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India rules out its troops for
Iraq
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - India, after foot dragging for over
two months, will not send its troops to participate in a
"stabilization force" in Iraq. Wary of the negative
political and electoral fallout of sending its troops,
especially in the context of the recent revelations
regarding the Central Intelligence Agency's use of false
information in the leadup to the war on Iraq, the
government turned down the American invitation.
Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha said that such a
deployment could be considered only under a United
Nations mandate. The decision came after a meeting of
the cabinet committee on security in Delhi on Monday
afternoon. "Our longer term national interest, our
concern for the people of Iraq, our long-standing ties
with the Gulf region as a whole, as well as our growing
dialogue and strengthened ties with the US have been key
elements in this consideration," Sinha said.
He
added, "India remains ready to respond to the urgent
needs of the Iraqi people ... were there to be an
explicit UN mandate for the purpose, the government of
India could consider the deployment of our troops in
Iraq."
The US put in a request with the Indian
government early in May for a brigade-strength
deployment of over 17,000 troops in Iraq. If New Delhi
had agreed the Indian contingent would have been among
the largest in Iraq, second only to the size of the US
military deployment there.
Several rounds of
consultations have taken place between India and the US
over the past month. The government has consulted twice
with the opposition parties. Monday's meeting of the
cabinet's committee on security, which is headed by
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, considered fresh
inputs received from the visits of the Indian Foreign
Secretary Kapil Sibal to the US and of R M Abhayankar,
Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), to
Iraq and other countries in the region.
The
American invitation had generated heated debate in
India. Indian opinion has been divided right down the
middle on the wisdom of sending troops to Iraq. Those
who supported deployment argued that India's ambition of
being regarded as a regional or global player of
significance would be furthered by sending the troops.
For them, the American invitation was an opportunity to
further Indian strategic and economic interests, a
chance of being accepted as a regional power.
They argued that if India did not send its
soldiers or dragged its feet in making a decision,
others would take its place and Delhi would be
sidelined. Moreover, India's deployment in Iraq would
enable it to participate in the CENTCOM (US Central
Command) and this was seen as an opportunity to dilute
Pakistan's role in that structure.
Furthermore,
the Americans, it was argued, were looking at the Indian
response to their request for troops as indicative of
Delhi's reliability as an ally. Relations between the US
and India have shown a remarkable improvement in recent
years. Now, with India turning down the US request,
Delhi will be worried that an annoyed Washington will
tilt even more decisively in favor of Pakistan, undoing
years of strenuous efforts at correcting the tilt.
There were several strong arguments against an
Indian deployment in Iraq, though. The US war on that
country was not initially sanctioned by the United
Nations. There was concern regarding the implications of
being seen to be too close to the US and endorsing the
reality of American occupation of Iraq. While UN
Security Council Resolution 1483 provided Delhi some
kind of a fig leaf to send troops to participate in the
"stabilization force", it was not be cover enough to
convince the opposition parties, which were opposed to
Indian deployment. Besides, sending troops to Iraq now
would be a contravention of the spirit of a
parliamentary resolution passed in April that "deplored"
the US attack on Iraq and called for an early pullout of
American troops.
Some view the US request for
Indian troops as the latest example of "outsourcing". It
is widely believed in India that the US invitation had
much to do with the growing American casualties in Iraq
and the high monetary expenses – it costs the US $3
billion a month to keep its soldiers there. There was
concern here that Indian soldiers would end up as
"cut-price cannon fodder".
In the several rounds
of consultations that have taken place, India raised
some of its concerns. These included the need for a UN
mandate - the excuse it has now used - and the area of
operations of the Indian troops, issues of command and
control and so on. Indian forces participating in
peacekeeping missions abroad have done so only under the
UN flag. A key reason for opposition to participation is
aversion to working under American command.
According to an official in the Indian Ministry
of External Affairs, the Bush administration had
addressed some of these misgivings. Indian troops would
have been responsible for one of the five sectors into
which Iraq has been divided, and as a "sweetener", the
US had apparently offered India "the most peaceful of
the five sectors" – the Kurdish-dominated areas in
northern Iraq. American casualties in the Kurdish areas
have been minimal. There is little insurgency here, say
analysts, which means that Indian troops would have been
less likely to get killed or caught in situations where
they would have to use force on the locals.
One
of Delhi's main concerns has been how the Muslim world,
especially Iraq's neighbors, would have viewed India's
deployment in Iraq. According to MEA sources, Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates are said to have indicated
their support; Jordan and Turkey were not opposed but
wanted it only with a clearly-defined mandate. Although
India-Iran relations are warm, Tehran was uncomfortable
with Indian troops working to stabilize the US
occupation of Iraq. Syria and Iran feared that India's
presence would delay the US exit from the region.
Last month, the Indian government said that it
would make a final decision only after evolving a
national consensus. The opposition parties and some
constituents of the ruling coalition have been opposed
to deployment under US command. Incidentally, even the
Samata Party to which Defense Minister George Fernandes
belongs and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a fraternal
organization of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, were
against India accepting the American invitation.
And with general elections due next year, the
ruling coalition was clearly reluctant to take a
decision that was fraught with risk and which could have
led India into a quagmire. While the strategic and
economic gains were weighed carefully, the final
decision was a political one.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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