi'ites (Sunnis
constitute 77 percent of Pakistan's population and
Shi'ites 20 percent) and destabilize the country, said
officials. Pakistan has witnessed a long history of
violence between these sects, most of which has been
perpetrated by groups that emerged in the 1980s during
General Zia ul-Haq's rule.
Between 1989 and 2003
(until July 6), 1,468 persons have been killed and 3,370
others injured in some 1,813 sectarian incidents in
Pakistan, according to the Institute for Conflict
Management database. While no group has claimed
responsibility for the latest massacre, members of the
Shi'ite community have predictably blamed "Sunni
extremists". Large numbers of Shi'ites have protested on
the streets after the killings, attacking government
property and setting ablaze vehicles. Curfew has been
proclaimed, with troops patrolling the streets of Quetta
and other cities in an effort to prevent any retaliatory
attacks. The latest attack unambiguously suggests that
Islamist sectarian extremists, many of whom went
underground after a prolonged crackdown during which
several top leaders were arrested or killed in 2002, are
resurfacing, despite official efforts at containment.
Musharraf, on his return to Islamabad, condemned
the attacks, declaring, "Whether they are religious
extremists or sectarian extremists they are ignorant and
wild." The incident comes in the wake of increasing
Islamist fundamentalist/extremist opposition to his
regime's current engagement with the United States.
Islamists may have intended to send a message regarding
their uneasiness with Musharraf's current agenda. Such
incidents also indicate that the jihadis retain
substantial striking capacities, negating Musharraf's
"feel-good message" in the US that al-Qaeda and its
affiliates were on the run. While the immediate
provocation for the massacre is still unclear, Federal
information minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed said that
sectarian terrorists could have been retaliating against
recent arrests: "In Punjab and in Sindh there was a
crackdown ... the day before yesterday [July 2], their
important people were all arrested."
The
incident in Quetta, a city affected by relatively few
sectarian killings, suggests an extension of the
sectarian strife in Pakistan. Punjab province and
Pakistan's commercial capital, Karachi, in Sindh
province, have been the primary hubs of sectarian
violence over the past two decades. However, the two
major attacks, including the latest one, during this
year have occurred in Quetta. On June 8, 13 trainee
police personnel belonging to the local Hazara community
of the Shi'ite sect were killed and eight others injured
at Sariab Road in Quetta. There is also a tribal
dimension to the Quetta attacks. A majority of the
Shi'ite victims are Hazaras, hailing from Afghanistan
but who have been living in Quetta for generations.
However, officials in the area have said that the Afghan
origin of the Hazaras is only a coincidence. Quetta,
which lies close to the border with Afghanistan's
Kandahar province, has been a hotbed of Islamist
extremist activities for years.
In sharp
contrast to his seeming ambivalence to Islamist
terrorist activities elsewhere, Musharraf's intent has
been unambiguous as far as domestic sectarian terrorism
is concerned. His "war against terror" has vigorously
targeted sectarian terrorist groups, and has had
substantial impact domestically. Last year witnessed a
marked decrease in the fatality index of sectarian
violence with 121 persons killed and 257 others injured
in 63 incidents, as compared to 261 persons killed and
495 others injured in 154 incidents during 2001. Among
the major incidents of sectarian violence in 2002 was
the February 26 attack at the Shah Najaf Mosque in
Rawalpindi in which 11 persons were killed and over 19
others injured when three terrorists opened fire on a
group of approximately 40 worshippers. In another major
attack, seven women and five children were killed, while
25 others were injured in a bomb explosion in the
women's section of a Shi'ite religious ceremony at
Bhakkar in Lahore on April 25.
The relative
reduction in casualties in sectarian violence is
primarily traced to the fact that the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ), the main Sunni group, was vigorously targeted by
state agencies following its January 12 proscription
last year. A significant number of its cadres, including
the top leadership, were either arrested or killed
during various encounters. Approximately 26 LeJ cadres,
including many top leaders, were killed and 32 of them
arrested during 2002. Those killed included Riaz Basra
and Asif Ramzi, two top LeJ leaders. Basra, Pakistan's
most wanted sectarian terrorist, was killed along with
three of his accomplices during an encounter in Mailsi
on May 14. He is reported to have established a training
camp at Sarobi near Kabul in Afghanistan where recruits
from Pakistan were trained in the use of firearms and
explosives for carrying out sectarian attacks in
Pakistan and against the Taliban's Afghan opposition
(the erstwhile Northern Alliance).
Asif Ramzi, a
most-wanted LeJ terrorist and a proclaimed offender for
over 12 years, was a key link between local Islamist
terrorists and the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He was wanted
for involvement in more than 87 cases of murder, attacks
on embassies and other terrorist acts, and had a price
of Rp 3 million (US$52,000)on his head. US Federal
Bureau of Investigation officials suspected that Ramzi
manufactured the bombs used in the May 8, 2002 blast
outside the Sheraton Hotel. He was among the seven
persons killed in the December 19 explosion at a
chemical warehouse in the Korangi area of Karachi.
Akram Lahori, another front-ranking LeJ
terrorist involved in 38 cases of sectarian killings in
Sindh, was arrested in Karachi on June 17, 2002. After
Riaz Basra's death, Lahori was acting as the LeJ chief
and he had himself monitored and taken part in sectarian
killings in Karachi, where he was residing for the
preceding one and a half years. Lahori, arrested along
with five accomplices from Orangi Town in Karachi,
reportedly confessed that dozens of the group's
activists had been prepared for suicide missions under
the guidance of top al-Qaeda leaders holed up in
different parts of the country. In the continuing
crackdown, on May 29, Qari Abdul Hayee, the succeeding
acting LeJ chief, was arrested during a surprise raid
conducted in the Muzaffargarh district.
Despite
these various reversals, however, the group appears to
have retained a substantial capacity to strike, and it
has emerged as a key provider of logistical support and
personnel to the remnants of the al-Qaeda and Taliban
currently present in Pakistan. Indeed, many LeJ cadres
are reported to have joined various front outfits of the
al-Qaeda that emerged in the aftermath of the January 12
proscription. The LeJ was also said to be involved in a
majority of the attacks on Christians and Western
targets in Pakistan during 2002.
Among the
others, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni
group, and the Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP), a
Shi'ite extremist group, lay low temporarily in the
aftermath of their proscription. They did not, however,
alter their organizational structure and, though their
cadres went underground for some time, openly resumed
their political activities after a brief hibernation.
The SSP even re-commenced publishing its official organ,
the monthly Khilafat-i-Rashida, which it had
discontinued immediately after its proscription. It also
ran a highly effective electoral campaign for its
candidate, Maulana Azam Tariq, who won a parliamentary
seat from the Jhang constituency in Punjab province in
the October 2002 general elections. Similarly, while
retaining its existing organizational infrastructure,
the TJP joined the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) under a
different name - the Tehrik Millat-i-Islami Pakistan.
The central command of this group also formed new groups
to function as front outfits. TJP office-bearers were
reportedly accommodated in the new Azadari Council and
Haideri Foundation.
At the other end, the
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a militant
Wahhabi tribal group which operates primarily in the
tribal belt, such as in Swat and the adjoining districts
of the North-West Frontier Province, has, according to
recent reports, suffered the most in the countrywide
crackdown on Islamist extremist organizations with a
domestic agenda and activities. A large number of its
cadres were arrested in Afghanistan after the fall of
the Taliban, while those who managed to escape were
subsequently arrested on their return to Pakistan. Under
alleged US pressure, Pakistan's military regime could
not show any leniency towards the TNSM, as its cadres
had more directly challenged the American forces in
support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The
Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan, the main Shi'ite group
responsible for sectarian violence in the past, remained
dormant through 2002 and the first half of year 2003.
While Musharraf has acted stringently in dealing
with domestic terrorism emanating from sectarian groups,
the prevailing law and order situation in the country
demonstrates that terrorism is not an affliction that
can be dealt with in a piecemeal fashion - encouraged
and supported in one direction, and suppressed in
another. The crackdown targeting sectarian groups, it
appears, is failing to produce the desired impact, and
incidents like the latest massacre in Quetta suggest
that the underground networks and support structures of
sectarian groups, particularly that of the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, remain unimpaired, and may, indeed,
have achieved greater complexity and resilience through
their linkages with other terrorist organizations.
Clearly, a more comprehensive strategy is required to
destroy the source of their lethality.
Kanchan Lakshman, research associate,
Institute for Conflict Management; assistant editor,
Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
Published with permission from the South
Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
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