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The time's ripe for Pakistan and
Israel
By Ramtanu Maitra
It is
no longer relevant to ask whether Pakistan will
recognize Israel. The issue is when. From available
evidence, which points to pressure exerted from outside
on Islamabad to speed up the process, it is reasonable
to expect that President General Pervez Musharraf is
going to take that leap before the year is over. But
before doing that, he will "test" the landing ground,
making sure that the political risk involved will be
adequately rewarded.
On July 6, Musharraf,
responding to a question in a Geo TV interview
concerning Pakistan's policy on Israel, said that as
soon the independent Palestinian state is established,
Pakistan might review its policy on Israel "after
consultation with the brotherly Arab states". He also
sent a warning to Islamic fundamentalists, and to the
old and dwindling tribe of socialists in Pakistan, that
deliberation on Israel's recognition must not be done
with emotionalism.
The two-step
On
July 16, in an interview with al-Khaleej of the United
Arab Emirates, Musharraf used a slightly different
formulation: he said that the Pakistan government can
only study the question of recognizing Israel if the
Middle East conflict is settled. "Islamabad will take
its decision at the right moment and will take into
consideration the feeling in Islamic countries and
public opinion in Pakistan," he stated.
On the
same day, the president received support from a
political leader in Pakistan. In an interview with a
private television channel in London, Pakistan Muslim
League (Q) president Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain said that
recognition of Israel could be considered once there is
peace in the Middle East and an independent and
sovereign Palestinian state is established. The PML(Q)
is widely acknowledged to be Musharraf's personal
political party.
The Pakistani president's
eagerness to court Israel has not gone unnoticed in Tel
Aviv. Commenting on Musharraf's Geo TV interview,
Israel's ambassador to the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Oded Eran, said, "We have
seen the statement of President Musharraf on the issue
of recognition of Israel by Pakistan. It is a positive
statement and we hope that it will not prove to be a
statement of political expediency and his views will be
translated into action by the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Israel and Pakistan." Eran,
known for his skill of negotiating with Islamic
countries, went a step further, saying that Israel will
have an even-handed approach toward India and Pakistan,
once Pakistan recognizes Israel.
When asked the
million-dollar question, whether Israel would be willing
to provide defense equipment if Pakistan accords
recognition, Eran said, "We have a long way to walk. We
want to have good relations with Islamic states, and
Pakistan is a very important country. When we start
discussing the areas of cooperation only then we can
think of such an area."
At about the same time,
the Nation of Pakistan reported that a high-level source
in Pakistan's foreign affairs establishment revealed in
Islamabad that Pakistan may not recognize Israel
immediately, but that a study to establish some sort of
political relations with Israel is in the offing.
Moreover, he said, the government is also likely to be
given options and recommendations soon in order to
initiate some sort of diplomatic ties with Israel.
The timing
Although a firm date for
the recognition of Israel has not been set by Islamabad,
the process of softening the ground has clearly begun.
It is likely that Musharraf, who has thrown in his lot
with the Bush administration in order to survive
politically, was put under pressure at the Camp David
pow-wow with President George W Bush recent;y.
Recognition of Israel could be yet another "favor" that
the Americans want from him in exchange for Washington
not rocking the boat in Pakistan. The lively Pakistani
press will undoubtedly dig out the reason why Islamabad
chose this point in time to get on the road to
recognition of Israel.
It is not that Israel is
considered "untouchable" by Pakistani authorities. From
time to time contacts have been developed between the
two. Side by side with the name-calling, which was
audible to everyone, there existed secret contacts. In a
memorandum from March 2000, a scholar from the Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies (JCCS) in Tel Aviv
documented various efforts by and contacts between the
authorities of the two countries aimed at establishing
diplomatic relations.
A host of Pakistani
officials and diplomats have met, discussed and at times
dined with their Israeli counterparts. Such contacts
were held primarily in Washington, London or at the
United Nations headquarters in New York. At the same
time, a number of other locations, such as Yangon in
Myanmar, Kathmandu in Nepal and Tokyo in Asia, Lagos in
Africa, Ankara and Tehran in the Middle East, Caracas
and Ottawa in the Americas and Brussels and Rome in
Europe also functioned as meeting points for Israeli and
Pakistani diplomats.
Some of these meetings were
private and bilateral, while others took place at
functions organized by the host countries, or by foreign
missions accredited to the host countries. Israeli
diplomats regularly monitored and reported the movements
of their Pakistani counterparts. The document also
pointed out that influential Jewish leaders like Edmund
de Rothschild have privately operated, and at times
funded, efforts to further Israeli-Pakistani
normalization.
Comings and
goings
Following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in the winter of 1979, Washington came to
Islamabad with loads of money and arms. The objective
was to leave no stone unturned in the West's effort to
give the Bolsheviks a black eye, and, perhaps, deal a
mortal blow. Pakistan, under the military dictatorship
of Zia ul-Haq, was eager to comply. The arms and money
flowed in, and Washington also brought in Israeli
intelligence and other Western intelligence agencies to
help out the Afghan mujahideen and Pakistani
intelligence groups. During those years, the Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Israeli
intelligence developed a complex relationship, which
remains knotted even today like a basket of cooked
spaghetti.
Likewise, in May 1996, another report
suggested that Pakistani law enforcement officials met
with the top brass of Israeli intelligence during a
conference on counter-terrorism in the Philippines. The
report disclosed that in February of that year, in
several one-to-one sessions during the conference, two
senior major-generals and three brigadiers of Israeli
intelligence met senior Pakistani officials to listen
and explain their methods and strategies to deal with
the worsening wave of terrorism facing the two nations.
In August 1997, the Israeli media reported that
a delegation of religious leaders from Pakistan spent a
week in Israel. Besides visiting Islamic holy sites,
they met Foreign Ministry officials and endorsed the
idea of promoting Islamic tourism from Pakistan.
In September 1997, leader of the Awami Qiyadat
party, Mirza Aslam Beg, who was Pakistan's chief of army
staff from 1988-1991 following the mysterious death of
then-president Zia in 1988, made his preferences clear,
"Pakistan has no direct differences with Israel;
therefore, we are a third party to the dispute ... We
have no conflict with Israel; therefore we should not
hesitate in recognizing Israel."
The latest
reports indicate that Pakistan recently sent a business
delegation to Israel. Some other reports say that
Musharraf sent a special envoy to Tel Aviv on a secret
mission some time ago.
India factor
A
number of factors have stood in the way of normalization
of relations between Pakistan and Israel. Of these, in
my view, two stand out - and, significantly, neither of
these is operative any longer. First is the India issue.
India was one of the first countries to recognize Israel
in 1947, but because of its pro-Palestine position in
the Israel-Palestine dispute, New Delhi took another 45
years to develop full-fledged diplomatic ties with Tel
Aviv. Equally important has been oil-short India's
priority on pleasing the oil-producing Arabia. One Arab
request was that India not develop full diplomatic
relations with Israel, their ostensible enemy.
As long as India, a Hindu-majority state, kept
Israel at a distance - although India had also developed
many secret ties with Israel throughout this period - it
was well nigh impossible for Pakistan to recognize
Israel. For Pakistan, "Islam" and "Muslim solidarity"
acted as barriers. But conditions have now changed.
India established full diplomatic relations with
Israel in 1992, and New Delhi has gone pell-mell to
strengthen its military ties with Tel Aviv since. This
latter development was also motivated by a strong
anti-Pakistan bias. It has perhaps become evident to
Islamabad now that India has been obtaining from Israel
sophisticated weapons systems and diagnostics, designed
to exert a far-reaching military superiority over
Pakistan. In an editorial June 19, the Daily Times of
Lahore pointed out that a study was done by the Pakistan
army in 1994 in which it proposed that Pakistan protect
its strategic interests by recognizing Israel. The study
estimated that Pakistan's presence in Tel Aviv could
force Israel to "balance" its relations with India and
recognize Pakistan's strategic importance in the region.
Interestingly, Eran, responding to the news about
improvement in Pakistan-Israel relations, made the same
statement, saying Israel recognizes Pakistan as a "very
important" nation.
The second issue is nuclear
weapons. At one point in the late 1980s, a strong rumor,
propagated mostly by Western academics, circulated to
the effect that New Delhi was in touch with Tel Aviv to
launch a surprise attack on Pakistan's nuclear research
facilities located at Kahuta. Former ISI chief General
Hamid Gul, the source of much disinformation over the
years, was categorical about this evaluation. The
surprise attack did not occur.
Instead, Iraq's
Osirik nuclear facility was turned to dust by the
Israelis; but Israel had no intention of doing the same
to the Kahuta facility. But after the May 1998 nuclear
explosive tests by Pakistan in the Chagai Hills, at a
time when the crystal ball gazers were talking about
Pakistan developing the "Islamic bomb", a number of
Israeli analysts made it clear that Tel Aviv was not
worried about the Pakistani bomb per se, but its effect
on nuclear wannabes among nations considered potential
threats by Israel. Israel had the same view toward
India's nuclear program.
There were several
reasons for Tel Aviv's sense of comfort and conviction
that Pakistan was not making the so-called Islamic bomb.
Eugene Bird, a retired US Foreign Service officer who
was president of the Council for the National Interest
in Washington, DC and a diplomatic correspondent for the
Washington Report, wrote in March 1995 that in the
middle 1980s, when Pakistan brought up the American
refusal even to discuss the Israeli nuclear program with
Tel Aviv, it was hinted to Islamabad that it might send
a letter affirming that Pakistan would never help Arab
states acquire an Islamic bomb. Pakistan's president
sent such a letter affirming that his country's nuclear
program was aimed solely at achieving a balance of such
weaponry with India, and that Pakistan would not help
enemies of Israel to acquire such weaponry.
Writing in the JCCS journal Strategic Assessment
in June 1998, Shai Feldman listed four reasons why
Pakistan is unlikely to transfer sensitive nuclear
material and technologies to another Muslim state.
First, Pakistan developed its nuclear
capability in response to India's nuclear program and as
a result of its concern regarding its overall strategic
standing vis-a-vis, India.
Second,
Pakistan was at the time of writing hard pressed to
persuade the US to lift the economic sanctions imposed
on it. Even the most virulent pro-bomb political leaders
in Pakistan had to confront the harsh economic
consequences of America's reaction to the nuclear tests.
Rather than risk these consequences, Pakistan will not
transfer nuclear materials to antagonize America's
closest ally in Middle East, Israel.
Third, if Pakistan's nuclear capability
has an "Islamic" dimension, it is as a "card" in the
country's quest for influence in the Muslim world. Yet
such a capability can provide Pakistan influence among
these states only so long as it continues to enjoy a
nuclear monopoly among the Muslim states. The transfer
of sensitive nuclear material and technology to another
Muslim state would contribute to the loss of such a
monopoly, and would erode whatever additional influence
Pakistan has gained among the Muslim countries through
the recent nuclear tests.
Fourth, Feldman
emphasized that the Pakistani nuclear tests did not
change the situation in any way. Even prior to these
tests there was little doubt in the Middle East
regarding Pakistan's nuclear capability. The various
factors that have dissuaded Pakistan from transferring
nuclear materials and technology in the past are also
likely to inhibit such transfers in the future, he
prophesied.
Conclusion
Events
have proved Feldman right: Israel still sees no threat
from Pakistan. But then, if Israel does not see in
Pakistan a threat, why shouldn't the two be friends,
many Pakistanis wonder. They point out that there are,
in fact, a number of reasons why Pakistan ought to
recognize Israel. Writing for The News on July 8, Ahmed
Quraishi pointed to the need for Pakistan "to neutralize
both the money-hungry Israeli military-industrial
complex and the strong Jewish lobby in Washington". "The
first can cease the transfer of military technology to
India, and the second can help in securing key Pakistani
strategic goals with regards to a long term Pakistan-US
relations, " Quraishi added.
Still, what worries
Islamabad is the possible Arab reaction to Pakistan's
recognition of Israel. Yet there would seem to be little
to worry about that as well. Last year, Saudi Arabia's
Crown Prince Abdullah offered Israel full peace if Tel
Aviv agreed to a Palestine state. A report in the
Pakistani newspaper Daily Millat on July 16 cited
European Union, UN and Russian officials involved in the
Middle East peace process to the effect that Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia and 53 other Islamic countries have agreed
to recognize Israel by 2005. The delegation hailed
Musharraf's positive approach on the subject, and hoped
other Islamic countries would also adopt a soft line
towards Israel.
"All the Islamic countries would
be asked by 2004 to give their opinion on whether they
want an independent Palestine state to be a member of
the United Nations or have any objection to accept
Israel as a state," the Daily Millat quoted a member of
the delegation saying.
Assurances from Arab
leaders will assuage Pakistanis who are concerned about
Arab solidarity, but many Pakistanis feel that is a
much-overrated item. These Pakistanis would point out
that the Arabs did not, in fact, help Pakistan either
financially or with arms in its past conflicts with
India. These Pakistanis are particularly critical of
socialist Arabs, not hesitating to point out that the
late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser used to go
around saying that India was his second home. Similar
gripes exist in Pakistan against Yasser Arafat because
of his close relations with New Delhi in the 1980s.
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