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India sits up and listens
By Sultan Shahin
NEW DELHI -
Pakistan is often said to be run by three "As" -
America, Army and Allah, in that order. Now the latter
two, represented by Muslim fundamentalists and their
supporters in the army, are teaming up with the Hindu
fundamentalists ruling India to reduce the influence of
the first A - America - and oust the pro-American,
lately pro-Israel, liberal President General Pervez
Musharraf. The prize for India: status quo in Kashmir
and revenge for the Musharraf-organized Kargil war of
1999. The prize for religious extremists in Pakistani
politics and the army: Talibanization of Pakistan and
re-Talibanization of Afghanistan.
The chief
patron of Pakistan's Muslim fundamentalists, also known
as the "Father of the Taliban" and supporter of Osama
bin Laden, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, has just finished his
four-day surprise visit to India. He is the head of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) and leader of the opposition
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the six-party
fundamentalist alliance that holds 20 percent of the
seats in Pakistan's National Assembly and which runs the
provincial government of North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP) as a majority, and Balochistan as a coalition
partner. Rahman led a delegation of Muslim
fundamentalist scholar-politicians.
He was
accorded a warm welcome on many fronts. Prime Minster
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, leader of the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) that heads India's coalition government, was
able to find 90 minutes to spend with Rahman at short
notice. Similar courtesy was extended by other top
leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP or World Hindu
Forum) and Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS, the
fountainhead of Hindu fundamentalism in India).
As if these first-time high-level meetings
between Pakistani Muslim and Indian Hindu religious
extremists were not stunning enough, Rahman shocked the
country, not by his fundamentalist rhetoric - that would
have been expected - but by a peace blitzkrieg. He said
all the right things that would have been sweet music to
Indian ears, but for the fact that the sight of these
words emanating from his fundamentalist mouth, so used
to brandishing extremist anti-India rhetoric, was
incongruous to Indian eyes.
Indians found it
difficult to forget that it was from madrassas
(religious missionaries) run by Rahman's party that the
Taliban (literally, students), the erstwhile rulers of
Afghanistan, had graduated. His madrassas were
known as factories of militant, jihadi Islam where poor
Muslim children were brainwashed into a fanatical
version of Islam that even promotes suicide as a part of
jihad, something that is anathema to orthodox Islam.
Rahman's peace rhetoric was nevertheless
compelling. If nothing else, it had great curiosity
value. He was not only asking for a peaceful solution to
all problems including Kashmir through bilateral
dialogue, he was specifically against third party (read
American) intervention - something Pakistan has been
seeking for decades. He was not only willing to settle
for the present line of control (LoC) that separates the
Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir being converted
into an international border - a dream solution for
India - but even to consider Pakistan merging with India
altogether in the way that both Germanys came together
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
Indeed, his magnanimity had no limits. He was
prepared to be generous not only on behalf of Pakistan,
but also on behalf of Indian Muslims - his delegation
was hosted by the Indian counterpart of his party called
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (the party of Islamic scholars of
India). When told by fundamentalist leaders that they
were seeking to demolish only three out of the thousands
of mosques in India, that is two more after the
successful demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992,
Rahman was incredulous. "Only three?" he asked. How his
Indian Muslim hosts reacted is not known.
To
suit the Hindu taste, Rahman was even prepared to alter
his jihadi ideology. He gave the same interpretation of
jihad that Musharraf often does. He told the India
Abroad News Service, "Jihad is not what your or the
Western media portrays it to be. The true concept of
jihad in Islam is that of Jihad-e-Akbar, which is a
bigger jihad, not against other communities, groups or
religions but against one's own self [ego] and within
the Muslim society to fight evil, injustice, inequity,
exploitation, illiteracy and ignorance. That is why all
Muslims must go for this jihad."
In numerous
interviews to the print and electronic media, he
consistently refused to rise to the journalistic bait
and criticize India. But he was most forthright in
expressing himself against any US intervention in the
region in the name of resolving the Kashmir dispute,
"Even after the failures of so many talks and wars to
sort out the Kashmir imbroglio, I am of the view that
there is no need for a third party to intervene as it is
a matter between India and Pakistan, and a country like
the US will have its own vested interest to toe if it
intervenes. Such intervention will create more problems.
The Agra summit [2001] failed owing to the lack of will
to sacrifice, but I have faith in the Shimla Agreement
[1972, setting out parameters for negotiations between
India and Pakistan]. See, the Pakistani people abhor US
policies as they have seen them in Vietnam, Middle East
and the Indian sub-continent, but for their personal and
vested interests, the rulers in the country have toed
the US line. Let me make it clear that the public has
nothing to do with the US. The fact is that Pakistanis
are more inclined to be closer to India rather than
following the dictates of the US."
Regardless of
what Rahman and other opposition politicians say, what
matters in Pakistan is the army. What do the
fundamentalists in the army think about the growing US
influence in Pakistan, and do they have the guts and the
necessary support and leadership to take on Musharraf?
Until recently the answer would have been in the
negative. Musharraf has been able to ride roughshod over
them with the help of a few moderate generals. But
things may now be changing.
While Musharraf was
in the US last month to reassure his interlocutors about
his pro-American bona fides, his own chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff Committee, General Mohammed Aziz
Khan, said at a public meeting, "America is the number
one enemy of the Muslim world and is conspiring against
Muslim nations all over the world." (See Asia Times
Online The long arm of
resistance, July 2). This was a direct
challenge to Musharraf's pro-American policies. The
Inter-Services Public Relations of the military did its
best to kill the story before it reached the press. But
it is obvious that Aziz, though his present position is
largely ceremonial, would not have felt emboldened to
mount a challenge unless he had sufficient support among
the 10 corps commanders of the army.
Aziz is a
well-known Islamic radical of the same Wahhabi mindset
that informs Rahman and many others in the MMA. But
there is a difference. He was a member of the youth wing
of the other important fundamentalist party, the
Jamaat-e-Islami, in his college days. Jamaat is a part
of the MMA, but its chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, is a
rival to Rahman in the leadership stakes. Also, it would
be far more difficult for Kashmir-born Aziz to forsake
the Kashmir cause, even for the sake of radicalizing the
whole of Pakistan. A Kashmiri's first loyalty is to
Kashmir. Aziz belongs to the ferocious Suddan tribe of
Poonch that was mainly responsible for mounting a
military challenge to India in 1947 during the partition
struggles.
Despite irreconcilable ideological
differences, Musharraf continues to have high regard for
Aziz. It was Aziz who had, in effect, mounted a coup and
deposed the former prime minister Nawaz Sharif when the
latter sacked Musharraf from his job as army chief while
he was flying back from an official engagement in Sri
Lanka in October 1999. Thus Aziz not only saved
Musharraf's job, but he is also widely believed to have
saved his life. This is why, even when it became
difficult to keep Aziz in the field following September
11 and Musharraf's decision to back the US against the
Taliban, he merely kicked Aziz upstairs and did not sack
him.
But apparently Aziz has utilized his
ceremonial position to galvanize opposition to
Musharraf's pro-US policies. What has helped him
immensely is the US invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Anyone can see that it was neither related to weapons of
mass destruction or the "war against terrorism". Though
no one really knows why America went to war, most
Pakistanis see it largely as a US attempt to
re-establish old-style colonialism in the Muslim world.
They see Pakistan itself becoming a US target. Even
Musharraf himself has expressed such misgivings. But
while Musharraf's answer is to go closer to the US,
eschew religious extremism and even talk about
recognizing Israel, the fundamentalist answer is
Talibanization of Pakistan and re-establishment of the
Taliban government in Afghanistan to oppose US hegemony
in the region, even if it means seeking help from Hindu
fundamentalists in India and sacrificing the Kashmir
cause.
Pakistani fundamentalists have far more
urgent reasons for taking on Musharraf than just concern
over growing US hegemony and the present Pakistani
administration's support for it. Before the elections of
October last year, Musharraf brought forward a law that
made it mandatory for all candidates to have a
bachelor's degree. The law was specifically designed to
keep fundamentalists out of the election process. The
independent election commission, however, pronounced
religious degrees as equivalent to the required
bachelor's degree. But now Musharraf's government
(albeit not overtly) has mounted a legal challenge to
disqualify national and regional assembly members who do
not have the required degree. It contends that degrees
awarded by madrassas do not meet the same
educational standards.
If Pakistan's highest
court rules against the MMA, the fundamentalists will
lose control of the regional government in the NWFP as
well as any possibility of coming to power at the
federal level through a new coalition arrangement as
more than 60 of their MPs will be booted out. The MMA is
presently mounting a serious protest against the legal
challenge and plans to launch mob violence if it loses
the legal battle, due to be decided in September. It
could thus do with support from sections of the army,
the ultimate arbiter of power in Pakistan. It would also
help if Musharraf is by that time forced to sack himself
as army chief (the position he holds in addition to the
presidency) and somebody like the radical Aziz is in the
saddle, even if Musharraf continues as a civilian
president. This would also bring closer the specter of
Pakistan becoming the world's first Muslim
fundamentalist nuclear power.
A fundamentalist
collation comprising politicians and sections of the
army is thus very much desirable from their point of
view. It also seems feasible if the fundamentalists in
the army are able to seize the moment. Aziz after all
had succeeded in persuading fellow generals to mount a
coup against an elected prime minister to reinstate
Musharraf. Will he also succeed in persuading them now
in the urgent need - from his point of view - of
removing Musharraf? Or will Musharraf, who has survived
and estimated six assassination attempts since September
11, succeed in facing the united fundamentalist
challenge?
These are some of the imponderables.
But why should Pakistan's Islamic radicals woo India?
How can India help, and why would it do so even if it
could?
In the absence of official information
about what Rahman actually talked about when he met the
Vajpayee and other top Hindu leaders, one can only
speculate on the basis of his public pronouncements. It
seems Rahman is seeking India's support in keeping
Americans out of South Asia. He is promising a
negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute more or
less on India's terms, if India helps fundamentalists
come to power. He is also promising help in dealing with
India's Muslim fundamentalists for finding a negotiated
solution to the dispute arising out of the demolition of
the Babri Masjid and the BJP's need for building a
temple on the spot through an out-of-court settlement in
order to win the forthcoming elections.
Presumably India spends a large amount of money
in buying influence in Islamabad. That influence could
be helpful to the fundamentalists. At the very least,
fundamentalists would not want India to panic and join
hands with the US when they mount their final assault on
the bastion of power. They are probably afraid that the
US may try to persuade India to put a spanner in their
works, directly or indirectly. They may even be afraid
that India, fearful of a nuclear-armed Islamic
fundamentalist power next door, may launch a pre-emptive
attack or help the US or Israel launch one on Pakistan's
nuclear facilities.
Pakistani fundamentalists
have approached India at a time when they probably know
that India is not happy with the US. Washington has
neither succeeded in persuading Musharraf to completely
halt militant infiltration across the LoC nor in asking
him to join India on a bilateral dialogue on Indian
terms. A US attempt to further internationalize the
Kashmir question by helping organize an international
conference on the subject beginning in Washington on
July 25 has further angered India. The US has mobilized
Kashmiri lobbyist and the executive director of the
Kashmiri American Council, Ghulam Nabi Fai, to organize
the conference. Successive American administrations are
known to have been grooming Fai as a sort of Hamid
Karzai for an independent Kashmir, a la Afghanistan.
Top Kashmiri leaders have told this
correspondent several times during the past 13 years of
insurgency that the US is willing to help Kashmir gain
independence from both India and Pakistan if its leaders
committed to giving it military bases in Ladakh, Gilgit
and Baltistan. However, they also claimed to have taken
the line that it is better for Kashmiris to remain a
slave of Indian and Pakistani administrations than
accept the slavery of the US. The Indian government
cannot be unaware of these straws in the wind. With Fai
being helped to organize this conference, India is not
at all happy with the US at the moment.
Indeed,
the government of India officially expressed last week
its strong disapproval to Washington over an invitation
to Kashmiri leader Mehbooba Mufti for the State
Department-sponsored conference. Upset at what it saw as
Washington "crossing the line", the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) scuttled the idea of Indian participation.
Then it summoned deputy chief of mission in the US
embassy, Al Thibault, and issued a demarche to him
saying it was really none of the State Department's
business to "intervene" in such a sensitive issue
between India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Mehbooba, chief
of the People's Democratic Party, whose father is the
chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir state, turned down
the invitation. She denied having had any dealings with
the MEA on the subject, but it is believed that the
government may have advised her against attending the
conference.
But happy with the US and
pro-American Musharraf or not, can secular or even Hindu
fundamentalist India even contemplate making common
cause with Muslim fundamentalists? Yes, it can. Indeed,
both India's secular and Hindu fundamentalist leaders
have found it easier to deal with Muslim fundamentalists
than with liberal Muslims.
The legitimization of
the role of Muslim fundamentalists in the politics of
the South Asian sub-continent began with Mahatma Gandhi
in 1920. The one recognized Muslim political leader then
was Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who ended his career as the
founder of Pakistan. He was already a senior Congress
leader when Gandhi joined the party after his return
from South Africa. He was the most secular and liberal
Muslim one could imagine. Top Hindu leaders described
him as "the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity".
He had joined Muslim League, a pressure group to
articulate Muslim fears and demands, on the specific
condition that he would continue to be with the
Congress. But rather than dealing with him, Gandhi chose
to bring into mainstream politics the Jamiat-ul-Ulema,
the same group whose progeny in Pakistan led by Rahman
spawned the Taliban. He even supported the obscurantist
Khilafat (Caliphate) movement designed to fight for the
Muslim Caliph in Turkey, a movement that Jinnah
vehemently opposed. Mustapha Kamal Pasha, a liberal
Muslim leader of Turkey, idolized today by Musharraf of
Pakistan, abolished the institution.
But the
government of India even today, though it is run by
Hindu fundamentalist groups, approaches only Muslim
fundamentalist groups, those who want to re-establish
Khilafat and oppose nationalism, if it wants to tackle
some issue concerning Muslims. It does not recognize the
secular, nationalist leaders as worth being consulted on
Muslim affairs. Incidentally, supporting the idea of
Khilafat, that the world Muslim community should have a
pope-like figure guiding them, is now considered an act
of sedition: two Muslim youths were sentenced to seven
years in prison last week for putting up posters saying
"Oppose nationalism, support Khilafat".
Amazing.
But Hindu leaders have very good reasons for their
preference for Muslim fundamentalists. A secular,
liberal Muslim, like Jinnah then or Musharraf today, is
also an educated Muslim aware of his legal rights and
able to argue his case forcefully in the light of
national or international law. On the other hand, a
fundamentalist often lacks such qualities.
Jinnah, for instance, was demanding for Muslims
a share in jobs and a share in power, reservations in
legislatures and so on. On the other hand, Muslim
fundamentalists were simply demanding that they be
allowed to retain the Muslim Personal Law, which would
permit them to torture their wives with daily threats of
bigamy and instant divorce. For Gandhi, the choice was
not very difficult. The easy choice he made was,
however, not very wise. It led to partition. It has also
left many time bombs ticking behind, set to explode at
different times.
That Indian leaders today are
tempted to deal with Pakistani fundamentalists is clear.
They have seen at Agra how difficult it is to deal with
Musharraf. The general is clever and articulate. He is
also knowledgeable and committed to his goals. Even a
weakened, post September 11 Musharraf may not be easy to
tackle. On the other hand, fundamentalists are offering
everything on a platter. You don't even need to ask. A
nuclear-armed Talibanized Pakistan may be a vision from
hell. But that is in the future. Right now leaders have
to concentrate on winning elections. What better slogan
than the achievement of having solved the Kashmir and
Babri tangles in one go?
But shortcuts have a
way of leading straight to trouble. Faced with a similar
choice, Gandhi made a disastrous decision. Many
present-day problems, not just in India, but in Pakistan
and Bangladesh too, emanate from the encouragement given
to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema leaders of an earlier generation.
Had Gandhi managed to tackle Jinnah, India would have
been today perhaps the most powerful nation on earth
after the United States. Let Vajpayee not make the same
disastrous choice with the Jamiat-ul-Ulema leaders of
the present generation.
The lure of short-term
gains invariably leads to long-term damage. In the
present case, even the short-term solutions being
presented by Rahman may not work. Tuesday's suicide
terrorist attacks on Indian army posts that took several
lives should be warning enough. India should beware of
falling into the trap of believing its own propaganda.
Insurgency in Kashmir is not entirely a creation of
Pakistan. It had started with genuine disenchantment of
Kashmiris with India. And for very good reasons. It can
only be tackled with winning hearts and minds. This is a
long and arduous process. But it can be done. And
without any help from fundamentalists. Let India choose
the path of wisdom for once.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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