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Kashmir: A Shi'ite voice in the
wilderness
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - For the
first time in the 10-year history of the Hurriyat
Conference, a Shi'ite has been elected as its
chairperson. Maulvi Abbas Ansari, a cleric, is the
fourth chairperson of the Hurriyat, an umbrella grouping
of 23 Kashmir separatist organizations. Ansari heads the
Ittehadul Muslimeen, a Shi'ite constituent of the
Hurriyat.
The election of Ansari is seen as a
boost for the moderates in the faction-ridden Hurriyat.
The outgoing chairperson, Abdul Gani Bhat, said that
Ansari's election symbolized not only the political but
also the sectarian unity of Kashmiri people.
There is little political or sectarian unity in
the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). While the
broad regional divide - Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh
- and the religious divide between Hindus, Muslims and
Buddhists in J&K has been commented on, little
attention has been paid to the sectarian divide.
Analysts, and especially the media, have tended to view
perceptions of each religious community as largely
homogenous. As a result, the sharp differences that
exist within each religious community have been ignored.
Muslims constitute 95 percent of the population
in the Kashmir Valley, 30 percent of Jammu and 46
percent of Ladakh. However, they do not speak with one
voice. The Shi'ite-Sunni divide, while not as deep and
bloody as it is in neighboring Pakistan, exists.
Tensions simmer beneath the surface. The fissures have
erupted in the open on several occasions and have the
potential of exploding seriously in the future.
Around 13 percent of the Muslim population in
the Valley is Shi'ite. In J&K's summer capital,
Srinagar, Shi'ites - as do other minority communities -
prefer to live in clusters, resulting in almost
exclusive Shi'ite neighborhoods in the city.
There is little love lost between Shi'ites and
Sunnis. Several Sunnis, even those who otherwise seem
liberal, refuse to eat food cooked in a Shi'ite home.
The antagonism between the two seems, strangely, far
more serious than the Muslim-Pandit enmity. The
Shi'ites, otherwise more conservative, especially with
regard to the treatment of their women, are opposed to
attempts by Sunni militant groups to impose the
burqa (a full veil) on women. Shi'ites complain
that after Friday prayers in the mosque, Sunni boys
throw stones at their houses. Shi'ite-Sunni trouble in
Iraq reverberates in Srinagar.
The onset of the
militancy in J&K heightened feelings of
vulnerability among the Shi'ites. The militants'
targeting and massacre of minorities, first of the
Pandits and then the Sikhs, added to their fears. There
is widespread fear among Shi'ites that the militants
could target them next.
Shi'ite feelings of
vulnerability mounted dramatically in 2000. A few months
after militants massacred Sikhs at Chattisingpora, the
Shi'ites were targeted too. In June 2000, a landmine
blast killed 12 Shi'ites and wounded 20. The blast took
place at a congregation of Shi'ites in the town of
Pattan. While the main target of that attack might have
been the former minister for housing, Maulvi Iftikhar
Hussain Ansari, who was present at the congregation,
several in the community feared that the community was
being targeted. The Hizbul Mujahideen claimed
responsibility for the attack.
In November that
year, Aga Syed Mehdi, son of Aga Syed Mustafa, the most
prominent Shi'ite Muslim cleric in Kashmir, was killed
along with five others in a landmine blast. Mehdi was
the first Shi'ite political leader to be killed in the
decade-long militancy. His death was attributed to his
pro-India leanings - he was a member of the Congress
party. His death led to the Shi'ite community staging
angry protest marches. "Kafiran patt rafizan laar"
(After the exodus of infidels, it is the turn of
Shi'ites) is a fear that many Shi'ites talk about to
date.
Many of these fears have to do with the
fact that most of the militants have been indoctrinated
and trained in Pakistan - where Shi'ites are
discriminated against by the state and its machinery, as
well as by Sunni extremist groups. Reports of sectarian
killings in Pakistan have deepened Shi'ite suspicions of
Pakistan and of the militants it has armed and trained.
Furthermore, there are the mehmaan mujahideen
(foreign militants), who have been trained in
Afghanistan and carry with them the ideological
indoctrination of the Taliban.
Most of the
militant groups operating in J&K are Sunni Muslim.
The Shi'ites say that they are opposed to the militancy
and had stayed away from the uprising in 1989. Under
pressure from Sunni militants, the Shi'ite youth decided
to take up arms. A few Shi'ite militant groups were
formed, but these, says an eminent Shi'ite based in
Srinagar, were "to protect the community from being
labeled as 'pro-India' and to show the Sunnis that the
Shi'ites too were with them on the separatist cause".
According to Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A
Portrait Gallery by K Santhanam and others (New
Delhi: Sage and IDSA, 2003), the attacks in the early
1990s by Sunni militant groups on the Shi'ites led to
the formation of the militant group Pasban-e-Islam for
"self protection" of the Shi'ites. In 1992, it was
renamed the Hizbul Momineen.
Surrendered
militants of the Hizbul Momineen told this correspondent
in 2000 that the group seemed more concerned with
negotiating protection arrangements and alliances with
Sunni militant groups than with fighting the Indian
forces. However, none of these arrangements ever lasted
as the suspicions of each other's motives ran deep. "The
Sunnis were wary of our loyalties; they feared we were
working with the Indian Intelligence. And we felt it was
a matter of time before they turned on us," recalled a
former area commander of the Hizbul Momineen.
Indeed, the dominant sentiment among the
Shi'ites is pro-India. The possibility of J&K
joining Pakistan fills them with dread. The option of
azadi (freedom) from both India and Pakistan,
while favored by many in the Valley, is not something to
which the Shi'ites aspire. An independent Kashmir, they
fear, will leave them at the mercy of the dominant
Sunnis.
Incidentally, the militancy did not take
root in Muslim-dominated Kargil. Kargil is predominantly
Shi'ite. Pakistan's attempts at inciting the people of
Kargil against India and calls for Islamic brotherhood
have failed to strike a chord here. As among the
Shi'ites in the Valley, those in Kargil see Pakistan as
their bigger enemy, notwithstanding the bond of Islam.
The misfortune of the Kashmiri Shi'ites is that
they are not trusted either by the Sunnis or by the
Indian security forces. While the security forces do
turn to them to some extent for local intelligence
input, they are wary that the lure of Pakistani funds
has influenced the youth of the community. The Shi'ites
resent the fact that despite their loyalty to India,
they are not provided special protection from the
militants, as are the Pandits, for instance.
Ansari's election as the leader of the Hurriyat
has not had much impact on the community. The
pro-Pakistan orientation of the Hurriyat has brought it
little support from the Shi'ites. Ansari has little
support in his community. His participation in the
Hurriyat is seen by most Shi'ites as a sell-out of their
interests. His election per se is unlikely to contribute
to sectarian unity in Kashmir.
However, should
Ansari get the Hurriyat to engage in talks with India
and make the organization shake off its image as a
mouthpiece of Pakistan, he might succeed in drawing
Shi'ite interest in the Hurriyat. That, however, seems a
tall order.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
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