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Sri Lankan government's muddied Tiger
policy
By Ameen Izzadeen
As Sri Lanka last
week marked the 20th anniversary of a dark event that
changed its destiny, leaving a permanent scar on its
body politic and history, the quest for peace assumed
not only added significance but also added urgency.
July 23, 1983, was a black day that marked a new
and bloody chapter in Sri Lanka's history, when 13
Sinhala soldiers were killed by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), sparking off Sri Lanka's worst ever
race riots. Twenty years later and after 65,000 deaths,
the national question remains unresolved though a
fragile ceasefire between the government and the LTTE
keeps the country suspended between war and peace.
A couple of weeks ago, the people feared that
the country would be plunged back to war. The navy's
sinking of a rebel ship believed to be carrying weapons,
the setting up of an LTTE camp in the
government-controlled area, the LTTE's refusal to abide
by the ruling of Scandinavian truce monitors, the
continued killings of members of Tamil parties opposed
to the LTTE and of military informants, and the
government's arms-buying mission to Israel, prompted
questions as to whether the country had been dragged
back to the brink of war.
Although the majority
Sinhala community is irked by the LTTE's uncompromising
posture vis-a-vis many a contentious issue, none, save a
few hardline parties and groups, wants a return to open
hostilities. The 20 years of war have cost the country
more than 600 billion rupees (US$6 billion) in terms of
defense expenditure alone. Economist SS Colombage has
been quoted in a recent article as saying that if not
for the war, Sri Lanka's growth rates would have been 7
to 8 percent and the per capita income around US$2,000
by now, instead of the present $870.
Aware that
the country cannot afford to go back to war, most Sri
Lankans, especially the Sinhala majority, grudgingly
give their nod to the government's accommodation of LTTE
demands, though this is seen as something of a
humiliation.
But the questions many are now
asking relate to the LTTE's unwillingness to show any
flexibility. Although the LTTE regards its willingness
to agree to a federal structure as a major concession
for the sake of peace, in terms of concrete action, its
contribution towards confidence building has been
wanting. On the contrary, it has teased and provoked the
Sri Lankan government with its high-handed actions in an
apparent bid to set off a possible return to war. On
June 23, the day anti-terrorism police inspector Sunil
Thabrew was killed in a Colombo suburb, allegedly by an
LTTE double agent, the LTTE stormed a government prison
in Batticaloa to rescue one of its cadres facing murder
charges. The LTTE also continues with its much condemned
child recruitment process, which includes the abduction
of children, although it has given umpteen assurances to
international human rights groups to the contrary.
The LTTE has also raised several demands, to
which the government is unable to accede. These include
the demand for the withdrawal of security forces from
the High Security Zone (HSZ) in Jaffna; and the
allocation of a section of the eastern sea for its Sea
Tiger wing to conduct naval exercises - terms that
cannot be met by the government without compromising on
national security.
To its credit, Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front
administration has exercised utmost restraint in dealing
with these irritants. This was evident in its handling
of the current crisis over the LTTE's refusal to
dismantle a camp set up in a government-controlled area
despite a ruling by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
that the LTTE action violated the cease-fire agreement.
Even the navy, which has been accused of sabotaging the
peace process by some peace activists - after its
numerous encounters with the LTTE - has acted within the
parameters of the cease-fire agreement and in accordance
with international maritime laws.
The
Wickremesinghe administration, on July 16, took another
major step to reactivate the peace process stalled by
LTTE's unilateral pullout from it in April, supporting
the demand for an interim administration for the
Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces.
Government circles are optimistic that the LTTE would
respond positively to its latest proposals on the
interim administrative structure. However, the LTTE had
previously rejected earlier communications regarding the
interim administration, claiming that they contained
little. The latest proposals, have set off a political
storm in the South, are currently being studied by an
LTTE legal team, and government negotiators, especially
Constitutional Affairs Minister and chief negotiator GL
Peiris, are confident that there would be a breakthrough
this time. Peiris has disclosed that the proposals are a
basic "Discussion Document" aimed at not only drawing an
LTTE response, but also getting the rebels back into the
peace process. He says further details can be discussed
at the negotiating table.
While the Discussion
Document has stirred new hope among peace-loving people,
president Chandrika Kumaratunga and the main opposition
People's Alliance (PA), which is working out a political
alliance with the leftists-turned-nationalists Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a party that has rejected peace
with the LTTE, have dropped a bombshell. On Friday,
Kumaratunga's party rejected outright the government's
latest proposals for an interim administration, saying
it was premature to talk of such a move when an overall
political solution to the ethnic conflict was nowhere in
sight.
Adding to the crisis and confusion,
presidential advisor and former foreign minister
Lakshman Kadirgamar also accused the Wickremesinghe
government of misleading the president and the nation by
sending one document to her and a significantly a
different one to the LTTE. Government spokesman GL
Peiris claimed on Thursday that the differences in the
two documents were insignificant. But the PA claimed a
substantive issue was involved.
While
Wickremesinghe has maintained a clear course and
commitment, a disturbing feature in the opposition is
President Kumaratunga's regular change of stand. On July
23, she was due to address the nation, but it was put
off at the last moment because she had apparently not
made up her mind on her position regarding the interim
administration and because she was apparently displeased
with the differences in the documents. On July 24, it
was reported that she was closely studying the sensitive
issue and would keep her options open. But the next day,
her top advisor announced an outright rejection of the
latest proposal, leaving the country wondering where its
executive president and the main opposition party were
wandering on key issues.
The question has now
deepened the crisis within the "cohabitation government"
that has seen more conflicts than cohabitation in its
two-year existence. It appears that party interests are
taking precedence over the country's interest, which is
at the moment in the peace process. The success of the
peace process not only depends on the LTTE's commitment
to peace but also on the willingness of the two main
political parties to shed differences and work together
for peace.
Published with permission from the
South Asia Intelligence Review of the South
Asia Terrorism Portal
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